Introduction
All out war started on 20 November 1971 in East Pakistan and within one week most of the formations were shattered against overwhelming attacking Indian forces. The relative strength is mentioned in subsequent paragraphs. Eventually on 16 December 1971 the Pakistan Eastern Command (Commander Lieut General Niazi, known as Tiger Niazi) unconditionally surrendered about 65000 soldiers. It was a humiliating and decisive defeat and above all East Pakistan was lost. It was a tragedy of disgraceful nature, the scar of which would not heal till a decisive victory has been achieved against our deceitful adversary on the battlefield.
The following message is quoted for the interest of our learned readers:
PAK Army Flash/Unclass
141332E
G-0013
For Governor and Gen Niazi from President (.) Governor’s flash msg to me refers (.) You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds (.) The nation is proud of you and the world full of admiration (.) I have done all that is humanly possible to find an acceptable solution to the problem (.) You have now reached a stage where further resistance is not longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose (.) It will only lead to further loss of lives and destruction (.) You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of all armed forces personnel all those from West Pakistan and loyal elements (.) meanwhile I have moved U.N. to urge India to stop hostilities in East Pakistan forthwith and guarantee the safety of the armed forces and all other people who may be the likely targets of miscreants.
14 Dec 71.
Some bitter views and facts
The whole nation fell into deep despair and felt ashamed of the performance of the Commander Eastern Command and most of his formation commanders. Military critics and strategists were astonished as to how a large number of soldiers (about 65000) under experienced senior commanders had surrendered. He it is relevant to mention for the interest of readers that between 21 November 1971 to 16 December 1971, the casualties suffered by the Eastern Command were:
Killed Officers JCOs OR
53 101 2796
Wounded 45 42 825
This means that about 6500 soldiers were available to defend DACCA and some other strategic centres. But at the start of the all out war the Eastern Command forces were scattered in penny packets all along the borders. The high command was over haunted by the fear that any sizeable territory seized by the Mukti Bahini would be recognised by India as Bangladesh therefore the 2000 miles long border with India was thinly defended and nowhere strong for counter attack/offensive.
Relative Strength
| Pakistan Eastern Command – | Corps 1 |
| Division – 4 (one adhoc) | |
| Brigades – 9 | |
| Infantry battalions – 24 | |
| Armour Regiment – 1 (light tank) | |
| Artillery Regiments – 6 | |
| Anti aircraft regiment – 1 | |
| Mortar batteries – 5 | |
| Air Squadron – 1 | |
| Navy Gunboats – 4 | |
| Indian Attacking Forces – | Corps 3 |
| Divisions – 9 | |
| Brigades – 34 (one parachute) | |
| Infantry battalions – 112 | |
| (8 Mukti Bahini + 32 Border Security) | |
| Armour regiments – 3 (medium tanks) | |
| Tank squadron – 3 | |
| Artillery Regiments – 46 | |
| Anti aircraft regiments – 4 | |
| Air squadron – 10 | |
| Navy – Aircraft carrier – 1 | |
| Battleship – 1 | |
| Destroyers – 8 | |
| Landing crafts – 3 | |
| Gun boats – numerous |
Missed opportunities for counter offensive
By 23 Nov 1971 the Indian attacking forces were fully involved in fighting in various sectors of East Pakistan. Whereas there was complete lull on the western front although troops deployed on both sides of the borders were in eyeball to eyeball position.
Ever since the creation of Pakistan the nodal point of our strategy was that “the defence of East Pakistan would depend on the strength of West Pakistan”. Because of the location of our Central Government, vital defence installations, Armed Forces training centres and few other considerations the centre of gravity was in the west. Based on this dictum Pakistan had always kept major portion of its armed forces in West Pakistan for counter offensive role in case East Pakistan was attacked. It was beyond Pakistan’s resources to keep a separate force for each wing, to match or even to acts as a deterrent to our enemy, but however, sufficient forces was always maintained in East Pakistan to involved at least a three times bigger enemy force for a few weeks.
During September 1971 the Pakistan high command had correctly appreciated that an Indian attack on East Pakistan was imminent and that movement along the western border was to forestall Pakistani retaliation to ease pressure on East Pakistan. By 23 November the enemy forces were fully involved in East Pakistan and it was not possible to pull out even a couple of brigades as reinforcement for the west.
In the west initiative for offensive action was with Pakistan. The enemy was aware that one armour and one infantry division each had been positioned north and south of the Ravi River but the chosen point of threat was not known. The enemy was unable to discover the exact location of 2 Corps because mostly it was kept on wheels.
