The Valorous Story of Pabna Force

Introduction
This is the story of PABNA force consisting of 3 officers, 4 JCOs and 128 other ranks out of which between 26 – 31 March 1971, 2 officers, 3 JCOs and 80 other ranks had embraced Shahadat in the defence of Pakistan. The QUAID had won the priceless gift of freedom for the Muslims of the sub continent and needless to say that the people of Pakistan and Bangladesh (previously East Pakistan) owe all they possess today to the QUAID.

During 1971, before the Pakistan-India War, units and sub units of Pakistan Army had fought valiant actions against the rebels, miscreants and Indian armed infiltrators in various places of East Pakistan.

In March 1971, 25 Punjab (raised on 19 September 1965 at Mardan) was located at Rajshahi. It was commanded by Lt Col SHAFQAT BALOCH SJ, a veteran of the September 1965 war. It has only two companies to take part in action. One of its two companies consisted of Bengalis; it was disarmed and placed under arrest, whereas about one company was attached with Corps HQs, Division HQs and Brigade HQs for guard duties. On the night of 25/26 March, D Company (under strength – 2 officers, 3 JCOs and 80 other ranks) was sent to PABNA, 100 miles from RAJSHAHI on internal security duties. On March 28, 25 other ranks under Maj ASLAM RAJA were sent to help the hard pressed PABNA force (depleted D Company).

Political Situation
The Hindus of India gave moral and material support to the Bengali nationalists, consisting mostly of the Hindu community in East Pakistan. They exploited the linguistic and cultural differences and presented distorted picture of economic disparities between the two wings. The Awami League (AL) had launched a civil disobedience movement since 7 March 1971. Violence broke out almost everywhere. Bengali government servants walked out of their offices. For the next three weeks the situation had become alarming. The leaders of the AL were issuing directives to the civil government and the loyalty of East Bengal Regiment, Police and Intelligence agencies had been won. A massive number of arms had been received from India and issued to Mujahids, Ansars and the Police. Training centres for the Bengali miscreants, young men (particularly students) and political goondas were opened close to the border. Hatred had been cultivated against the West Pakistanis, the Army and Biharis. The troops were insulted, abused and some, who were found alone, were killed. Supply of fresh ration, electricity and water was stopped at some places where troops were stationed. Army units were virtually confined to the limits of cantonments. It was reported by the intelligence agencies and some loyal Pakistani locals that AL had planned to take over the province of East Pakistan through an armed revolt of the Bengali troops, the Indian armed infiltrators and armed miscreants.

In the meantime the sacred bonds of comradeship and spirit de corps were severed and because of malicious propaganda by the Indians, West Pakistani officers, JCOs and NCOs serving with Bengali battalions were mercilessly killed; even family members were not spared.

Military Action
On 23 March 1971 the Army was ordered to plan military action to control the law and order situation, restore government’s authority, disarm the East Bengal Battalions, East Pakistan Rifles and the Police and ensure the security of cantonments, naval base and airfields. Arresting of AL leaders was also included in the task.

H hour was fixed at 0100 hours on 26 March 1971. No written orders were issued but staff officers were sent to brief brigade commanders, who in turn visited battalion and regimental headquarters and issued verbal orders on 25 March.

There was one Division, the 14^th in East Pakistan with four brigades. The division has 19 infantry battalions out of which six were East Bengal Regiments with complete Bengali troops, while only some officers, JCOs and senior NCOs belong to West Pakistan. For the military action the total strength on 25 March 1971 was about 10000, whereas according to the intelligence reports and some loyal locals, there were almost 100000 armed Bengalis who were concentrated at various vantage points for offensive action, creating obstacles and sabotage activities.

But because of pre-emptive action by the Army, the mission to take over the province through armed revolt by the rebels had failed. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman was arrested during the dark hours on 25/26 night. It was a surprise raid.

