Tawi to Chak Kirpal September 1965 War

Introduction
As a commanding officer of 14 Punjab I had participated fully in the September 1965 War in CHAMB-JAURIAN Sector and SIALKOT Sector. I am narrating below a few events based on my memory and personal diary for the interest of our learned readers.

Operation GRAND SLAM
Between 15 and 22 August the overwhelming forces of the enemy had managed to rupture 12 Division defence. The strategic town of MUZAFFARABAD was threatened and the situation had become critical. In order to forestall the enemy offensive it was decided perforce to launch counter offensive on AXIS CHAMB-JAURIAN-AKHNOOR (also known as the MUNAWAR GAP) because it was the shortest approach to the strategic communication center of AKHNUR. The main objective was to capture AKHNOOR. The foreign ministry had given surety to GHQ that India would not cross the international border of Pakistan and the conflict would remain confined to the disputed territory of Kashmir. But even to a novice it was wishful to believe that Indian would not launch offensive operations against our strategic centers. GOC 12 Division was made responsible for the planning and conduct of the operation. He was to remain in command up to the capture of AKHNUR. For conduct of the operation 11 Cavalry, 13 Lancers, Artillery 4 Corps (Brig AMJAD), Artillery 7 Division (Brig KHURSHID), 10 Brigade (Brig AZMAT HAYAT – 2 battalions) were placed under command of GOC 12 Division. Details are given in the paragraph of relative strength. The plan was in brief as under:

a. The supporting artillery guns would move and occupy the forward gun positions during dark hours about 48 hours before the H hour.
b. From 0330 hours to 0500 hours on 1^st September all available artillery guns would start shelling known positions of the enemy, including the gun positions.
c. Units of 4 Azad Kashmir Sector (Brig HAMID) would capture heights of tactical importance situated to the north of River TAWI.
d. 102 Brigade, already deployed along the CFL would commence advance at 0500 hours and clear the area up to the western bank of the TAWI and also capture CHAMB. A tank regiment was placed in support.
e. 10 Brigade, already concentrated in the area BHAI PHERU, 35 miles from LAHORE on MULTAN Road would cross the TAWI and capture JAURIAN with be prepared mission to capture AKHNOOR. A tank regiment was placed in support.
f. No movement of army personnel and vehicles would be made near the CFL. Even recce of forward area was not allowed.

Relative Strength

Own Forces
4 Azad Kashmir sector (5 AK, 14 AK and 19 AK) was deployed facing the enemy positions of LALEL, DEWA, MANDIALA, MOEL and PHAGLA. Artillery support was available.

102 Brigade (9 Punjab, 13 Punjab and 8 Baluch) was deployed in front of MUNAWAR and the river TAWI along the CFL. 11 Cavalry (medium tanks) was to support the operation of 102 Brigade. Artillery support was available.

10 Brigade (14 Punjab and 6FF) was part of 7 Division and concentrated in BHAI PHERU (code word ‘Brother Turner’) on LAHORE-MULTAN Road. 13 Lancers (medium tanks) and available artillery was to support the operation. Recce and support company, less platoon, was under command. 4 Corps Artillery was to support the operation GRAND SLAM. It consisted of 39 Field Regt., 10 Medium Regt., 28 Medium Regt., 124 Heavy Battery., 34 Heavy Regt., 11 Battery light anti-aircraft, 29 anti-aircraft Regt and 17 Corps Locating Regt. 7 Division Artillery consisted of 21 Field Regt., 27 Field Regt and 107 Locating Battery.

For operation GRAND SLAM no formation in reserve was available.

Enemy Forces
10 Division HQ was located at AKHNOOR. 191 Brigade (with seven infantry battalions) was deployed from LALEL, DEWA, MANDIALA, MOEL, JHUNDA, MUNAWAR, CHITTI TALI and HAMIRPUR. In support 20 Lancers (AMX tanks), two artillery field regiments, one medium battery and two motor batteries were available. 10 Division Artillery was also available when needed. 41 Brigade was holding intermediate defensive position behind TROTI and JAURIAN. 80 Brigade as 15 Corps reserve was also located close to HQ. 10 Division to provide support immediate when needed.

