Introduction
The complex nature of contemporary conflict has highlighted the insufficiency of military means. So in recent Comprehensive Approach to operations, Other Government Agencies (OGAs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) also form part of military operations in various phases. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has participated in total 56 peacekeeping operations since World War II2. Other than Combat operations, it has performed constabulary and civil-military tasks in post conflict environment. Similarly, Australian Federal Police (AFP) has been participating in peacekeeping missions since 1964. Apart from ADF and AFP, OGAs, NGOs and various international organizations also operated in the same physical space for different mandates.3 Due to various organizational structures, systems, finances and most importantly cultures, there are many challenges to effective and harmonious working of all the participants. This study explores the effectiveness of the ADF interaction with OGAs. Although various OGAs operate along with ADF in contemporary environment, the scope of study is limited to ADF and AFP interactions in East Timor (including Timor-Leste 2006) and Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Island (RAMSI). The scope has been limited to deliberate upon the effectiveness of interaction between two major contributors in two distinct campaigns. In East Timor, ADF performed the lead role under UN mandate whereas in RAMSI, AFP led the mission under regional mandate. Due to non-availability of established measure of effectiveness of civil military cooperation, the comparison of both missions provide better understanding of ADF interaction with AFP under ADF and AFP command. It has been argued that effectiveness of ADF-AFP interaction has improved considerably through learning and adaptation by both organizations at personal, procedural and organizational level.
Intervention in East Timor
The Australian involvement in East Timor commenced with the command of International Force East Timor (INTERFET).4 Subsequently, Australia has been part of each UN mission in East Timor since its independence. Later on, Australia also led International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Timor-Leste upon breakdown of law and order in 2006. With ADF in lead role, the AFP has been deployed under United Nations Police (UNPOL) arrangements. Subsequently in Timor-Leste AFP was deployed under bilateral programme for police development (the Timor-Leste Police Development Program, TLPDP).5 Similar to East Timor, Australian contribution to RAMSI included ADF and AFP contingent in a Combined Task Force (CTF). Other than AFP, the fourteen Pacific nations also contributed to Participating Police Forces (PPF). The deployments of police and military have been parallel where interaction between ADF-AFP varied from headquarters to joint patrols in field.6
Experiences of RAMSI
Based on the experiences of East Timor, the procedures for coordination between both the forces were improved during RAMSI. The swift establishment of law and order and essential state services was lauded by international community and RAMSI was termed as ‘model for future deployments’.7 However, later riots erupted in Solomon Island capital Honiara in April 2006, which raised serious concerns about success of the intervention and it was assessed that root cause of the problem have not been addressed. The intervention received criticism in two Pacific Island Forums (PIF) reviews about its legitimacy, political accountability, and regional character. So after 2006, the changes made in the mission made it more inclusive and legitimate.8 According to PIF Eminent Persons Group (EPG), the RAMSI was effective at bureaucratic level for coordination, execution and relationship with citizens, whereas it was not politically aligned to Solomon Island government in terms of priorities.9 The friction in relations at political level has been evident during Manasseh leadership of 2006-2007. Based on the shortcomings in RAMSI, EPG proposed four changes. First was to avoid dependence on RAMSI in longer terms, better participation by Solomon Island government was required. Second was to improve regional participation in civilian and policing roles to make it more inclusive and legitimate. Third was to define a clear exit strategy and shared fears of instability in case of premature return. The last were reservations about its neutrality and impartiality in prosecuting the real instigators of ethnic violence. The analysis of the situation reveals that initially the swift response by Australian government was essential to control the situation, however, during the phase two the participation by the government was in an opaque environment.10 Despite various difficulties after 2006 where the bilateral relations deteriorated, the progress has been phenomenal. In first three years the Solomon Island Government revenue increased by 170 per cent due to reforms in taxation system.11 It may be argued that the growth of revenue is insufficient compared to growth in the population, however, it is considerable improvement compared to weak economic condition in 2003.
Effectiveness of Interaction
In both the missions, ADF and AFP have been operating in the same space. Although both have different mandates but sometimes their areas are overlapping. Both the forces are operating on the different end of the law and order spectrum, while complimenting each other.
