Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is space over land or water within which identification, location, and routing of aircrafts are controlled and it is enforced by a state in the interest of security and safety. While ADIZs usually extend into what is universally acknowledged to be international airspace, even by the countries that maintain them, they in no way confer sovereignty. Its extent is determined by the reaction time to respond to foreign and possibly hostile aircrafts. ADIZ is a defence concept concerned with controlling the airspace surrounding a nation for military purposes; there is no essential linkage with territorial claims or sovereignty issues. Given the high speeds of modern aircraft, prior authorisation allows planned flights to be identified as such, rather than being treated as an enemy aircraft which could result in interception by fighters and accidental conflict. Thus civil airliners entering an ADIZ are required to radio planned course, destination, and other details about passage through the ADIZ, typically to a military air traffic controller. The role of ADIZs has diminished significantly since the end of the Cold War; the emphasis is on in-flight safety after long-range aircraft were used against domestic targets in the 9/11 attacks. The authority to establish an ADIZ is not given by any international treaty nor prohibited by international law and is not regulated by any international body. The first ADIZ was established by the United States soon after World War II. As surveillance technologies improved, the scramble for security reached a frenzied peak during the early stages of the Cold War when the fear of a sneak nuclear airborne first strike was a strategic fixation amongst protagonists.
Several countries currently maintain ADIZs including Norway, Britain, USA, Canada, Japan, Pakistan, India, South Korea, Taiwan and China. Three conventional criteria preside over such zones, these are: the Zones cover undisputed territory, Zones do not apply to foreign aircraft not intending to enter territorial airspace, Zones do not overlap. Since states have the right to regulate air traffic only over their land, countries are not legally obliged to comply with another States ADIZ requirements in international airspace, but commercial traffic tend to do so because of the promise of security and safety. Why did China establish its East China Sea ADIZ? Despite the knowledge that the central three criteria were breached, it covered the disputed Islands of Senkaku/Diaoyu; the Zone solicited information even if the foreign aircraft had no intentions of entering China’s territorial air space; and intriguingly, the new Zone intruded and overlapped the Japanese and Korean ADIZs. It also, cannot be coincidental that the inexact vesica piscis formed by the intersection of the Japan and China ADIZ along with the intersection of their disputed Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) are centered on the Chunxiao gas fields (originally disputed but since 2008 overseen by a shaky joint development programme).
Tensions are undoubtedly high in the East China Sea region at the moment, but this is not Cold War. No country wants to target the heart of the global economy. The surprise attack formulation as articulated by China’s defence ministry is therefore on thin ice and has left China’s ADIZ more a question mark as to what their strategic intent is. The rationale that it is illicit trafficking of man, material and narcotics that is the object of the Zone is ludicrous since the region is neither a significant drug route nor is it a cognizable unlawful human trafficking corridor. The suggestion that the Zone was motivated by a desire to reduce the risk of midair collisions is hardly tenable since the most acute peril that airmen face is when there is duality of control without clear and unambiguous responsibility and power to regulate traffic. The underlying problem is not commercial air traffic, which is already under efficient regulation in the East China Sea, but the movement of military flights which have no obligation to abdicate control to the Zonal controller whilst in international airspace. Proclaiming the ADIZ and declaring the right to “emergency defensive measures”, it has put pressure on China to intercept foreign military flights increasing the risk of accidents. The move up an escalatory ladder jumped a few rungs when military aircraft from the US, Japan and South Korea challenged the ADIZ. The ADIZ would give China a chance to keep track of all aerial movement in the region. China has already declared an exclusive economic zone in a part of Western Pacific thus making a greater presence in the region. This can also be seen as a response to the US ‘pivot to Asia’ or ‘rebalance strategy’. China’s actions are aimed at sending a message to the US that it is serious about challenging an Asian order in which America has been the dominant power for forty years.