At the advent of Operation GRAND SLAM, the Pakistan Army had an edge in armour and artillery over the enemy, whereas the enemy had an edge in infantry. The enemy had two infantry brigades in reserve and one was deployed behind JAURIAN.

Important Relevant Events – 29 Aug to 1700 hours 02 September
At midday on 29 August orders were suddenly received by 10 Brigade, in the BHAI PHERU concentration area, to move out forthwith to forward concentration area on GUJRAT-BHIMBER road. Both the infantry battalions of 10 Brigade were short of about 200 personnel who had proceeded on annual leave. During July 1965, 4 officers, 2 JCOS and 40 other ranks had been posted out to units operating in AK, from 14 Punjab. Two types of weapons with two types of ammunition were carried by 14 Punjab because American small arms had been recently issued to replace the old .303 weapons.

The road party of 14 Punjab reached the forward concentration at 0730 hours on 30 August. The commanding officer also returned from leave and joined, immediately attending a conference in the Brigade HQs.

Only five sets of maps covering the operational area were issued. The scale of those maps was in meters and kilometers (copies of captured Indian maps) whereas the Pakistan Army was working in yards and miles.

On orders, the American small arms with ammunition, the cumbersome gas equipment and other heavy stores were left at the railway station for onward dispatch to the rear party. Telegrams to all personnel on leave were issued to rejoin the battalion forthwith.

At 0330 hours the artillery guns started shelling the enemy’s known targets and at 0500 hours units of 4 AK sector and 102 Brigade crossed the CFI and attacked their respective objectives.

At 1600 hours on 1^st September the GOC 12 Division held a meeting in the tactical HQs of 102 Brigade and personally explained the plan to all the Brigade, Battalion (14 Punjab and 6 FF) and Artillery commanders. Suddenly 4 enemy Vampire jets dropped bombs and strafed the area. After a few minutes some PAF Sabre jets appeared and in the ensuing dog fight shot down 3 enemy fighters. After the all clear the GOC gave the following orders:

a. Guns to move forward on code word COCA COLA to provide maximum support even at long range.

b. Guns completed move forward into gun positions on code word 7 UP and 10 Brigade to move forward up to the bank of River TAWI.

c. On code word WHISKY, 14 Punjab, the spearhead battalion to start crossing the TAWI. A tank squadron (13 Lancers) to support the crossing and its further advance. 14 Punjab to lead the advance up to half way to JAURIAN and then protect the right flank of the main body of 10 Brigade (6FF and 13 Lancers) by continuing advance to the River CHENAB.

The units of 4 AK sector and 102 Brigade had captured most o their objectives including the vital enemy stronghold of CHAMB by first light on 2^nd September. In the meantime at 0530 hours, through cross country and undulating ground intersected by nullahs, 14 Punjab reached close to the river bank. The battalion was deployed in 2 up formation and ready to commence crossing the River TAWI.

The ground across the river was undulating and even boggy at places. 14 Punjab left the F Ech transport behind with orders to cross as and when the main route was cleared by the main body of 10 Brigade. For immediate close support only 2×3” Mortars and 4×2” Mortars with maximum bombs were carried by the men. Emergency rations and maximum ammunition was ordered to be carried by all ranks. A step up wireless detachment was created to keep link with the Brigade rear link left with the F Ech party.

The enemy artillery shelling and machine gun firing continued sporadically. No enemy movement was seen through binoculars and it was evident that the enemy had left out posts and screen parties to delay crossing of the river.

Even after a few hours no code word was received as such anxious inquiries were made to find out reasons for the delay. HQs 10 Brigade only us to wait for further orders. Some of us thought that perhaps the UNO had intervened. The River TAWI was in spate and five channels were visible which were required to be crossed. An ace swimmer from a forward company quietly slipped into the river and reported back that the water level was about 4 to 5 feet deep, the current was not fast and could be waded through with little effort. About midday uneasiness started prevailing and I personally visited the Brigade HQs to find out the reason for such inordinate delay but no plausible explanation was received. By then the enemy shelling started hitting more targets. On locating enemy gun positions our guns retaliated and soon silenced their guns.