From the deployment of the Indian forces in the west it was evident (as confirmed by various report) that area between DERA BABA NANAK and excluding FAZILKA (Indian II Corps) was thinly held by about 11 brigades. The Indian high command had concentrated its reserve force about 20 to 30 miles in the south of the river Sutlej. Area between Hussainiwala Headworks and Amritsar, a front of about 80 miles, was held by about 7 infantry brigades and one armoured brigade. Bridges, communication centres, roads and towns of strategic and political importance were located only 20 to 30 miles away from the border, whereas Hussainiwala Headworks and the river bridge was hardly a mile away.
The formidable Indian reserve force (First Armoured Division + 14 Division + artillery support) was concentrated in area Farid Kot, Kot Ka Pura and Muktesar, its task was to capture Kasur, Luliani (now Mustafabad), Raja Jung, Raiwind and destroy Pakistan counter offensive force, namely 2 Corps.
On the word “Go” even during peacetime move, the formidable Indian reserve force would have taken 3 to 4 days to cross the existing canals and the rivers Sutlej and Beas. In the event of all out was in the West the Indian reserve force would have been exposed to air threat and also when all the vital bridges over the rivers and communication centres were held by the opposing forces, it would have caused much delay and confusion. Therefore, it was not possible for the Indian reserve force to intervene in the progress of the onslaught of Pakistan counter offensive force at least for 5 to 6 days.
According to various relevant facts between 21 and 25 November 1971, Pakistan high command had missed a golden opportunity to launch a bold counter offensive in RAVI-SUTLEJ corridor. To achieve surprise, with operational planning well in advance, it was possible to concentrate secretly superior forces at the right place and at the right time. By capturing a big chunk of Indian territory of strategic, political and economic interest, Pakistan would have forced an early ceasefire in East Pakistan on advantageous terms and thus saved from suffering humiliation of the decisive defeat, surrendering of about 65000 soldiers and above all, the secession of East Pakistan.
Comments of some Indian writers
Some comments mentioned in the books of various Indian writers are being produced below which would be useful for research by students of Military history on the debacle of East Pakistan.
“The choice of Niazi to replace Tikka Khan was unfortunate for Pakistan whereas Tikka had a dedicated application to material aims and political vision, Niazi was essentially a battalion commander in general’s uniform”. (Victory in Bangladesh – Maj Gen LACHMAN SINGH).
MANAKSHAW (the Indian COS) planned to make maximum use of psychological warfare. In November 71 he conducted operation in such a way that Niazi was induced to move his troops forward to defend important towns and approaches ahead of the rivers. Niazi thus denuded the Dacca Bowl of all fighting troops and so deployed his army that it was incapable of falling back on the Capital across the rivers. MANAKSHAW thus gained a strategic advantage initially and Niazi played into his hands.
Niazi seemed to have lost his nerve as he had no regular troops in or around Dacca that could be relied upon to defend his last citadel. Battles are often decided more by impressions made on a commander’s mind than the actual state of his troops. Any threat from the rear is magnified manifold, especially in the minds of non-fighting elements. A spirit of despondency possessed the higher command in Dacca instead of a heroic spirit born out of despair.
An indirect and major threat of Mukti Bahini operations was to entice the Pakistani forces into a faulty deployment forward of the Dacca Bowl.” (Victory in Bangladesh – Maj Gen LACHMAN SINGH).
“If Pakistan had crossed the international border in West Bengal in pursuit of guerillas as well as to overrun their bases in India in the end of May 1971 and also hitting Indian in the west. That was India’s worst hour, army and civilians were not mentally attuned to immediate war. Pakistan could have gained profitable objectives both in the west and the east before the onset of the monsoon.
Niazi had no control over his command. His HQs was unable to indicate strength of his forces and where they were located. Large quantity of arms and ammunition in dumps fell into Indian hands. The number of troops, the defence potentials, the water obstacles, if Niazi had the heart to fight he could have prolonged the war enough to enable Pakistan’s foreign friends to push through a resolution in the Security Council to safeguard its territorial integrity and compel the Indians to accept it. But Niazi’s rapid collapse saved India this embarrassment. The abject surrender brought Pakistan humiliation which it would find difficult to live with.” (Liberation of Bangladesh – Maj Gen SUKHWANT SINGH).
At 0900 hours on 16 December 1971 Maj Gen NAGRA GOD 2nd Mountain Division sent his ADC and two officers from Para battalion with the message “My dear Abdullah I am here. The game is up, I suggest you give yourself up to me and I will look after you.” NAGRA had been Indian Military Attaché and knew Niazi.