Order to move to PABNA
The Commanding Officer 25 Punjab was briefed in HQs 14 Division about impending army action in East Pakistan. The orders were that curfew would be imposed on 25/26 March and all the troops belonging to East Bengal Regiments, East Pakistan Rifles and civil police personnel would be disarmed. Disloyal political leaders and goondas would be arrested and vital installations guarded. Initially 23 Brigade (Brigadier Abdullah Khan Malik) was not aware about the task assigned to 25 Punjab. The situation in the areas of responsibility of 25 Punjab was rapidly deteriorating. The presence of the rebels, miscreants and armed Indian infiltrators as reported by the intelligence agencies was as under:

1. One wing of EPR – About 1200 strength at NAWABGANJ – 23 miles from RAJSHAHI.
2. One wing of EPR – About 1000 strong at NAUGAON – about 26 miles from RAJSHAHI.
3. About 500 policemen at SARDAH College – 16 miles from RAJSHAHI.
4. In and around PABNA, great number of armed miscreants and goondas were inciting the people against the Army and West Pakistanis.

D Company was dispatched to Pabna on the night of 25/26 March on internal security duties. As already mentioned above, it was an under strength company. It carried pouch ammunition, only one heavy machine gun and three days rations. The strength of D Company was as under:

• Major Muhammad Aslam Raja
  – later Shaheed. On 28 March he was sent with 25 men to help the hard pressed
  Company at Pabna.
• Captain Asghar Jawaid – the Company Commander, was wounded and managed
  to escape.
• 2/Lieut Rashid Abdullah – later Shaheed
• Sub Shah Mohammad – managed to escape
• N/Sub Fateh Khan }
• N/Sub Abdul Rahim } – later Shaheed
• N/Sub Barkat }
• Other ranks – 135 of which 80 embraced Shahadat and 30-32 were wounded.

Sequence of Events

1. D Company after clearing obstacles enroute reached PABNA at 0730 hours on 26 March 1971. Only a few political leaders were arrested. The civil administration showed inability to cooperate as nearly all the civil servants had been threatened to obey directives of Awami League. All vital installations were guarded by detachments commanded by JCOs.
2. At about 1800 hours on 27 March 1971 all the vital points were attacked by the rebels. Heavy fighting started during which both the sides suffered casualties. The detachment guarding the civil exchange was surrounded by a strong rebel force and efforts to help them had failed. The police station and the civil jail were the strong points of the rebels. For unknown reasons the Police was not disarmed.
3. On 28 March 1971 the Company commander with a platoon raided the Police Station but after inflicting and suffering casualties the raiding party withdrew. The Company commander was wounded during the fighting and 2/Lieut Rashid Abdullah took over the command. The telephone exchange was surrounded by the rebels and one JCO and twenty soldiers were sent to rescue the guard but after suffering casualties the rescue party withdrew; the telephone exchange guards were left to their fate. The Company HQ was also surrounded and both the sides suffered casualties during the fighting.
4. The Company was in touch on wireless with the battalion HQs. Major Aslam Raja was sent by the Commanding Officer to take over the command of PABNA force. He reached by 1000 hours on 29 March after clearing obstacles and opposition of the rebels. Two F-86s were sent to help the Company as a result of which the rebels suffered a lot of casualties but their overwhelming strength continued offensive action, which was repressed with effective fire.
5. In view of the casualties suffered due to heavy fighting it was decided to withdraw the left over strength to RAJSHAHI. The detachment guarding the telephone exchange could not be extricated and they embraced Shahadat fighting to the last man and the last round. According to loyal locals they were mercilessly killed.
6. At 1100 hours on 29 March the left over personnel started withdrawing. The wounded also carried arms and accompanied the main body. After covering a few miles the Company was ambushed and suffered more casualties but continued the withdrawal in tactical order. On 30 March, after crossing 27 miles the Company had suffered 70 dead and 30 wounded and was left with only 40 soldiers to fight overwhelming strength of the rebels and armed miscreants. RAJSHAHI was still 70 miles away.
7. Once the remnant of the Company had reached near the railway station GOPALPUR, it was not possible to move any further due to the constant firing of the rebels. The Company Commander requested for helicopters for lifting the remnant soldiers, including a number of the wounded, but the Division HQs informed them to move immediately to ISHURDI airport which was 7 miles away. The rebels were all around and exchange of heavy fire continued because of which moving to the airport could not be carried out.
8. At about 1800 hours during heavy fire Major Aslam Raja collected all the available commanders and decided that the company would exfiltrate in small parties during the night. Major Aslam, Lieut Rashid Abdullah and Hav Rafique were the leaders of the three parties consisting of 13 men each. Capt Jawaid was the leader of the 30 wounded being carried in 5 jeeps. The wounded party used the kacha track away from the road and thus avoided serious clash with roaming rebels.
9. By midday on 31 March only 50 personnel (including 30 wounded) had reached RAJSHAHI. Enroute due to the firing of the rebels more injuries were sustained by the wounded personnel. There is no authentic report about the fate of Major Aslam, Lieut Rashid Abdullah and others who had failed to reach RAJSHAHI, but it is obvious they had embraced SHAHADAT while fighting for the defence and solidarity of PAKISTAN. The last message received from Major Aslam on the wireless was ‘KHUDA HAFIZ’ and the echo of his voice is still remembered by those who had heard it. Some survivors mentioned that the rebels called upon them to surrender but they refused to give in and continued fighting. Subsequently when the unit search parties visited the battle sites they could find no trace of those who had embraced Shahadat; obviously their mercilessly mutilated bodies had been left for the beasts and vultures.

