No conflict is static and it changes with the time. It evolves with changing policies, interests, capabilities and competing interests of key players. All these factors influence a conflict and Af-Pak theatre is no different. The announcement of major U.S. troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 influenced the decisions of many regional and local players. Stripping down to basics, conflict in both Afghanistan and Pakistan has now evolved into a civil war. In addition to nation states, a growing number of non-state actors in both countries are becoming key players.
In Afghanistan, militancy is predominantly rural with its heartland in eastern and southern Pushtun areas. Ideologically, it is underpinned by extremely conservative and puritanical Sunni school of thought heavily influenced by the Deobandi strand. The opponents of militants include a broad array of urban and educated Pushtuns, nationalist and tribal Pushtuns and almost all non-Pushtuns. In view of long association of Pakistan with Afghan conflict spanning now over two generations, some new elements such as sectarianism has made roads in Afghanistan. Discrimination against Hazaras was mainly on ethnic and class bases in Afghan society but now sectarian element is also added and broadened to other Shias. Some Afghan militant groups developed close ties to sectarian militants of Pakistan. Some of Pakistani sectarian killers set up base in Balochistan and developed links with Afghan counterparts with the result that Shias were specifically targeted on both sides of the Durand Line. In Balochistan, small Pakistani Hazara community suffered heavy losses in target killings and large scale bombings of their neighborhoods. On the other side of the border, some Afghan militant groups influenced by Pakistani sectarian trend bombed Shia houses of worship and shrines. This was so alien to Afghan traditions that even the Taliban leadership denounced it.
In case of Afghanistan, the question is whether Taliban are willing to accommodate the wishes of other Afghans and be part of a broad based government or still thinking of an outright military victory. Even if they agree to accommodate the wishes of other Afghans, will they be willing or capable to confront more hardliner among their own ranks. These second tier commanders are battle hardened, ideologically more committed and less likely to compromise. In case of Pakistan, it is also not clear at present whether militant groups will negotiate with the government and even if they agree what will be their terms.
In the last decade, conflict in Pakistan has also evolved and now contours of conflict are becoming quite clear. Militants predominantly Pushtuns from tribal areas took control of most of the tribal areas and overflowed into settled areas especially Dir, Malakand and Swat. They also made periodic forays in large cities of Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (KPK). Foreign militants as well as large number of non-Pushtun Pakistani militants found safe heavens in the areas controlled by the militants. Military offensive especially after 2008 pushed militants out of major towns but still large numbers are entrenched in several pockets.
Contrary to popular perception in Pakistan, from the year 2001 to 2007 Americans and Afghans stayed away from direct involvement with Pakistani non-state actors. Everything was routed through the Pakistan government and the army. Of course, intelligence assets in Pakistan were cultivated but they were focused on Al-Qaeda as well as local militant threat. Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti clashed with Pakistani government and before moving to the hills where he was killed in 2006 by Pakistani forces, he asked Kabul for safe passage. Kabul routed the request to the Americans but it was vetoed and Bugti was asked to mend his fences with General Pervez Musharraf (this was communicated to me by someone close to President Hamid Karzai).
It was extreme frustration of Afghans as well as deterioration of American-Pakistani relations that prompted Afghans as well as Americans to think about other options. Baloch militants were allowed to use limited Afghan space. As a last resort, Afghans decided to have their own links with Pakistani militant leadership to use it as a bargaining chip in final negotiations with Pakistan. Pakistan has always underestimated the capabilities of the opponents. Pakistan has influence in Afghanistan but it is essentially backing one party in the civil war. It is logical that all those who oppose Taliban see Pakistan as a mortal enemy. As early as 2002, I was aware of some of sentiments expressed by various Afghan leaders who resented Pakistani meddling in Afghanistan. They had vowed at that time that “if this time neighbors (referring to Pakistan as well as Iran) don’t behave, then we will make sure that they are not immune from the consequences”. (This was communicated to me in 2002-03 by someone who has close relationship with many key Afghan power brokers). It was quite clear to me that this meant that the winds of chaos would blow in the other direction.
A battle of narratives is raging in Pakistan adding more confusion. Now militants have a sympathetic audience in different segments of Pakistani society that helps them to continue to recruit and launch successful attacks against military and civilian targets. A segment of Deobandi Sunni school of thought and a very small Ahle Hadith school of thought ( thanks to ideological and financial support from Saudi Arabia, this group now has influence beyond its numbers) is clearly sympathetic to militant views. Now the ruling party of KPK, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf is slowly moving further to the right. In Pushtun society those opposing the militancy include many educated and urbanized as well as a large segment of tribesmen while in broader society, Barelvi Sunni school of thought as well as Shias are squarely against militants. Rural and urban Sindh as well as Balochistan also has no significant sympathy for the Islamist militant cause. Recent killing of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Hakeemullah Mahsud in a drone strike clearly exposed these fault lines of Pakistani society. Narrative of each party is quite instructive.
In KPK, what is happening now is exactly the replication of what happened in 2002-07. Then the Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) provincial government pretended as if there was no problem, hoping that the militants would stay in their own area and leave them to enjoy the perks and privileges of the government. The result was plummeting of the morale of civilian bureaucracy and police with ultimate collapse in the settled area of Malakand division and Peshawar was surrounded by militants. This is exactly what is happening now and there is a clear and present danger of potential administrative collapse if militants regroup. The cost in blood was enormous to push the militants back and we hope that same mistake is not made again.
In Afghanistan, it is likely that a small number of U.S. troops will remain with primarily training and support mission while Afghan security forces will lead combat missions. The negotiation track is withering therefore all Afghans who oppose the Taliban will try to use international military, intelligence, economic and diplomatic resources to keep them in check. Afghans will now likely use Pakistani non-state actors for leverage in its negotiations with Pakistan. If President Hamid Karzai miscalculates big time and try to overplay his hand, resulting in complete withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops then the theatre will become a playing field for intelligence operatives with unintended sanguine consequences. In case of Pakistan, dysfunctional institutional response to various challenges combined with confusion in society is preventing implementation of a cohesive national security policy. One gets a feeling that there is general resignation and fear while civilian and military leaders have put everything in a holding pattern.
If Afghanistan and Pakistan are unable to bridge their differences then both countries will suffer as there is risk of conflict spreading both horizontally and vertically. In that case, fault lines of both countries will deepen and battle lines redrawn. Failure of state to secure it citizens has it consequences as individuals will seek protection in their other identities i.e. ethnic, sectarian, tribal thus weakening the national bond. Supporters and opponents of militants in both countries will shape the next phase of the conflict. Opponents of militants will act on their own where they feel strong and cooperate with domestic and international players targeting these militants. Militancy is becoming an existential threat to many communities of Pakistan and Afghanistan and their actions will be based on this single factor and not on any lofty nationalist or religious rhetoric.