There are considerable differences in both organizations. While ADF is organized with an outward focus for use of deadly force for external enemies, the AFP is inward looking with an aim to respond to crimes. While military operates in large formations and requires effective command and control, the police operate in small teams and require considerable discretion in operations.12 Some commentators suggest that ADF training covers post conflict tasks and both roles can be performed by a single force, it is to be recognized that conflict and peace environments requires very different skills.13 In peace time, police has major role to play while armed forces are to be available in case of emergency whereas in case of deteriorated law and order conditions, the military has to establish the law and order and police has to complement, till it can take over the law and order responsibilities. So both forces need to be effective in interoperability in order to maximise the results of government intervention.14 So in order to avoid duplication of efforts between both the forces, it is imperative to remove the capability gaps between the forces as it has been analysed that during transition phase from one force to another, their exist capability gaps. One of such example is highlighted by Mr. Rob Wesley-Smith about the inappropriate employment of military forces during Timor-Leste unrest in 2006 where police force was required for flexible and non-lethal response.15 Similarly for RAMSI, Lt Col John Hutcheson (Commander Joint Force 635 in Solomon Islands) noted that while ADF focused on advance planning, the Participating Police Forces (PPF) lacked proactive approach to planning, multiple lines of operations and overall concept of campaign plan.16 Although military platoons were assisting PPF in apprehending high profile criminals, they complained sharing of information, insufficient planning and conduct for potentially unsafe interagency operations. Based on the experiences of operations, he recommended a joint interagency planning methodology and common intelligence sharing procedures for such operations in future based on the experiences of RAMSI and other allied countries. The other important difference was the ADF 24 hours duty cycle vis-à-vis PPF 8 hours shift mentality which depicted the cultural difference in the organizations. After combined operations in the field and development of relations at personal level and interagency awareness, the differences resolved and working was smooth. The difference highlighted by CJTF 635 (an ADF officer) were also acknowledged by police Commissioner Keetly (an AFP officer), where he accepted the inadequacy of joint interagency doctrine.17 Similar Assistant Commissioner Walters also acknowledged the ‘grey area’ in joint operations of ADF and AFP where AFP provides a ‘less than lethal option’ for operations between general duties and lethal force during such missions.18 So the gap between the role of defence and policing and how both forces can complement each other to bridge the gap. Since 2006, both the forces have improved their procedures and opted to secondment to each other headquarters for better understanding of the environment. AFP officers also join ADF officers in Defence Strategic Studies course in Australian Defence College. It has been observed that approach towards coordination and cooperation between both the forces is commendable. Based on the experiences, various joint working groups have been formed. Similarly, AFP has also formed International Deployment Group (IDG) and Operational Response Group (ORG) to bridge the capability gap between both the forces. The development of joint doctrines by Civil Military Cooperation Centre (CIMIC) and secondment has enhanced the effectiveness of the interaction.
Although ADF has been fully trained and equipped for overseas deployments, based on the experiences of East Timor and recommendations of Brahimi Report (UN Report on Peacekeeping Operations), AFP is a pioneer force to establish International Deployment Group (IDP), which has overcome various challenges to international policing efforts as well as enhanced cooperation with ADF.19 After the establishment of IDG, international policing has been recognised as the fundamental component of AFP and its international capabilities have increased many folds where Operational Response Group (ORG, for rapid deployments in critical situations) constitute to 81 percept of the IDG.20 The IDG future strategy was approved in August 2006, which increased its staff to 1200 with ORG comprising 150 personnel for rapid deployment in the wake of any international crises or emergency. An ‘Operation Planning Cell’ was also created to improve joint planning and reflection on lessons learnt with ADF.21 Apart from these tactical level actions, National Security Committee of cabinet ordered a review of interoperability between ADF and AFP. Based on the result of review Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Interoperability between the Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police was signed in September 2008.22 The MOU has provided an important instrument to enhance interoperability and effectiveness at policy level, especially a Joint Steering Committee has been formed to improve policies, processes and procedure.23 The personnel have been seconded between both the departments. The AFP has seconded two liaison officers in Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) and three for Australian Defence College. At present one officer is undergoing Defence and Strategic Studies Course. These exchange postings have improved the effectiveness and liaison officers provide specialist advice to ADF when required. On procedural level to develop a common operating language, Guide to Defence and Australian Federal Police Interoperability for Offshore Operations has been drafted. Although it does not provide a joint doctrine or procedural guide, it provides a framework for cooperation during offshore operations between both the forces.24
Way Ahead for Pakistan
Pakistan is a developing country with limited resources. Due to security environment of the state and government structure in previous years, the military forces have primacy on state affairs whether it is national security, foreign policy or law and order. Despite limited resources, armed forces of Pakistan have developed significant combat capabilities and earned international repute due to their conduct in various national and international conflicts. Pakistan Army contingent regularly form part of UN peacekeeping forces and have earned respect due to their ethical conduct on deployments. Pakistan Navy regularly participates in international maritime exercises, seminars and operates at sea to safeguards national interests in maritime arena. Since 2004 Pakistan Navy is participating in cooperative maritime security arrangement in Indian Ocean alongwith other international navies. Since 2009, Pakistan Navy is participating in international counter piracy efforts in Gulf Aden. Pakistan Navy has commanded both task forces comprising international navies, which is a testimony of its competence. Similarly, Pakistan Air Force is also renowned for its competence in air warfare. Other than combat roles, all the services are contributing to nation building by welfare organizations, educations institutes and housing developments. All armed forces are important component of national disaster relief plan. Based on the international experiences of whole of the government approach, there is a need to utilise Pakistan military forces to resolve national problems, especially in the areas of poor security conditions. Most of Pakistani coastline is in Baluchistan where Pakistan Navy has substantial presence. Recently Coastal Command has also been raised to defend long coastline. The latest mission of Pakistan Navy also includes development of coastal communities.25 So Pakistan Navy can play an important part in development of coastal belt especially in synch with Baluchistan Comprehensive Development Strategy (2013 – 2030) initiated by UNDP.26 Based on the experiences of developed countries task forces can be formed for dedicated tasks where military may have lead role or supporting role. This study described the two operations where military was in command or in support. The Australian experiences in this regard are relevant to Pakistan because both countries have similar state infrastructure (British legacy and American influence). Employment of military forces in support role will be beneficial to strengthen democratic institution and state capacity.
