In 2008, after the election of President Barack Obama, new administration re-visited the neglected Afghan theatre. After incremental escalations and surge, President Obama announced withdrawal of majority of U.S. troops by the end of 2014. This set in motion gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops and equipment starting in 2010-11. From 100’000 troops the numbers are down to about 50’000. In addition, large number of equipment is also being moved out or destroyed and sold as scarp. By February 2014, there will be only 34’000 American troops in Afghanistan and if a Status of Forces (SOF) agreement is not concluded between Afghanistan and United States then all U.S. troops will leave by December 2014.
In 2010, U.S. and Afghan officials started to work on a long term bilateral agreement and it was concluded in May 2012. This U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership agreement set the ground rules for continued U.S. support after troop withdrawal in 2014. In the last one year, Afghan and U.S. officials are working on a SOF agreement that will cover conditions for the presence of a small residual U.S. force. Both parties are maneuvering to extract maximum concessions in these negotiations. Disagreements on several policy issues and deteriorating personal relations between President Hamid Karzai and President Obama had an impact on these negotiations. Washington wanted to conclude the deal by the end of October 2013 to take this issue out of spring 2014 Afghan presidential elections as well as having enough time to prepare and secure required funding. However, disagreements slowed the process and now President Karzai announced that this matter will be referred to Loya Jirga (Council of Elders) gathering in late November 2013.
There have been disagreements on various aspects of ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and these frictions had an impact on ongoing negotiations about SOF agreement. Afghan and American perspective is divergent on two key areas. Afghans pushed back hard on deeply unpopular U.S. special operations night raids on homes. They insisted that house raids should be conducted by Afghans. Second issue is presence of militant sanctuaries in Pakistan. Afghan point of view is that unless Washington tackles the militant sanctuaries in Pakistan’s tribal areas, violence in Afghanistan will not diminish. On this issue, Americans though aware of the problem have a different take. In their view, major source of violence is inner dynamics of Afghanistan. In addition, there was a quarrel over transfer of Afghan prisoners held at Bagram base. Afghans wanted to use these prisoners for their own deal with insurgents while Washington was concerned that if some of these prisoners were released too soon in an intra-Afghan deal, they would show up at the battlefield again and U.S. had to fight same battles all over again. Washington wanted to use these prisoners as part of a final peace deal and preferably at a time when U.S. troops have gone home. A middle ground was reached where Afghans took custody of majority of prisoners while U.S. retained few dozen high value prisoners. In the summer of 2013, when Washington announced opening of Taliban office in Qatar without taking Karzai fully on board, relations took a nose dive and Karzai suspended talks about SOF agreement.
Afghans position during these negotiations is to bind Washington into a long term security and economic agreement. Afghans want a NATO type security relationship where U.S. guarantees its security. Washington is resisting this as it will eventually entangle Washington with Afghanistan’s problems with Pakistan. Washington is not in a mood to exchange tension headache of Afghanistan for migraine headache of Pakistan. Kabul views a more robust U.S. security commitment as a best bet against meddling by neighbors especially Pakistan and Iran but not willing to pay the price of giving immunity to American troops. Washington wants to avoid entanglement in regional rivalries at all costs and will not go beyond bare minimum.
Washington’s objectives about SOF agreement cover both bilateral U.S.-Afghan as well as domestic political arena. Washington has not spelled exact number of residual troops in view of divergence of opinion of military and civilian leaders. Military probably wants a higher end of about 10’000 but civilians want a lower end of about 5000. This force will be geared towards training, logistics, air support, Special Forces and intelligence operations. Washington does not want direct combat role and it has been clearly stated at all levels that after December 2014, all heavy lifting will be done by Afghan security forces.
The most crucial issue for Washington is immunity for its troops operating in Afghanistan. In the absence of this immunity, U.S. will not keep any troops in the country. This is what exactly happened in Iraq. Washington wanted to keep a residual force but negotiations with Iraqi government failed on this specific issue resulting in total withdrawal. Washington is aware of Afghan concerns about the issue of immunity. Removal of U.S. troops from direct combat role will also remove them from direct contact with Afghan insurgents and civilians thus diminishing the chances of accidents and mishaps. Like any other country in a conflict zone, gross violations are prosecuted by Americans under military law. Afghans may not be happy with the outcome of prosecution by Americans but they may have to live with this. It is clear that in the absence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, it will be very hard for any administration to get significant financial resources for Afghanistan.
In the last one year, the term ‘Zero Option’ has been used meaning that U.S. will not keep any troops in Afghanistan after the end of 2014. Military and intelligence community saw it as complete non-sense and it got no traction among civilians. Initially, no one in Washington believed that administration would even contemplate this option and that it was being used as a negotiation tool. However, deterioration of personal relations between President Karzai and President Obama as well as talk of complete winding down of Afghan operation in view of domestic challenges suddenly made Zero Option a possibility no matter how unlikely. Serious discussion about this option emerged in late 2012 prior to Karzai’s visit to Washington. In the summer of 2013 after the Taliban Qatar office fiasco and Karzai’s temper tantrums, an exasperated Obama decided to speed up the withdrawal process and bring the Zero Option at the forefront.