On seeing NAGRA, Niazi broke down and sobbingly commented in Urdu, “The bastards sitting in Rawalpindi have killed.” After crying on NAGRA’s shoulder, Niazi turned to Kher Commander 50 Para Brigade and asked him to name his regiment. KHER told him he was from the Signal Corps. Niazi said in our Army Signal officers were not given brigade to command. KHER said “no wonder you lost the war.” Here it is mentioned that Brigadier Suleman of the Signal Corps was commanding 14 Para Brigade when Niazi had taken over from him.
Message from Gen MANAKSHAW to Niazi and all those in East Pakistan – All India Radio
“Lay down arms before it is too late, the Indian forces have reached all round you. Your air force is destroyed. You have no hope of help from them. Chittagong, Khulna and Noakhali ports are blocked. Nobody can reach you from the sea. Your fate is sealed. The Mukti Bahini and people are all prepared to take revenge for the atrocities and cruelties you have committed. Why waste lives? Do you want to go home and be with your children? Do not waste time. There is no disgrace in laying down arms to a soldier. We will give you the treatment befitting a solider.”
Activities of Indian Agents/Spies
Every member of the Mukti Bahini (the rebels) was an Indian agent. According to Maj Gen Lachman Singh, during the operation the Mukti Bahini provided interpreters, guides, scouts who gave useful information which helped considerably in the quick victory of the Indian army.
The Indian spies had infiltrated into the sensitive areas and communicated valuable information to the advancing forces and to their air force for bombing and strafing bridges, important installations and location of formation HQs. The location of Corps HQs and static units deployed close to it was known to the Indians and daily bombing and strafing took place.
The Corps Signal Battalion was located next to the Corps HQs. According to Capt Muddassir (my son-in-law, later Brigadier) the adjutant told him that the location of the Corps Signal Battalion was subjected to daily strafing. On or about 10 December 1971 an officer patrol was sent to search the area around the position. A man was seen cutting grass and collection leaves; he was considered innocent by the patrol leader and was let off. Some of the Signal sets aerials (despite camouflage) could be seen from about 100 yards away. On 12 December Capt Mudassir took out a patrol to search the area because command post and Signal Centre were strafed. Suddenly the sun rays fell on a bright object in the branches of a tree only 100 yards away from the position. A man was seen hiding in the branches and was told to come down and surrender. As he was trying to reach into his pocket two shots were fired and he fell down with a thud, wounded. He was carrying a small wireless set and was the same grass cutter who was seen a few days back by the previous patrol. He was handed over to the Intelligence unit for interrogation.
Capt Mudassir often went to the Corps HQs where underground Command Post, etc was being dug before the all out war. Civilian labourers were also engaged for the digging. One labourer looked more efficient and well behaved. After the surrender the same labourer was seen in the uniform of a Major of the Indian Army. On seeing Mudassir, he smiled sarcastically, winked and said he had been able to collect the most valuable information and cleverly dodged the Pakistani intelligence staff. It was obvious that many like him would have been lurking in sensitive areas.
Major JOHAL SINGH
The Eastern Command HQs and static units located in the vicinity were being guarded by a rifle company of a Sikh battalion. It was commanded by a Sikh Major named JOHAL (could be corruption of JAHIL) SINGH. He was brutish in his dealings, would lavishly abuse in Punjabi whosoever stood in his way and was often drunk. One day he was calling bad names to the Punjabis (West Pakistanis), calling them cowards, cruel, rapists and murderers. The Sikhs have the art of saying nothing with seriousness. According to Capt Muddissir, he was also standing with some officers and men and listening to JOHAL’s humbug oration. Muddisir stepped forward and respectfully shouted in Punjabi, “Sir, you are also a Punjabi, brave, cordial, generous and religious. Sir, I am sure you are proud of being a Punjabi.” JOHAL looked at him for a few moments and then burst into laughter, saying, “Yes, I am also a Punjabi. Thanks for reminding me.” We all joined in his laughter. He was always respectful to Pakistani senior officers, addressing them as ‘Sir’.
Acts of Valour and Daring Actions
Despite the fact that gloomy situation prevailed in all the sectors, many examples of valour and an indomitable will to fight till the last by junior leaders and men remain proud pages of our history. Some glimpses of such acts are being highlighted as under:
1) D Company 15 Baluch was deployed in GANDADHAR. It was attacked by 14 Kumaon supported by a troop of tanks and artillery. A platoon was holding screen position, it fought gallantly and delayed the advance of the enemy attack, however the enemy outflanked the screen position. On 25 November 14 Kumaon attacked the company position but under the inspiring leadership of Maj SHAJAAT ALI KHAN repulsed the attack and inflicted heavy casualties (76 killed and wounded) on the enemy. After this gallant action the enemy failed to make any further serious attempt against BELONIA-FENI area.
