War is a constant feature of human history and often peace is described as intervening period between successive wars. Although all wars are destructive to life and property, the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815), World War I (1914-19) and World War II (1939-1945) are considered to be the major or total wars. These wars were ‘waged between several major states, …[for] popular national and ideological goals, by means of mass conscription and massive fire power’.2 The destructive power of modern weapons especially catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons forced mankind to think about limited wars. While there is no agreed definition about limited war, there is a general consensus that any war limited in space, means, and ends or involving restraint by belligerents is a limited war. The Korean War is considered to be the earliest example of limited war in the post-World War II era. Vietnam and the Falklands are also considered limited wars because of the limited space, means or ends which characterised these wars.
There is a perpetual debate as to whether it is possible to conduct a successful ‘limited war’, Indian misconception of Cold Start Doctrine with Proactive Strategy is a recent addition in this regards. It is argued that a successful limited war is possible provided both the belligerents agree to restrict their means and show restraint. The Kargil conflict between Pakistan and India in 1999 (both nuclear armed states) is a recent example. This essay will argue that it is possible to conduct a successful limited war, and will utilise the examples of the Korean, Vietnam, Indo-Pakistan and Falklands wars to justify this contention. It will commence with an overview of limited war theories in order to derive a criteria to evaluate the relative success of a limited war. It will then illustrate how success was achieved in each case.
The concept of limited war is not a new phenomenon. Clausewitz (1780-1831) identified that there are two distinct forms of war. One is based on the total annihilation of the enemy. The other form of war is limited and occurs when annihilation is impossible because of the political aims or because a protagonist possesses inadequate military means to accomplish annihilation.3 While the former is fought for the elimination of the opponent’s political independence, the later aims to obtain favourable terms for negotiation of a peace.4 He argued that: ‘each age had in its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions’, which determine whether war would be total or limited, and what would be the limits.5
‘The term ‘limited war’ is imprecise as it is found in ordinary usage among writers on war’.6 The term is generally used in historical and contemporary context. Historically, the wars fought in 18th century Europe are considered limited wars. After French revolution (1789), these wars turned into total war or as Jomini describes them to be ‘national Wars’.7 The Russo-Japanese War (1904 – 1905) is considered the first great war of the 20th century,8 however, British naval historian Julian Corbett argues that it was also a limited war as it was fought for a limited object, ‘the assertion of certain claims over territory which formed no part of the possessions of either belligerent’. Although it was fought between two armed nations rather than armies alone, the object was limited and it was abandoned rather than risking all the men and material employed.9
Contemporary limited war theory developed after World War II. However prior to this time, comprehensive destruction of the enemy was considered to be the only way to achieve victory. After World War II and primarily due to the effect of nuclear weapons proliferation, emphasis has been placed on avoidance of general war and achievement of political objectives through limited military means.10 The theory involves the collective efforts of civil and military establishments, academics and weapons developers particular to the nuclear era. Leading US civilian strategists William Kaufmann, Robert Osgood and Henry Kissinger criticised this theory on two basis. First, massive retaliation in response to minor provocations was not considered as a credible deterrence to enemy. Secondly, this theory emphasized on total victory and presented no option for lesser victories with limited means. Hence, limited war was considered to be a link between US policy and its power.11 The prime factor behind these efforts was to avoid another world war rather than limitation on military capabilities. Although it is considered to be linked with particular time in US foreign policy, it is also relevant to international environment because of global appeal to avoid unnecessary sufferings.12
Various strategists defined limited war in different ways. British strategic analyst John Garnett provides a comprehensive understanding of limited war theory. He believes that the term limited war is used in four distinct forms in contemporary era which are based on geographic area, objectives, means employed and selection of targets. Firstly, ‘[this term] is sometime used to describe wars which are limited geographically… limited war is a term which is applied to wars which are fought in, and confined to, restricted areas of the world surface’. Several different wars are identified as limited wars on this account, which include the Korean War, Vietnam War, Indo-Pak War of 1965, Yom Kippur War. However, the critics of this criteria argue that wars are fought quite destructively within this limited area so they can be known as ‘local wars’ since they are restricted geographically, but they may not be limited in means and ends.13 Therefore, wars limited geographically cannot be the only criteria upon which we rest our definition of limited war.