Change in Command – events 1730 hours 2^nd to 4^th September
After waiting for about 11 hours 10 Brigade Order Group was held. All were bewildered to know that the command of operation GRAND SLAM had been entrusted to Major Gen YAHYA KHAN the GOC 7 Division, but previously there had been no indication to anyone about the change in command. However, Pakistan Army had lost 11 precious hours while the enemy was provided much breathing space to reorganize and receive reinforcements. Comments on the change of command will be discussed in the paragraph under ‘Conclusion’.

14 Punjab commenced crossing the river at 1730 hours pm 2^nd September. The Battalion less FEch completed the crossing by wading through by 1900 hours. A tank squadron of 13 Lancers supported the crossing from the bank. Only one sepoy embraced Shahadat due to enemy machine gun fire. The enemy continued shelling on the likely crossing places but no damage was done. 6FF also crossed the river by wading through it.

Advance to Contact Operation TAWI to JAURIAN
After crossing the river which was in spate (it had five channels) at 1730 hours on 2^nd September the battalion captured DAR Village, the enemy firing at long range had retreated leaving behind some ammunition and equipment. However enemy artillery kept on shelling TAWI crossing area but was soon silenced by our guns. It was pitch dark however the forward Rifle Company managed to advance for about a mile. The area at places was muddy, undulating and full of rice fields. Vehicles were unable to move on this terrain, however the next morning before sunrise, advance to contact march commenced cross country. Only 2×3” mortars with about 20 bombers and some spare belts for the machine guns were carried by the men. Enemy artillery OP could see our advance but we continued at brisk pace and soon captured NIKKIAN Village; some enemy soldiers were killed and after half an hour MARJANGI was captured with some enemy ammunition and equipment. The advance towards NAWAN HAMIRPUR continued, first time we were marching on shingle road. It was a big and beautiful village situated on the bank of the River CHENAB. Some enemy soldiers fired on us but they were soon shot by our advancing troops and a few soldiers were even captured. About 40 civilians surrendered who were sent back. In the absence of control points clear message could not be sent to the brigade HQs but the commander was anxious to know the location of the battalion. Aware of the interest of the commander (Brig AZMAT HAYAT) I used the name of NEELO for NAWAN and HUSNA for HAMIRPUR – the location was fully understood. The next urgent message of the commander was, “capture ASP area RING CONTOURS” passed in clear. On the same frequency an enemy operator (an officer) established contact and my intelligence officer receive his message, “If you go to RING CONTOURS you will dig your grave there.” My IO promptly replied, “We will make sure you will dig your grave there.” Strangely this message proved to be a triumph of prophecy because on the night of 4/5 September we had captured about 50 POWs and killed a dozen. On the map RING CONTOURS were shown about 2000 yards in the south of JAURIAN.

To the delight of the troops an orchard with guava fruit was found outside the village. The orchard was blessed with the greatest moment of pride in its life because it provided meal to about 400 soldiers of Islam.

The night was spent guarding the approaches to the river. Before sunrise on the 4^th the advance commenced cross country through undulating ground along the river bank.

From DANPUR Village a few shots were fired from small arms by the enemy but the advance continued. It was a beautiful village but the villagers had disappeared. A SADHU was standing outside the temple of the village and watching the smiling soldiers of Islam advancing. To his surprise the soldiers waved and the SADHU, after some hesitation, waved back. The soldiers shouted ‘MAT DARRO.’

We had covered about a mile or so when suddenly from the north (TROTI hill side) enemy machine gun and 2” mortar fire was coming on us but actually enemy tanks were firing from about two miles away in the north; this fact we came to know after the capture of JAURIAN. But if we had come to know the presence of tanks on our flank, our reaction would have been more aggressive and advanced more cautiously.

The battalion continued advance and soon captured the Village RATTI DANDA at MANCHAK; the enemy bunkers were destroyed by firing rocket launchers and some soldiers were killed. At 1450 hours six enemy Hunter aircraft appeared on the horizon and were on our heads in no time. We all went to the ground promptly. The aircraft zoomed past and started strafing and rocketing our transport. Suddenly three F-86 jets appeared and we saw two Hunters diving down in flames and two F-86 zooming past our heads, turned right and started giving hot chase to the remaining four enemy Hunters. We all shouted ALLAH O AKBAR. Later in the evening we were informed by our brigade on wireless that five enemy aircraft had been shot down by PAF on that day.