The declaration of the ADIZ came immediately after the meeting of the third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Party Congress. Geng Yansheng, spokesman for the Ministry of National Defence on China’s establishment of the ECS, ADIZ “the Chinese government announced the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone on November 23, 2013. It is necessary measure for China to protect its state sovereignty and territory and airspace security. It is conducive to maintaining flying safety in international airspace, and is in line with international laws and conventions. The announcement of the East China Sea ADIZ has earned understanding and recognition from an increasing number of countries and peoples, but misunderstandings or even distortions also exist”. These developments in the region speak volume about the ‘New Leadership’s’ policy in the region. It is definitely aimed at countering US military deployment in Asia. Conversely, it seems the twenty four character policy of Deng Xiaoping is over. China is playing the game of ‘weiqi’ where it is slowly expanding its influence through steps that are not at the threshold of violence and do not trigger a forcible response.
The assertive Chinese behaviour has led to a greater US-China strategic rivalry. The tension is already expanding to the SCS region which is evident from the collision of the US and Chinese ship. The collision was the most serious one since 2009, when Chinese ships and planes repeatedly harassed the US ocean surveillance vessels USNS impeccable in the South China Sea. The US Secretary of State John Kerry has already warned China of declaring an ADIZ in the SCS. Washington has committed forty million USD to strengthen its sea defence capabilities and the two countries are close to opening up of Subic Bay and the Clark Air base. Japan is already planning to set up a new amphibious military unit and deploy unarmed surveillance drones in its southwest in the disputed area. The first ever joint naval exercise between India and Japan is also a fall out the ADIZ. South Korea announced the expansion of its ADIZ, further south in the disputed area; prior to this South Korea’s ADIZ did not cover the submerged rock. It plans to hold talks with “related countries” to avoid any further military clashes. Other countries like Australia, Philippines, Vietnam, Germany, France and European Union. Australia stated this move as ‘unhelpful to regional security’.
There appear to be three calculations underlying this declaration. Firstly, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army seems to be trying to force a reappraisal of China’s claim to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, the legal status of which is entangled with the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between the US and Japan, following the end of World War II. During the last few years, Chinese naval forces have been involved in tense and aggressive confrontations with the Japanese coastguard and Maritime Self-Defence Force around the disputed waters, and China is seeking to expand its influence in the area by using maritime patrol aircraft, and also drones, for surveillance and reconnaissance of Japanese air activities over the disputed seas. Secondly, this declaration is a response to the recent nationalisation of three of the five Diaoyu/Senkaku islands by the Japanese government, and also to its perceived militaristic resurgence. Japan has just launched its first helicopter-carrying destroyer, the Izumo, and plans to establish a naval intelligence base near the disputed islands. China is making a preemptive strike, and trying to deter Japan from increasing its air operations in the area. On the first day that the ECS ADIZ was in force, China sent two electronic reconnaissance aircraft, a Y-8 and a Tu-154, to conduct administrative and monitoring operations in the disputed waters, and Japan scrambled two F-15s to “intercept” them. Thirdly, China is making a more subtle move to influence South Korea. The ECS ADIZ overlaps South Korea’s ADIZ in an area which includes Leodo, a submerged rock southwest of Jeju Island, and also an uninhabited maritime scientific observatory established by South Korea in accordance with the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Seoul has expressed its concern about this unilateral declaration, but Beijing’s response to Seoul has been different from that toward Tokyo. The Chinese are attempting to drive a wedge between South Korea and its allies, the US and Japan, in the knowledge that Seoul is already distancing itself from the current Japanese administration.
The strategic move has abruptly come up during a period when Japan under the leadership of Abe, is trying to increase its military capability. It has encompassed the airspace over the disputed Senkaku Island, now owned by Japan, in its ADIZ. As per the Air Identification Rules, Japan has to share its flight report or provide Identification details to China over the Island it itself owns. This clearly indicates China’s strategy to challenge Japan on the disputed zone. China’s ADIZ strategy has projected its assertive unilateral attitude in the region. This no doubt indicates its attempt to establish a sovereign airspace in the region. Although to justify its attempt, it has referred to countries like US and Japan who has previously established ADIZ, it didn’t follow their course of bilateralism in this regard. US which established the first ADIZ setting the tradition coordinated with Canada. On the other hand, Japan, despite facing much opposition from Taiwan, coordinated with it before implementing the planned action. But China’s move was sudden and abrupt, projecting its impudent foreign policy attitude. Does this in turn portend any trouble for China’s other South Asian counterparts, hinting towards its tendency to impose unilateralism as per its national interests?