If Karzai is upset so are Americans and this is poisoning the relations. If Karzai can lecture western diplomats that they are responsible for rise of radical Islam and that foreign troops are causing harm to Afghans then surely Americans can tell him to try to govern and survive without American bayonets. Americans are not hesitant to point that the mere thought of being hanged from the nearest pole can spur a lazy person to action. Some adult supervision is urgently needed in this kind of environment.
Afghans are shrewd negotiators and they are using all the tricks up their sleeves to get the best deal but there is always the risk of miscalculation. Afghan power brokers know their economic and military dependence on Americans coupled with a belief that even if U.S. wants, its interests in Afghanistan are too important to be dumped so easily. They are ignoring two crucial American sigh posts; first changed domestic American scene and second Obama administration’s desire to disentangle from Afghanistan as soon as and as completely as possible. Support for continued U.S. engagement in Afghanistan is steadily declining at home and with severe domestic economic woes and budget sequestrations, current commitments are simply unsustainable. If Afghans provide an opportunity then administration can jump on the opening stating that look Afghans don’t want our troops any more in their country and go for a clean break. Afghans need to be realistic and they can not expect that Washington will essentially underwrite the running of the Afghan state indefinitely.
Karzai’s basic assumptions about Washington need serious re-evaluation. Things change and nothing is static is the realm of real politic. What is relevant in one context at any given time period becomes irrelevant in another context. U.S. desire for long term bases in Afghanistan to tackle Al-Qaeda, use of hard military power to tackle local extremists, pressuring Pakistan for regional goals and squeezing Iran on nuclear issue were dominant themes until very recently and all these factors enhanced the value of Afghanistan in U.S. national security discourse. However, strategic environment has changed. Killing of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, focus only on those extremist groups posing direct and imminent threat to U.S. national security, use of small scale intelligence driven special forces and drone operations, dialing down of ‘good will’ kills for extremists of other nations, diminishing value of Pakistan for U.S. national security in view of removal of large number of U.S. troops from Afghan theatre and entente with Iran on nuclear talks means that value of Afghanistan has proportionately reduced. Many Afghans including some of Karzai’s allies are aware of these shifts and fear that Karzai may end up making a miscalculation.
The best short term outcome is a bilateral agreement where only about 3-5’000 American troops in non-combat role stay for 3-5 years. American troops will not be subject to Afghan law but Washington will ensure that any gross violation or criminal activity is prosecuted and punished according to American military law. In return, Afghanistan will continue to receive economic and development aid and in the meantime speed up the process of capacity building of security forces and improve governance. On their part, Afghans need an in house debate about benefits and risks of residual U.S. presence. Karzai needs to take members of Loya Jirga and parliament in confidence and most likely in the end majority will agree to presence of a small U.S. contingent with immunity.
My view is that benefits of a smaller U.S. contingent probably less than 3’000 outweigh risks. U.S. troops are a luxury item and cost is prohibitive. The cost of overseas deployment of 1000 U.S. soldiers is about $1 billion per year. In addition, government’s own monitoring agencies have reported significant waste, fraud and abuse in these funds. Smaller numbers provide more resources channeled towards local security forces and more development and economic funds. Based on recent experience of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, my view is that in fact more troops severely restrict military and diplomatic maneuverability. Force protection trumps everything else thus forcing uncomfortable compromises with local, regional and international players that are detrimental in the long run. Everyone was aware of this fact and they fleeced Americans. What could have cost $5 in the absence of U.S. troops caused $500 in the presence of U.S. troops. American contractors, all Iraqi and Afghan players, all neighbors of these two countries as well as their cousins made money as one trillion dollar is a lot of money.
Strict financial discipline on own as well as Afghan government with objective of keeping waste, fraud and abuse below twenty percent mark is a reasonable goal. If Washington can keep the price tag for Afghan engagement below $5 billion per year for next five year with gradual transition that may be a workable option. To put things in perspective, Pentagon’s 2014 budget for Operation Enduring Freedom is about $80 billion.
In the last decade, U.S. influence has rapidly declined all over the globe despite large scale military operations in two theatres. In fact, large scale military operations have inflamed the Muslim world with escalation of extremist incidents all over the globe. U.S. will act when its security is directly threatened but instruments used will be different. Every society has its problems and Afghans will solve their own problem in their own ways. Whatever the reasons and mechanics of U.S. operations, it provided another opportunity for Afghan nation to integrate with global community and chart a new course with all its flaws. If Afghanistan can transition to a reasonably functioning and stable state and integrate with regional economy that will be the best outcome for everybody. Efforts of reconciliation as well as regional cooperation with focus on common interests and threats may provide reasonable stability for economic development and long term peace dividends.
Acknowledgement: Author thanks many for their valuable input. However, conclusions as well as all errors and omissions are author’s sole responsibility.