Academics also hold that limited wars are those which are ‘fought for limited objectives’. So the difference between limited and unlimited war is the limited objectives, hence World War II is identified as unlimited war since the allied objective included unconditional surrender. However, the critics of this definition argue that wars with limited objectives could still be fought with great harshness. Moreover, one belligerent may restrain himself consciously in usage of means to obtain limited objectives, whereas others may use all available resources or his objectives may not be limited. So the definition based on the limited objectives also seems inadequate on its own.14
Academics also argue that limited wars are ‘fought with limited means… wars in which restraint is practiced by the belligerents in respect to the quantity and quality of the weaponry used in the conduct of war’.15 An example of this is the Korean War where nuclear weapons were available but not used. However, the problem with this criterion is Indo-Pakistan wars and Arab-Israel wars were not limited wars because both belligerents used all the military means available to achieve the objectives. Additionally, in the case of Arab-Israel wars, the annihilation of Israel was one of the objectives of Arab states, which is not a limited objective. Another objection to this criterion is that ‘the means employed to gain the object only loosely correlates with war aims’.16 In Afghanistan in 2001 and in Libya in 2011 US and NATO were able to overthrow regimes without significant ground intervention.17 So this definition is also considered inadequate in isolation.
The fourth criterion is war in which some restraint is shown in the selection of targets. French president Charles de Gaulle envisaged a war ‘in which two super powers [United States and Soviet Union], while battling it out with nuclear weapons in Europe, agreed to restrain themselves from striking each other’s homeland’.18 This type of war was envisaged to be geographically limited to Europe, limited in objectives, might be limited in means as well because low yield nuclear weapons were to be used for selected target only. The recent example of this kind of delusion is Indian initiative of Cold Start Doctrine with Proactive Strategy. This is based on the belief that a strategic space for limited war exists under the nuclear umbrella. India contends a limited conventional conflict is possible with high intensity and fast tempo operations, while remaining below Pakistan’s perceived nuclear threshold.19 Pakistan believes that any war imposed by India will be considered a total war and tactical nuclear weapons empower it to counter any such move by India without using strategic nuclear weapons.20 Hence, this criterion is also problematic when viewed in isolation as nuclear weapons may be used and one might think it to be a limited war whereas for others it may not be limited war.
To summarise, the limited wars are those wars which are limited in geographic area, objectives, means employed and selection of targets. All wars will have some characteristics of this criterion and if any war includes all these characteristics, it will be considered an ideal form of limited war. However, it is important to understand that limited war should not be considered as an alternate form of warfare. As Adam Elkus (Security and foreign policy analyst associated with Small Wars Journal) has articulated ‘War has truly one nature, and its character in any given conflict is predominantly determined by its political object’.21
The validity of limited war concept can be verified from the fact that there have been more than 50 conflicts between different states since Second World War but the superpowers got close to direct confrontation to each other only on the Cuban Missile Crises of 1962.22 British Field Marshal Michael Carver also supports this argument by identifying that all wars since the beginning of nuclear age are limited and conventional wars due to various reasons despite there were many civil wars.23
Korean War (1950 – 1953) is an example of a successful limited war since throughout the campaign, the US administration continued to restrict ends and means. US Foreign Policy expert Robert Osgood argues although it is questionable whether they were successful in fighting efficiently, but they were successful in restricting it to limited war.24 The major consideration for every action by US and coalition forces in Korea was to avoid any provocation that would enable the communists to intervene and turn the war into a third world war. US President Truman recalls:
Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: to prevent a third world war and the terrible destruction it would bring to the civilized world. This meant that we should not do anything that would provide the excuse to Soviets and plunge the free nations into full-scale all-out-war.25
Hence the US administration deliberately limited its political objectives in Korea. The military means employed were also restrained to avoid igniting a third world war or over commitment of American resources in Korea, to prevent giving a free hand to communists in Europe. This was achieved by restricting all military actions to the Korean Peninsula and avoiding any action which could be provocative like blockade of Chinese main land.26 It is considered a limited war at strategic level.