2) On 6th December, the enemy’s 3rd Mountain Brigade and 8th Mountain Brigade mounted silent attack on the locality of 15 Baluch in LAKAHAM area. The attack was repulsed because the enemy had suffered 75 killed. On 7 December D Company was rushed to HAJIGANJ to rescue GOC 39 Division (Man Gen Rahim Khan) who had been ambushed. The Company was soon involved in fighting against a strong enemy force and suffered 22 casualties whereas the enemy also lost many soldiers.
3) B Company 13 FF was assigned the task of covering the CHARKAI approach during the battle of HILLI which started on the night of 3/4 December. The Company locality was subjected to intense shelling. Enemy tanks and air force also participated in the battle but the enemy attacking force was unable to dislodge B Company; the enemy suffered a lot of casualties. Above all the finest example of personal courage and inspiring leadership was evident in the person of Brig TAJAMMAL, Commander 205 Brigade whose brigade defended HILLI and repulsed repeated attacks by the enemy for about 20 days.
4) A Company 13 FF under the leadership of Maj SABIR KAMAL MAYER (SJ and Bar) was deployed in the BAHADRIA area. Maj Sabir had taken special pains to prepare the defence of the company. At midnight on 8 December the enemy launched an attack with superior strength. The attack was supported by tanks (which were able to operate during dark hours) and artillery. At first light enemy aircraft also strafed the locality intensively. A fierce fight ensued and at one time it looked as if the much superior force of the enemy would annihilate 13FF. However, the resolute and indomitable men displayed rare grit and refused to give in. Finding that his only RR was missing the menacing enemy tanks, Maj KAMAL personally handled the gun and destroyed one enemy tank. Maj KAMAL and the gun was spotted by the enemy and the spot was showered with every weapon at the enemy’s disposal. Maj KAMAL received 6 bullets in his chest and embraced SHAHADAT close to the gun. He had achieved the impossible because the enemy halted further action as they had lost 55 soldiers and a greater number were wounded.
5) 12 Punjab (less C Company) was deployed in MOHAMMADPUR area to guard CHUGACHHA-JESSORE approach. One company was holding screen position in area 8 r (relative height). On the night of 28/29 November had concentrated 350 Brigade of 9 Division supported by TSS Squadron (ex 4S cavalry). For two hours the 8r locality and other localities were shelled. The enemy launched 1st J and K Rifles against 8r but the attack was beaten back. During 29 and 30 November the enemy pounded 8r with artillery and mortar fire. A fresh attack supported by tanks was launched. The battle lasted for few hours but the defenders of 8r remained steadfast and continued fighting with determination against ghastly superior enemy who retired in haste and left behind two destroyed tanks and 83 dead bodies. In the entire action the enemy had suffered 113 killed. It was later learnt through the foreign journalists that 1st J and K Rifles was so crippled and demoralized that it had to be left out of combat for the remaining period of the war.
6) BURINDA was occupied by A and B Companies of 12 Punjab. On 4 December the enemy attacked Burinda with Sikh Regiment supported by artillery, tanks and air force. Most of the anti tank weapons had been destroyed by the enemy tanks and the situation had become precarious. But the Company commanders (Capt Ashraf and Capt Saleem Suleman) displayed exceptional qualities of leadership and kept moving from trench to trench exhorting their men to fight till the last. They personally directed artillery fire and handled anti-tank weapons; thus the enemy was not allowed to break through.
7) In the battle of DAULATPUR the enemy had attacked Company localities with artillery and air support. On 7 December 7 Punjab of the enemy was mounted on APC but Maj MUNIT AHMAD personally manned a 75 mm RR and knocked out two APCs and forced the enemy to halt the attack.
8) After the surrender Maj General DILBIR SINGH GOC 9 Indian Division who had served with 4/15 Punjab (now 12 Punjab) visited the battalion and paid rich tributes for their gallantry, particularly on 8r.
9) 25 Punjab had sent a rifle company for the defence of BARAKHATA. A large enemy force managed to isolate but an immediate counter attack by some available elements forced the enemy to break cordon and flee. The enemy left behind a large number of dead and 15 prisoners.
10) The enemy had captured HATHI BANDA/SONAHAT. Maj Abdul Akbar and Hav Mohammad Azam with two fighting patrols charged the intruders and forced them to retire in haste. The enemy suffered heavy casualties; their company commander was also killed. The patrols of 25 Punjab also lost 7 killed including Hav Mohammad Azam.