Lieut SIDDIQ AKBAR left with a fighting patrol at 1530 hours for carrying out close recce of JAURIAN. Capt ANSARI of 27 Field Regt accompanied the patrol as FOO (forward observation officer) for pounding enemy position in JAURIAN. The patrol managed to reach the outskirts of the village and saw enemy vehicles and 9 tanks in hull down position. Enemy troops were seen moving up and down the AKHNOOR road. The artillery observer engaged all the targets and created havoc and soldiers, tanks and vehicles were scurrying for cover. In the meantime an enemy patrol (about 20 soldiers) moved from a flank to encircle our patrol but all the members of the patrol managed to retire safely. Our shelling and the presence of a force (14 Punjab less transport, less RRs and less about 150 soldiers) was considered a great threat by the enemy and confusion was observed by our recce patrols as some vehicle were using lights.

Enemy Raid
At about 1900 hours while the battalion localities were being adjusted to counter enemy attack with tanks and infantry (possible even after dusk), an enemy party about 150 strong suddenly raided MANCHAK and RATTI DANDA positions held by us. The enemy raiding party had penetrated upto the battalion tactical HQs. From both sides small arms fire continued for about twenty minutes. It was a moonlit night and visibility was good up to 50 to 75 yards. The enemy suffered lot of casualties and about 50 enemy soldiers (including an officer and JCO) were captured. Over a dozen dead bodies were seen in the standing crops. Our casualties were negligible, three had embraced Shahadat and six were wounded. The enemy kept on shelling our position for the whole night. JAURIAN and the main axis JAURIAN-AKHNOOR was shelled by our artillery intermittently with harassing fire. A recce patrol reported some movement of enemy troops about 200 yards close to our north locality. I directed the artillery fire as Capt SABTAIN (the FOO) was present in the Tac HQs (consisting of the adjutant, IO, wireless operator, Intelligence NCO and two runners) and it was a good shoot and enemy ran back. Shell splinters of this shoot also flew over the forward troops. Enemy artillery shell splinters also flew over us and landed some yards away from our half dug trenches. When touched they were red hot.

During the later half of the night the battalion Medical Officer with some men joined Tac HQs, they had covered about 10 miles but luckily they heard my shouting ‘MAT FIRE KARO very light fire KARKE DIKHU.’ According to the MO they heard the shouting from about 200 yards away.

Capture of JAURIAN, 5^th September
At 0600 hours on 5^th September the Commanding Officer 13 Punjab reached with his battalion from the rear and passed the following order of 10 Brigade Commander:

1. 14 Punjab will attack and capture JAURIAN at 0730 hours.
2. 13 Punjab will guard the right flank of 14 Punjab.
3. 4 Corps Artillery will carry out shelling of the area of JAURIAN from
   0700 hours to 0730 hours.
4. PAF will bomb the area for a few minutes.

During our own artillery fire the battalion moved into the forming up position about 1000 yards short of JAURIAN. Enroute 3 enemy soldiers were captured and 3 were shot dead when they tried to escape.

At H hours the attack commenced. The enemy machine gun and other small arms failed to stop the attacking companies. Movement of enemy tanks was heard on the right but the troops with slogans of ALLAH-O-AKBAR, YA RASULLAH and YA ALI charged on both sides of the road and overran the enemy positions. Enemy tanks seen in a clump of trees a few hundred yards on JAURIAN-AKHNOOR road were forced to withdraw in the rear by our accurate artillery shelling. Detachment of Rocket Launchers also fired rockets from close range and by 0900 hours the entire area of JAURIAN had been cleared. The battalion casualties were 3 Shaheed and seven wounded. The following were left behind by the hurriedly withdrawing enemy:

1. 8 light tanks (3 damaged)
2. 8 artillery guns with ammunition
3. Over 3 dozen vehicles (5 damaged)
4. Small arms ammunition dump
5. About two dozen tents, large size
6. Lot of items of ordnance store and equipment
7. A great quantity of dry rations
8. Many dead bodies

At 0930 hours the brigade main body also entered from TROTI-JAURIAN road and was greeted by 14 Punjab with slogans of ALLAH-O-AKBAR. The following message of the President was received by the GOC 7 Division.