Conclusion
In Conclusion, the contemporary conflict has transformed into complex engagement of various actors where military means are insufficient to achieve lasting stability. In recent conflicts, AFP and other OGAs, NGOs and international organizations participated alongside ADF. Due to different systems, procedures, finances and cultures, the interaction between ADF and other participants is not smooth always. While various steps have been taken to improve the effectiveness of the interaction, the study limited its scope to effectiveness of interaction between ADF and AFP in East Timor and RAMSI, which were two distinct operations. Although both forces operate in different end of security spectrum to complement each other, it has been observed that in East Timor the both the forces did not had the clear understanding of the mandate of each other and significant gap in the capability existed. Based on the experiences of East Timor the measures were taken at tactical, procedural and organisational levels to enhance interaction and understanding of both the forces. The raising of IDG and Joint Steering Committee are important steps in this regard. Whereas the MOU for interoperability and common language for operations between both the forces has provided a framework to improve the interoperability. Although the interaction was not effective during East Timor and Solomon Islands, it has considerably improved by enhanced interaction at personal level and concrete steps at procedural and organizational level. Pakistan being a Commonwealth nation can benefit from Australian experiences for solution of national issues like law and order, safety and security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
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End Notes
2The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has been involved in peacekeeping since 1947. The first ever UN peacekeeping operation was conducted in 1947 using Military Observers; the United Nations Good Offices Commission to Indonesia (UNCI). Whereas Australian police have been deployed in peacekeeping operations since 1964 when officers were sent to Cyprus as part of the United Nations Force (UNFICYP). So far AFP has been deployed in Cyprus, Sudan, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Nauru, Cambodia, Vanuatu and Afghanistan. Australian Defence Force and Police Involvement in Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Operations 1947- present. http://www.peacekeepers.asn.au/operations.htm (accessed 15 Sep 13) and AFP International Deployment, http://www.afp.gov.au/international/IDG/current_deployments.html (accessed 15 Sep 13).
3The OGAs include Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Attorney- General’s Department, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), Customs, Department of Finance, National Archives, Treasury and Department of Veteran’s Affairs. The NGOs include Australian and foreign NGOs whereas international organizations include International Committee of Red Cross and Red Crescent, World Food Programme, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees etc.
4Australia led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) which comprised 13,000 personnel from 21 nations. It was single largest deployment of Australian forces after World War II with 5,500 personnel deployed.
5Grant Edwards and Tess O’Donnell, ‘Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP): Lessons in Capacity Building Approaches’, in Vandra Harris and Andrew Goldsmith (eds), Security, Development and Nation-Building in Timor-Leste: Cross-sectoral Perspectives (Routledge: London, 2011).
6Goldsmith and Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, 221-37; Greener, the New International Policing, p. 113; Greener-Barcham, ‘Crossing the Green or Blue Line?’ 90-112.
7Jamie Watson cited in Sinclair Dinnen, ‘Solomon Islands’ in Hotspot: Asia and Oceania, (ed.) Clinton Fernandes. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2008, 216.
8Mary Louise O’Callaghan cited in Fry and Kabutaulaka, ‘Political legitimacy and State-building intervention in the Pacific’, 32.
9Pacific Islands Forum Eminent Persons Group, ‘A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, May 2005, 10, available at http://www.ramsi.org/node/14
10Gordon Leau Nanau, ‘Intervention and nation building in the Solomon Islands’ in Intervention and State‐Building in the Pacific, (eds) Fry and Kabutaulaka, 151–53.