Conclusion
Following deductions emerge from the facts enumerated above:

1. D Company 25 Punjab was greatly under strength for the detached role. They should have first taken live ammunition and all the company weapons (including RRs and heavy machine guns) because it was known that the rebels were trained army personnel and were fully armed. By 28^th March evening the 3 days rations had been consumed.
2. The Company was commanded by a junior officer but only four days, Major Aslam with 25 men was sent to help the hard pressed Company.
3. Despite the sharply changing critical situation, reports sent by the Company commander, no decision was communicated for withdrawal. At least 60 to 70 armed personnel with a battery of field guns in support should have been sent for help and extrication.
4. As per the assigned mission, per force, detachments were sent to guard vital installations located in PABNA town. As such due to the distances in between, material support was not possible; also the Company was not capable of successfully beating back the rebels who had surrounded some detachments.
5. The Battalion commander, Company and Platoon commanders had underestimated the strength and capabilities of the rebels.
6. The locals appeared calm and peaceful for two days, but actually they were providing all information about the location, strength, weapons and activities of the Company. For unknown reasons the policemen were not disarmed and they wholeheartedly joined the rebels.
7. Within 36 hours of the arrival of the Company the rebels had surrounded all the vital points and the Company HQs, isolating them from each other, but the road RAJSHAHI-PABNA was still safe as Major Aslam with 25 men had managed to join the Company HQs.
8. By the evening of 29 March the Company had suffered heavy casualties and the pressure of a big force of rebels was mounting intensively. The men had expended most of their ammunition and as no help was expected there was no option but to withdraw and save as many lives as was possible.
9. Major Aslam had correctly decided the left over force to be divided into small parties for exfiltration through the area that was thickly infested with rebels. The population was also hostile therefore only small parties would have managed to escape.
10. The 3 parties had distracted attention of the rebels from the wounded party because they managed to reach RAJSHAHI, whereas the 3 parties kept on fighting but lost 2 officers and 19 other ranks.
11. The preparation for the IS duties (lack of strength, weapons, ammunition and rations) was influenced by the fact that the rebels were their comrade in-arm, Muslims and above all, Pakistani. They were not considered like the enemy they had fought against during the September 1965 war. But this soft attitude for old comrades-in-arms proved disastrous that snuffed the light out of numerous lives.

The End
The performance of all the officers and men had been unshakeable during that grim and horrid situation. They were invincible in determination, as patriots they fought with a bold disregard for danger and willingly accepted Shahadat in the defence of their country, PAKISTAN.

The performance of Major Aslam, in particular was outstanding but no one was awarded for acts of valour because they were fighting against their own former comrade in arms. Of course ALLAH has bestowed them with SHAHADAT – the highest award, and GHAZI are those who had fought and returned alive.

These days some Bangladeshi leaders are again active in dragging Pakistan into the filth of 40 years old political follies but have purposely ignored the rebellious and nefarious role of their own leaders during that reign of terror. They are also highlighting, probably on advice from the Indian leadership, the so called atrocities committed by the Pakistani soldiers belonging to West Pakistan who were carrying out their sacred duty of defending the existence and solidarity of Pakistan. Perforce the rebels (according to the definition of Oxford Dictionary – ‘person who rises in arms against, resists, or refuses allegiance to the established government) were killed during battles and a great number of loyal Pakistani soldiers were also killed by the rebels and their dead bodies were thrown to wild beasts and vultures.

History attests that rebels have always been hanged, killed or disgraced.

The aim of this piece is to highlight facts and not to hurt the feelings of learned Bangladeshi readers of DJ. The above narrative is based on my research.