“Accept my heartiest congratulations on your remarkable victory of JAURIAN. I am confident you will press on relentlessly until the enemy is completely routed. The nation is watching your progress with pride. Convey my very high appreciation to all ranks under your command.”

From JAURIAN to CHAK KIRPAL
At 0930 hours 6FF commenced advance on JAURIAN-AKHNUR road. Enemy artillery and air force had become very active. Suddenly enemy started shelling the battalion HQs area probably because the enemy OP had seen the concentration. Everybody dispersed and shifted about 50 yards south east of JAURIAN near a water channel. 6FF advance was held up by the enemy tank and machine gun fire. Our Fech (all transport, ration and ammunition carrying vehicles as well) also joined us by 1200 hours. The disposal of the Indian prisoners was a great headache. Only 1 JCO and 10 men were left in RATTI DANDA to guard them. The turbans of Sikh prisoners and their captured rifle slings were used to tie their hands and legs.

At 1615 hours on 5 September transport of 6FF, Recce and Support Company and our Fech vehicles were all lined up on the main axis facing the east (AKHNOOR direction). Suddenly enemy aircraft appeared and both the COs with their parties and the troops hurriedly went to the ground but about 60 vehicles remained on the road. The aircraft rocketed the column but failed to damage any vehicle; only 3 soldiers of 6FF were wounded.

At 1630 hours orders were received to protect the brigade line of communication and the causeway between TROTI and JAURIAN. At 1700 hours I held a conference; close by our position some tanks were located in hull down position when suddenly an enemy tank appeared from the flank and knocked out our one tank only 15 yards away from us. At 2330 hours two rifle companies were sent to occupy TROTI Hill as it was considered vital ground. The companies holding TROTI Hill found abandoned enemy weapons and ammunition.

At 0600 hours on 6th September a message was received from the brigade that India had launched offensive action with full might on LAHORE, KASUR and SULAIMANKI sectors. Now it was all out war but no one was surprised because it was expected soon after we had cross RAWI river. No one thought of his home, family and family members because there was only one thing paramount i.e. to fight relentlessly to kill and kill the enemy. 4 Corps Artillery and two armour regiments left for SIALKOT which had been heavily attacked.

At 0800 hours on 6th September the battalion was ordered to follow 6FF which was held up beyond CHAK KIRPAL. A and B Companies moved in available vehicles at top speed; they were followed by battalion HQs, Mortar Platoon and Recoilless Rifles. According to information the enemy concentrated troops and tanks for counter attack. 13 Punjab and 6FF were ordered to take up depth position ahead of CHAK KIRPAL and 14 Punjab was to take up depth position in area CHAK KIRPAL, a big beautiful village situated on the right side of the road.

At 1030 hours when the forward platoons had started digging in, shelling started on 6FF position established ahead of CHAK KIRPAL in area DALPAT. The shelling was intense, 6FF started withdrawing through our forward localities (only 6 platoons + 4 RRs + Mortar platoon + 4 machine guns). My battalion HQs was hardly 200 yards behind in the area of high embankment of the road. Enemy tanks were firing from close range but our artillery shelling and 3” mortar firing stopped their advance. After some time the enemy brought more infantry and tanks and under the cover of artillery fire started advancing towards our platoon localities. Enemy movements were seen. Because of the withdrawal of 6FF and the enemy advance for counter attack, the situation had become critical. Our two rifle companies, despite my request for releasing them from TROTI defence, was not accepted. Both sides were firing intensely and enemy under cover of fire kept on advancing. Some officers suggested withdrawing behind to hold defence in front of JAURIAN. A sense of gloom and anxiousness prevailed. I, some of my battalion HQs officers and JCOs were going up and down sending ammunition and men (snipers, pioneer platoon and every available man) to reinforce the two forward companies. I kept going up and down and even visited the forward platoon locality. Two RRs of the R and S Platoon had been deployed. Captain MUNIR (a handsome young officer) was standing close to me. Our RR took aim and fired on an advancing tank, it was hit and destroyed. From another locality RR was fired and luckily it had also hit a tank. Own artillery was also engaging the enemy. Capt MUNIR who was standing near his RR, hardly 15 yards from me was directing fire when an enemy tank shell targeted the RR with a direct hit but instead Capt MUNIR was hit and his leg was blown off; soon after he embraced Shahadat. CO 6Ff managed to collect his withdrawing companies and were ordered to hold depth positions. Our medium guns also created havoc and eventually the bold counter action of our troops (who kept on firing small arms), artillery, RR detachments and the couple of own tanks located close to the localities forced the enemy to disappear in the rear. Of course they had suffered a lot of casualties and three tanks were also destroyed. I remember my 2^nd in command (Major ARIF) gave me a pat and embraced for having controlled the situation and said, “Well done, Sir.” Perhaps it was the finest hour of the battalion. Even today the entire picture of the valiant action remains vividly in my eyes.