11Sinclair Dinnen, ‘Dilemmas of Intervention and the Building of State and Nation’ Politics and State Building in Solomon Islands, Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (eds), Asia Pacific Press, The Australian National University
12Beth K. Greener-Barcham, ‘Crossing the Green or Blue Line? Exploring the Military-Police Divide’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 18, no. 1 (March 2007), 90-112.
13Edward R. Maguire and William R. King, ‘Trends in the Policing Industry’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 593 (May 2004), 15-41; Alan J. Vick, David T. Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky and John Stillion, Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other than War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 2.
14Committee Hansard, 24 July 2007, 22–23.
15The initial requirement was overwhelming force to establish command and control, subsequently flexible response by police was required to find the real culprits. He states, ‘Instead we had a rather ridiculous and embarrassing ongoing scenario of heavily armed and heavily kitted military trying to deal with Timorese who could just run away and hide’. Mr Rob Wesley-Smith, Australians for a Free East Timor and Australia East Timor Association, Submission 20, to The Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Australia’s Involvement in Peacekeeping Operations. Special Report, Canberra: Australian Parliament House, 2008.
16Various military activities conducted in support of the PPF demonstrated the differences in the planning methodologies of ADF and AFP. ‘While the Australian Defence Force (ADF) possesses a proactive planning culture, the PPF were largely reactive in character and had little appreciation of the response timings that might be required to conduct actions on foreign soil… [t]he police approach was characterised by compartmentalised activity—an approach that was further exacerbated by the existence of different threat assessment methodologies’. John Hutcheson, ‘Helping a Friend: An Australian Military Commander’s Perspective on the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands’, Australian Army Journal, vol II, no. 2.
17He suggested: ‘…even if only some of these and similar observations are accurate, the AFP needs to redouble its efforts to ensure that the systems, the processes and, more importantly the doctrine, underpinning future operations by the IDG are adequate.’ AFP Commissioner Keelty, Policing in a Foreign Policy Space, National Press Club Address, 11 October 2006. http://www.afp.gov.au/media-centre/speeches/2006/npc-address.aspx (accessed 22 Sep 2013).
18‘We found in Timor that, if we sent the normal general duties police out in the street with batons, handcuffs and OC spray, the area of engagement was over 20 or 30 metres because they were hurling rocks or sending darts at us and those sorts of tools were not quite enough. The ADF’s next step could be the use of lethal force, whereas we have less lethal capability to be able to counteract that with things like shotgun bean bag rounds, which are very effective over 30 to 50 metres. We found they were very effective in that environment’. Commander Lancaster, Committee Hansard, 25 July 2007, 9. http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=_fragment_number; query((Dataset%3Acommsen)%20SearchCategory_Phrase%3A%22committees%22)%20committeeName_Phrase%3A%22standing%committee%20on%20foreign%affairs%20defence%20and%20trade%22%20Questioner_Phrase%3A%22senator%20sandy%20macdonald%22%20Questioner_Phrase%3A%chair%20(senator%20payne)%22;rec=1 (accessed 22 Sep 2013).
19United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations; John McFarlane,’ The Thin Blue Line: The Strategic Role of the Australian Federal Police’, Security Challenges, vol. 3, no. 3 (2007), 91-108.
20‘Australia has provided a small number of police (currently fifteen) to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) continually since 1964. However, it was not until the establishment of the IDG in 2004 that international policing was recognised as a core component of Australia’s policing commitment and Australian police found them “operating in a foreign policy space”. With 900 staff (of an authorised 1200), the IDG has three core components: an Australia-based component; a mission component; and an Operational Response Group (for rapid deployment to critical situations). The mission component accounts for 81 percent of IDG resources, and its work includes commitments in eleven foreign countries, as well in Australia’s remote external territories and emergency response in Australia’s Northern Territory’. Australian Federal Police, International Deployment Group, http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-deployment-group.aspx.
21Juani O’Reilly and Paul Jevtovic, ‘Policing the Neighbourhood and Keeping Peace in the Pacific’, Platypus: Journal of the Australian Federal Police, no. 96 (September 2007), 11-2.
22Australian Department of the Defence and Australian Federal Police, Memorandum of Understanding on Interoperability between the Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police Force, signed 26 September 2008.
23Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2008-09 (Canberra: Australian Federal Police, 2009), 65.
24Australian Department of Defence and Australian Federal Police, Guide to Defence and Australian Federal Police (International Deployment Group) Interoperability for Offshore Operations
25Latest Mission of Pakistan Navy is, ‘Protect Maritime Interests of Pakistan, deter aggression at and from sea, provide disaster relief, participate in development of coastal communities and contribute to international efforts in maintaining good order at sea’. http://www.paknavy.gov.pk/
26Draft Baluchistan Comprehensive Development Strategy is available at http://sprsmbalochistan.gov.pk/uploads/reports/Draft%20BCDS%20%20Version%201.0.pdf