The Vietnam War (1955 – 1975) was fought as a part of wider US strategy of containment of communism. It is a good example of misjudgement of a war. During Korean War, the major concern of US establishment was to avoid the spill over of the conflict to Chinese mainland and avoid the usage of nuclear weapons. The US administration misjudged the nature of the war, while US believed it to be a limited war; it was total war for North and South Vietnam.27 The validity of the fact that ‘what one state believes to be limited objective may be an object of core strategic importance to the opponent’.28 Contrary to Korea, in Vietnam the limitations were posed because political objectives did not warrant the costs of expansion.29 In Korea and Vietnam Wars, the losses to US forces were well beyond the expected attrition. As both wars went on for longer times, North Korea and North Vietnam adopted the policy of attrition. Resultantly, these wars became unpopular at home front. US had to alter political objectives for graceful exit. In Korean War, the objective shifted to maintaining North and South Korean border at 38th parallel, whereas in Vietnam a fragile peace enabled withdrawal.30
The Falkland Islands War (1982) is another example of a successful limited war. Argentine forces invaded and occupied the Falklands Islands on 2 April 1982. The British government despatched a naval task group to retake occupied territory and the war ended with Argentinean surrender to British forces ten weeks later. British professor Lawrence Freedman identifies it to be ‘a textbook example of a limited war; limited in time, in location, in objectives and in means’.31
The Kargil War between India and Pakistan (May-Jul 1999) is a recent example of limited war between two nuclear armed states. The war started when Kashmiri freedom fighters occupied heights vacated by Indian Army in winter season. It was localised to Kargil district of Kashmir and other areas along the Line of Control (the de facto border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir). As the situation escalated, Pakistan armed forces also got involved. However both sides ensured to keep it limited to Kargil area only. Although both sides have different claims, the causalities on each side were around 500 killed and 1000 wounded. International diplomatic efforts coupled with the risk of escalation to nuclear threshold, diffused the situation and both forces returned to their earlier positions. Adam Elkus asserts Kargil to be characterized by ‘slow, heavily telegraphed political and military moves designed to gain an advantage without triggering general war’.32 To date, it is the only example of conventional warfare between nuclear armed states. ‘Continuous contact between the two governments, both formal and back channel, doubtlessly played a key role in this restraint’.33
US think tank RAND Corporation recognises Kargil as a successful limited war as ‘at least one of Pakistani objective was to secure territory, however marginal. Of course, its other objective [was] to internationalize the conflict, [which] was just as salient… [as] these meagre territorial ambitions’.34
Limited war in Indo-Pak subcontinent is an illusion to Indian military hierarchy. Indian Army Chief General V P Malik describes:
With nuclear weapons here to stay, the probability of an all-out, high intensity regular war will remain fairly low. Even if a conventional war does break out, it is likely to be limited in time, scope and space: some people call that a sub-conventional war or limited conventional war. Such a war would have to be conducted within the framework of carefully calibrated political goals and military moves that permit adequate control over escalation and disengagement. Such precautions, however, do not rule out altogether a large scale conventional war with nuclear or non-nuclear weapons.35
The limited war concept of Cold War era is further validated by peculiar environment of South Asia. RAND research analyst Ashley Tellis describes the situation in a better way:
I believe that limited war should be viewed not as a product of the proclivities of the state, but rather as a predicament resulting from a specific set of structural circumstances. The transparent presence of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent for the first time makes unlimited wars untenable as a matter of state policy. Ideally, they should also make war itself obsolete. But oftentimes, nuclear weapons don’t do that. So we are confronted with a dilemma. On one hand, unlimited war is not feasible, but on the other hand, the obsolescence of war is not assured. And if one is confronted with this vise, then the only alternative one has is to think of how to manage and prosecute limited war successfully… it actually represents a dilemma of the nuclear age. And it is a challenge that faces India both with respect to Pakistan and with respect to China. In both cases, unlimited war is not feasible. There is also no guarantee that war is obsolete. And therefore the challenge of limited war confronts India squarely, both with respect to its northern and its western borders.36
Success in limited war depends on the consent of both belligerents as exhibited in Kargil. Interestingly, even in Indian context, there is a difference of opinion in military, academic and political sphere. While General Malik and Ashley Tellis continue to hold that ‘limited war was, and still is, a strategic possibility’,37 US Department of Defence Advisor Peter R Lavoy argues that Indian politicians differ from professional military thinking by believing: ‘limited war is not a viable option in a nuclear context’.38 Michael Carver’s argument about limited war is also relevant in this regard:
War therefore, if it is to be a rational ‘other means’ of the continuation of state policy, will have to be conventional and limited. Nations however powerful, will have to accept limits and recognize, as Sun Tzu did, that after the fighting is over, one has to continue to live next door to one’s opponent. As the Soviet Union’s military doctrine emphasizes, it is superiority in the ‘correlation of forces’ that gives a nation the freedom of action-that essential of strategy-to determine the limits. The weaker party, on the defensive, or the one who is not prepared to go as far as his opponent, has no choice.39