At 2000 hours the two rear companies joined and one was deployed to hold a locality in front and the other was ordered to hold high ground in the depth considered tactically vital ground.

An interest event took place on the morning of the 6^th. Capt QAMAR ZAMAN was the QM of the battalion. He was bringing the morning meal for the battalion and was leading in a Jeep whereas the 2 ton lorry was loaded with meal utensils and company representatives. Our Bech was located about 4 miles in the rear. Qamar was unaware about the location of the battalion. He kept on driving on JAURIAN-AKHNOOR road, the forward company sentry thinking the battalion was still far. He saw troops deployed on high ground on either side of the road. After driving for about a mile from CHAK KIRPAL towards AKHNOOR he saw some tanks in hull down position and thought they were our tanks in support. But his 6^th sense forced him to return. Reaching close to the no-man’s land he clearly saw the troops in green uniforms and realizing his folly he speeded up his vehicles and reached the safety of the forward company position. It was strange that the enemy troops did not stop the vehicles and did not even open fire on them. Most probably they thought the vehicles to be their vehicles. All of us congratulated QAMAR on his hair breadth escape.

Reasons for the Success
The success from crossing of the RAWI river to capture of JAURIAN is attributed to the following:

a. Enemy defence arrangements were stereotype with main defensive position established at TROTI feature and a few delaying positions on the main axis held by infantry and tanks.
b. The enemy had grossly under-estimated the unconventional outflanking capabilities of the Pakistan Army which achieved complete surprise.
c. The enemy had failed to guard unlikely cross places on the river.
d. The enemy had failed to check the cross country advance of 14 Punjab (without FEch and tank support) because the undulating, marshy and semi hilly area was considered impassable by a battalion. Only a few standing patrols and outposts were employed to guard the approach.
e. The enemy had failed to dislodge the RING CONTOURS hastily prepared position by 14 Punjab with tanks and infantry.
f. The main body of the Brigade had relentlessly pressed on against the enemy’s formidable position of TROTI.
g. Use of superior tactics, boldness and high morale.
h. Prompt and accurate artillery support.

Conclusion
I feel that the battle for the capture of JAURIAN, based on my personal reminiscences and experience, had been comprehensively covered.

Now a few bitter facts have to be mentioned with accompanying comments but there is no intention to malign or degrade any personality. Operation GRAND SLAM was delayed for about 72 hours and during that period the enemy had come to know of the concentration of Artillery 4 Corps, two infantry brigades (10 and 102) and two tank regiments near the CFL. General GUL HASSAN KHAN (who was the Director Military Operations during 1965) mentions in his book ‘MEMOIRS’ that it was not possible to keep such a heavy concentration hidden for a long period. He has also pointed out that the decision to launch GRAND SLAM was inordinately delayed but at last GOC 12 Division, Maj Gen AKHTAR MALIK was told to unleash it on 31 August. Prior to the launching of the operation, during discussions, GOC 12 Division had assured the DMO (later Gen GUL HASSAN) that it would take him no longer than seventy two hours to seize AKHNOOR. Considering the force at his disposal and the known enemy position when his (Gen AKHTAR’s) plan was formulated, the DMO (Gen GUL HASSAN) considered that it could have been done.

The plan was bold and its execution on 1^st September produced resounding success because, despite having known the concentration of the force, the offensive struck the enemy as a thunderbolt. The GOC had a tight grip over the conduct of the operation and the units under his command.

