Pakistan is writing a classic military history of the blow-by-blow fighting against insurgents. Military law enforcement operations in Waziristan, Swat, Dir, and recently in Tirah valley make an irrefutable case for where the laurels lay for the victories and where the blame lies for the retreats. Lack of Civil-military coordination and gap of communication or information sharing is hurting the cause of the military. Pakistan Army deserves civilian support. However, that is possible once common man knows what’s happening on the front.
In most of law enforcement operations in Pakistan’s tribal belt, Pak army is asked for a solo flight. This breaks the civilian relationship between the tribal and settled areas. To keep both wings balanced and to have a successful ‘National counter-insurgency Strategy’, there could be ‘Military Operations and Civilian provincial Development Support’ going side by side. This strategy will keep law enforcement operations reinforced and simultaneously maintain a link between civilians of both areas. With the inception of the 18th amendment, provincial government will feel more responsible in assisting the federal government for any development support that it can extend for the uplift of tribal areas. It will be a joint civilian and military effort that will enlist provincial, federal bureaucracy, political acumen, and military officers to build hospitals, schools, roads, and other infrastructure to win over the hearts and minds of not only tribal but also settled areas’ people. Any grand strategy which entails employment of army with its solo flight in tribal areas will be a strategic as it has proved in South Waziristan.
No strategy is possible without the involvement of local tribal leaders. Hence, working closely with the tribal chieftains, the army needs to make overtures to the tribal leaders in the newly established Taliban-free areas. Their support and consent will further strengthen steel curtain against the insurgents. History is a witness that the people from the areas like Tirah have proved to be very good soldiers and officers. Hence, there is a dire need for the construction of Cadet Colleges in these areas so that this may not only prove a hub of army recruitment, but may also contribute to the direct establishment of the writ of the government. More students from the region in such colleges will not only uplift this area, but would also bring obedience and order into the lives of the people around such establishments.
At the moment, consolidation of the Pak Army bases and bridging the gap between the local people and the army must be the main thrust of the strategy. This may require a troop-intensive strategy. But in the long run, this may be committed to shrinking it.
We need to take personal interest in tribal areas as these are the centerpiece of our border strategy. For that matter, As I normally write that Pakistan needs a DE foreign policy (A blend of defense and foreign policies)- it will keep the Foreign Office and the GHQ on the same page. Both will hold responsibility for military strategy and foreign policy, the combination of which will bring some changes at the policies execution level. Saying it enough just might make it so, especially if it caught on the Prime Minister House which is now occupied by Nawaz Sharif- one of the guarantors by the TTP for negotiation process.
When an insurgent realizes that he cannot defeat regular army in the battlefield, he turns up to an urban terrorism campaign. This involves, bombing civilian and military targets (attacks on election rallies, bazaars, Mehran airbase, GHQ, KAMRA etc), kidnapping of renowned and rich people of a locality, gaining ransoms to fund their organization and resultantly acquiring weapons, and having imprisoned important governmental functionaries (kidnapping of VC of Islamic College University Peshawar, Mr. Ajmal Khan) exchanged for hostages. In the circumstances, tracing down the hatchery of the insurgents is the best military strategy.
This would be followed by “isolate, weaken, fight”. In case of insurgents in tribal areas of Pakistan, it’s a well known fact that they have been supported by a few foreign agencies. Hence, first, any such life-line that is supplying them money, material and weapons must be cut-off. Similarly, the other life-lines of the insurgents must be trimmed before going for an all-out operation. Take the example of Tirah valley. In Tirah valley, the most important link that supports and keeps the insurgents breathing is their life-line back into Afghanistan. All bridges that link Afghanistan with Tirah valley must be guarded and filtered that the army believes eased Al-Qaeda and the TTP mobility. Later troops move into one village after another. Such move will enable Pak Army to make a steel curtain in the valley which will keep the insurgents away from settled areas like Peshawar. This will isolate them. Then, it’s important that the public opinion in the region must be molded. This is possible by pamphlets and different other means in which writ of the government must be explained in the light of Quran and Sunnah.
This will not only help in winning hearts and minds of the people, but would also weaken the insurgents’ grounds. Now as the insurgents will be internationally isolated and locally weakened, a minor strike of ‘fight’ will bring the entire edifice down. In the meanwhile, troops must construct inside Tirah. To make fortification faster, troops must bring disposable and quick-fit equipment and materials necessary to austere operating base.
If the insurgents agree to negotiate, negotiate along with political parties’ representation. This will make it multilateral talks which will give a serious look to the public. However, negotiation must be followed by rebuilding tribal areas. Using backwardness as a reason of their backwardness is enough. There must be a change in tribal areas. Construction of roads, schools colleges and offices related to the governance of tribal areas must be established in the vicinity. This would mean “negotiate, rebuild and educate”.
There is a strong correlation between public opinion in war time and the effects of casualties on the part of Pak Army. Human loss is acceptable to the public if it thought the Pak Army could and should win. Such sentiment is possible only and only if the gap between military operations and public awareness is shrunk. For that matter, establishment of a strategic planning cell for civil-military understanding (that would take a long-term look at security issues for both’s understanding) is a prerequisite. Moreover, functions like the recently held Yom-e-Shuhada are extremely necessary. Likewise, there is a need to establish a ‘counter-insurgency academy’, to share civilian approach with the commanders. This will also contribute in bridging the gap between the civilian and military opinions.
Moreover, the idea is to inform people what had gone wrong till now and provide clear benchmarks for the public to measure progress, like the growth of insurgents, their supporting groups and countries which assist them to carry out their subversive activities in Pakistan. The public would be shown that Pakistan’s law enforcing agencies are making headway; deflating the pressure from Afghan border. The goal would remain the same: a united, resilient and democratic Pakistan. The Pak Army does not need to come up with a new strategy, but would do a better job by describing the strategy already in place.
In a country where military takeover has been a routine, this might be considered a step towards militarization of democracy. However, we need to grow up to watershed between a peacetime military takeover and a wartime civil-military relationship. Military is not a national institution to be scared of. It’s the custodian of a country’s borders and during counterinsurgency, it deserves our full and unconditional support.
Let me repeat: support to the Pak Army for law enforcement operations in tribal areas is not waning; in fact, ignorance and unaware nature of the war to civilians is making them indifferent. If the Pak Army is in the midst of this war, the people of Pakistan must be given this realization. Soldiers cannot win a war on the front which is not known to their supporting countrymen.