Indo-Pak military standoff of 2001-2002 further validates this aspect. A terrorist attack on Indian parliament on 13 December 2001 was attributed to Pakistan by India. Although armed forces of both states were on highest alert for nearly two years, hostilities did not breakout between both the nuclear armed neighbours. Despite all preparations and Kargil example of limited conflict, Indian politicians conformed to Michael Cravers argument and did not agree to limited war logic presented by Indian military. This situation was similar to Vietnam War where Indian military believed in limited war whereas Pakistan made it clear that any war imposed on Pakistan would be considered a total war. Adam Elkus recognises that success in limited war is dependent on the behaviour of both the belligerents.40 The same fact was already identified by Clausewitz:
It took two to fight a limited war. If your opponent was prepared to exert himself to the utmost to achieve his objective, you had no choice but to do the same. The logical escalation to ‘absolute war’ had then to be accepted…the strategist must always have the ideal of absolute war clearly in mind. You had to approximate to the ideal form ‘when you can and when you must’.41
In conclusion, the war is a perpetual feature of human history. The destruction of Second World War and prolonged Cold War acted as a catalyst for the development of limited war concept, primarily in US policy circles. Despite various critics, there is a general consensus that any war limited in space, means, objectives and target selections is an ideal limited war. While Korean War is the earliest example of limited war at strategic level, Vietnam War was misjudged to be a limited war. Falklands War is another successful example of limited war. Kargil war is a recent example of a limited war between two nuclear armed states which was only possible due to mutual consent of both belligerents to avoid a nuclear confrontation. Whereas both belligerents in another situation were on the brink of war for two years but did not attempt a limited war, primarily because one belligerent did not agree to limit any impending threat. Hence it proves the argument; it is possible to fight a successful limited war only when both the belligerents agree to keep it limited.
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End Notes
2Robert E Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War,’ in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 349.
3Gordon A. Craig, ‘Delbruck: The Military Historian,’ in Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), 341.
4Michael Howard, ‘Limited and Absolute War,’ in Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002),49.
5Howard, ‘Limited and Absolute War,’51.
6James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), 190.
7Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War, 191.
8Piotr Olender, ‘Battle of Tsushima,’ in Russo-Japanese Naval War 1904-1905 (Poland: Stratus, 2010).
9Julian Corbett, ‘Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,’ in Strategic Studies A Reader, ed. Thomas G Mahnken and Joseph A Maiolo (London: Routledge, 2008), 127.
10Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War, 348-349.
11Bob Warrington, The American Approach to Limited War, accessed May 19, 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA440619 (),8.
12Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War’, 349.
13John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett, and Phil Williams, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975), 121-122.
14Baylis et al., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, 122.
15Baylis et al., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, 122. “Adam Elkus, 16The Strategic and Operational Dynamics of Limited War,’ Small Wars Journal, April 2012,1.
17Elkus, ‘The Strategic and Operational Dynamics of Limited War,’1.
18Baylis et al., Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, 124.
19Cdr M Azam Khan, India’s Cold Start is Too Hot, accessed May 19, 2013 http://www.usni.org/magazines/pro-ceedings/2011-03/indias-cold-start-too-hot. 20Adil Sultan, Pakistan’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Impact of Drivers and Technology on Nuclear Doctrine, accessed May 19, 2013, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1340000409_86108059.pdf ().
21Elkus, ‘The Strategic and Operational Dynamics of Limited War, 2.
22Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War’, 349.
23Michael Carver, ‘Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,’ in Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986),790.
24Robert E Osgood, ‘Limited War and Korea,’ in War, ed. Lawrence Freedman. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 338.
25Osgood, ‘Limited War and Korea’,
26Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War’, 340.
27Elkus, ‘The Strategic and Operational Dynamics of Limited War,’2-3.
28Elkus, ‘The Strategic and Operational Dynamics of Limited War,’2-3.
29Osgood, ‘The Reappraisal of Limited War’, 350.
30Bob Warrington, An American Approach to Limited War, 10.
31Lawrence Freedman, Reconsideration: The War of Falkland Islands 1982, accessed May 19, 2013,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/36819/lawrence-d-freedman/reconsiderations-the-war-of-the-falkland-islands-1982 ().
32Elkus, ‘The Strategic and Operational Dynamics of Limited War,’4.
33Peter R Lavoy, ed. Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 124.
34Ashley J Tellis, Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella: India and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001),80.
35General V.P Malik, Kargil War: From Surprise to Victory (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2006), 365.
36Ashley J Tellis, Future Fire: Challenges Facing Indian Defence Policy in The New Century, accessed May 19, 2013, http://carnegieendow-ment.org/pdf/files/futurefire.pdf (),4.
37Malik, Kargil War, 366.
38Lavoy, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia, 331.
39Michael Carver, ‘Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age,’ in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986),814.
40Elkus, The Strategic and Operational Dynamics of Limited War,’4.
41Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Peter Paret and M Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 581.