From 0500 hours to about 1600 hours on 2^nd September there was no activity and the units of 10 Brigade were waiting anxiously for the ‘code word’ to move. The reason for the delay was that GOC 7 Div (Gen YAHYA) had been ordered by the Chief to take over command of Operation GRAND SLAM.

According to the DMO (later Gen GUL HASSAN) on 2^nd September, late in the afternoon, the Chief came to the GHQ operation room and said that he had effected a change in command. Gen YAHYA, who had his HQs nearby, was to relieve Gen MALIK. He (the DMO) was stunned by this disclosure because the latter had told the DMO that GOC 12 Division would be handing over after AKHNOOR had been captured.

It is relevant to mention that I had the honour of translating Gen GUL HASSAN’s book ‘MEMOIRS’ and in that process I had over 35 sittings with him. We discussed many important events including operation GRAND SLAM, change of command and the delay in crossing of the river TAWI. When I asked him directly if the President was instrumental in effecting the change in command, he declined to comment. He however agreed that the change in command proved to be like “changing of horses in mid-stream.” If change in command was necessary then it should have been decided before launching of GRAND SLAM by dividing it into two phases. All concerned were also required to be informed.

The aim was to capture AKHNOOR and its maintenance was paramount. The high command also ignored the teachings that for complete annihilation of the withdrawing enemy, advancing troops must continue to accelerate the pace and remain at the heels of the enemy so as not to allow them any time for reorganization and regrouping. History will not forgive the personalities responsible for the delay because Pakistan lost a position opportunity of capturing AKHNOOR, cutting off of supply lines of at least three Indian Divisions, winning a stunning victory and forcing India for settlement of the Kashmir issue.

The Indian senior commanders (15 Corps Commander Lt Gen KATOCH, GOC 10 Div Maj Gen CHOPRA and the forward brigade commander with 7 infantry battalions) had displayed utter lack of enterprise in comprehending the prevailing situation during the last week of August 1965 for conceiving a bold plan for the aggressive defense in CHAMB-JAURIAN sector. After the artillery shelling from 0330 hours to 0500 hours on 1^st September it was evident that an attack on the Indian positions would be launched by Pakistan Army but despite this hardly at a few places stubborn resistance was offered.

From 0500 hours to 1700 hours on 2^nd September there was no attempt by Pakistani offensive forces to cross the river TAWI. The delay of about 11 hours was a great blessing for the Indian senior commanders because it provided respite for improving their defences, prepare intermediate positions and rush reinforcements. But the brisk advance and out-flanking movement of the Pakistani force had effectively neutralized their counter efforts and actions. After the capture of JAURIAN on 5^th September from the left behind tanks, guns, vehicles, ammunition dump, arms, ordnance store, prisoners and dead bodies there was sufficient evidence to show that panic had prevailed and that the command and control had become ineffective.

On 5^th and 6^th September the enemy Division Commander had sufficient troops at his disposal with support to artillery and tanks to launch a determined counter attack on the outstretched depleted 3 Battalions of 10 Brigade. But he lacked flexibility of mind to meet a favourable situation promptly and seize opportunities offered by the opposing side. His actions remained passively stereotype.

On 8^th September it was a dark night; the Battalion after having been relieved was to commence journey to SIALKOT sector because the situation had become critical. The Battalion convoy had halted on the bank of the river TAWI for the rear party to join. Enemy long range guns were shelling the crossing places of the river and shells were exploding close to the convoy. Nothing could have been more heartening to us than the warm and affectionate embrace with which colonel of the Battalion, Brig A.K. AKBAR greeted the battalion at the bank of the TAWI wearing the uniform of a colonel. He had exposed himself to great danger to come so close to the battle field. He warmly shook hands and gave SHABASH to all ranks who he had collected and addressed for a few minutes; this enhanced everyone’s morale. Thus ended the battle of JAURIAN with a pleasant surprise.

Bibliography

1. Memoirs – Lt Gen GUL HASSAN KHAN
2. My Version – Gen MUSA KHAN
3. September 1965, Before and After – Brig AMJAD ALI
4. The Pak-India War 1965 – Maj Gen SHAUKAT RIZA
5. The Indian Army after Independence – Maj PRAVAL
6. Many more books, etc.