11) A Company 25 Punjab located at BARUNGAMARI was attacked by an enemy brigade. Capt Ataullah held on to the position for 28 hours and inflicted a lot of casualties on the enemy. The Company had suffered 14 killed (including Capt Ataullah) and 14 wounded. As a tribute to Capt Ataullah, the enemy brigade commander (Brig Verma) gave a ceremonial burial.
12) Capt Asghar who was commander of B company 25 Punjab personally handled the RR and knocked out the enemy leading tank. However his RR was destroyed by the enemy and he was severely wound third time
13) AKHAURA defences were attacked by a brigade group supported by artillery (4 x Field Regts, 1 x Medium Regt and 1 x Heavy Battery) on the night of 30 November and 1st December. The attack was lead by a squadron of tanks and the battle continued till 5 December. During this period the enemy attacks were repulsed because of accurate and intense shelling of 31 Field Regiment, only 10 guns were deployed in the area. The guns repeatedly came under heavy counter bombardment and air attacks but continued to support the infantry defensive positions; on the average each gun had fired 1000 rounds a day. The rush of enemy attack with tanks on the guns did not shake the confidence of the gunners who blunted each attempt.
14) On the night of 8/9 December the enemy infiltrated two battalions and attacked MAGHRA bridge. The attack was led by a squadron of tanks and usual artillery support. Having by passed the main defences of 12 AK, the enemy charged on 27 Brigade HQs. A counter attack on the enemy was personally led by Brig Saadullah. The gunners of 31 Field supported the charge with not only their guns firing at intense rate at blank range but also with their small arms. The presence of the Brigade Commander had infused daring, determination and the will to fight till the end in those who were charging on the enemy. The charge was so fearsome that the enemy was routed leaving behind many dead and 7 of their tanks.
15) Hav YASEEN 31 Field Regiment stuck to his guns, kept on engaging the enemy with direct fire and the gun was silenced only when he fell dead on the trails of the gun.
16) On 27 November the enemy subjected KAMALPUR to intense shelling and strafing and followed it up with three consecutive attacks by 13 Guards and elements of 1st Marhatta. The Company of 31 Baluch fought with determination and repulsed all attacks. The company commander Capt IHSAN MALIK SJ did not allow a dent in the defence of the company and took a heavy toll of the enemy (80 killed including a gunner officer). Finding KAMALPUR too formidable, the enemy outflanked it and captured the area between KAMALPUR and BAKSHIGANJ. The CO, Lt Col SULTAN AHMAD SJ and Bar collected some men and launched an immediate counter attack and succeeded in inflicting partial eviction of the enemy. The enemy remained in blocking the road SHERPUR-BAKSHIGANJ. Maj AYUB SJ (later Shaheed) with a handful of men led a gallant charge against a company of 1st Marhatta and was mortally wounded. Maj Ayub who had acquired the reputation of being omnipresent and a fighter of exceptional qualities fell in BAKSHIGANJ.
17) On 7 December, 31 Baluch withdrew to JAMALPUR and for three days the entire defence work was subjected to shelling, strafing, rocketing and bombing, but very little damage was incurred. It was at JAMALPUR that Lt Col SULTAN AHMAD received a written message from Brig H.S. KLER of the Indian Army to the effect that the situation for JAMALPUR Garrison was hopeless and that the Garrison should better surrender failing which the final blow would be delivered. Col SULTAN sent back a stern reply with a 7.62 bullet saying that the soldiers ought to fight rather than take the pen. Through these messages the entire world came to know of the true spirit of Pakistani soldiers. On the night of 10/11 December the enemy put in probing attack but failed to make any headway. On 11 December 31 Baluch was ordered to withdraw to MADHUPUR. Confident of the formidability of JAMALPUR fortress, Col SULTAN accepted the order “under protest” because breaking through the enemy’s strong cordon was more hazardous and perilous than fighting it only till the end. While the sacrifices of 31 Baluch (98 killed including 4 officers and 2 JCOs and 82 wounded including 4 officers and 4 JCOs) could not avert the outcome of war in East Pakistan, the Battalion displayed indomitable will and spirit of a Muslim soldier.
18) Lance Defender SAKWAR of 29 Cavalry had refused to surrender to the Indians and kept on firing till he was killed in his tank.
The End
The above are but some examples of the courage, determination and leadership qualities which emerged from within those shattered formations which fought the war in East Pakistan. I was lucky to have interviewed many GHAZIS who had participated in the war and also received reports from various units during 2974-76.
42 years have passed but the memory of those horrid days ever remains fresh in my memory box. On hearing news of the surrender millions of Pakistanis had wept, millions had refused to believe and millions had vowed to avenge the disgraceful defeat, but alas there is no MUHAMMAD GHORI among us – only our long range missiles have been named after him.
