Background
Politically, the Persian Gulf (also known as the Arabian Gulf) may be termed as one of the most troubled and complicated spots on the globe. Differing economic, political and security concerns heavily laced with religious and ideological undertones make it an extremely complex region. The Palestine–Israel conflict where Iran’s support to Hamas and Hezbollah, the Arab-Iran confrontation based primarily on racial and sectarian divide, presence of Extra Regional Forces (ERF), rise of Al-Qaeda and the US led War on Terror (WOT) in neighbouring Afghanistan and Pakistan have further complicated an already very complex situation.
The region is sitting atop the biggest oil reserves in the world and this naturally gives rise to economic and political bickering among not only the Gulf States but the global community as well. Wars have erupted concerning border disputes (Iraq-Kuwait and Iraq-Iran wars) and sectarian differences have led to violence through the use of proxies by both sects. From the western viewpoint much of the tension between Iran and GCC States are believed to be solely sectarian in nature. Historians too hold the Sunni –Shia split in the Muslim world as one of the leading causes for the decline of the Islamic Empires. While historical data tend to support this theory, a closer examination of the sectarian divide in the Muslim Lands would reveal a slightly different story.
The Karbala incident marks the beginning of the schism in Islam that led to the creation of two major fiqahs – Sunni and Shia. There is hardly any difference between the two on the five basic tenets of the religion but in the interpretation of some aspects of the holy text and the Sunnah, there are divergences which have resulted in variances especially in the practice of the family laws and performance of rituals. Despite these differences, Sunnis and Shias have coexisted harmoniously in Muslim societies all over the world. They tolerated each other, recognised and rewarded talents regardless of the sect, intermarried and barring the extremist minorities on both sides, accepted one another as a part of the Muslim Ummah (brotherhood).
The sectarian schism, however, was a handy tool for ambitious individuals and powerbrokers that could be exploited to protect or promote/expand their power bases and fiefdoms. When it suited their purpose, they encouraged and promoted the sectarian rivalry among their subjects to justify wars against their opponents, when the real motives for waging them were self-preservation or simple power-grabbing. Internecine wars among Muslim states justified on the basis of sect severely weakened the World of Islam and eventually led to its eclipse. This dangerous and harmful practice unfortunately is still a factor among some of the nations in the Middle East, and Iran considers the ultra conservative Wahabi/Salafi State of Saudi Arabia as a threat to the entire Shia community of the world.
Within Shia Islam there are a number of sub-branches among which the Twelvers (Ahle Tashi) are the most prominent and in a majority: Irani Shias belong to this branch. It might come as a surprise to some, especially the Westerners that Twelver Shias consider the Ismaili and its offshoot Alawite Shias outside the pale of Islam. With the three moderate sub-branches of Sunnis, (Hanafi, Shafi and Maliki) the Twelvers have learnt to co-exist peacefully. With the ultra conservative Wahabi/Salafi sub-branch that is championed by Saudi Arabia, the Iranian Shias have major sectarian disputes while they have no such problem with the other GCC states where Shafi and Maliki Sunnis are in a majority. The current tension between Iran and UAE is based on territorial differences over the sovereignty of the three Gulf Islands and a struggle for political balance of power in the region.
On Iran’s Eastern border lie Afghanistan and Pakistan each with its own peculiar economic and security dynamics. In the wake of the WOT, Pakistan finds itself in a precarious security situation that has shattered its economy. Although ISAF has announced its planned withdrawal from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, the recent closure of Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC) through the Pakistani territory because of the attack on a couple of its check posts at Salala by ISAF could affect the withdrawal schedule if it is not resolved in the near future. For Pakistan, mere withdrawal of ISAF and NATO forces would not necessarily end the current instability in Afghanistan with its inevitable fallout on Pakistan’s tribal regions.
The question of CIA flown drone attacks has become a burning issue within not only Pakistan’s right-wing parties but also among its youth. While CIA’s drones may be scoring spectacular tactical victories against Al-Qaeda, from the Pakistani perspective the small tactical gains are overshadowed by major losses at the strategic level.i The inevitable collateral damages caused by the drone campaign alienate and radicalize the local population swelling the ranks of the insurgents and severely compromising the strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the locals, without which insurgency cannot be defeated. Overall, from the viewpoint of Pakistan, the drone attacks by American CIA in its tribal belt are highly counterproductive.
Pakistan’s economic woes, high unemployment rate, erratic and inconsistent governance, socio-economic policies and a continuous standoff with India are only adding fuel to the fire. In the context of USA / Israel military attack on Iran, the population – although mostly Sunni – is likely to put its weight behind the people of Iran out of sentiment for the Islamic world and a similar response is expected from Muslims around the globe. The attack would be widely seen in the Muslim world as another unprovoked assault on yet another Islamic country by the US forces on behest of Israel. The growing tension between USA / Israel and Iran is an issue whose ramifications are likely to exceed far beyond the geographical region of the Persian Gulf.
If one or a group of Arab countries are perceived to be covertly or overtly siding with the US and/or its “allies” in their attack on Iran, the global Muslim sentiments will turn hostile towards them resulting in huge embarrassment with the potential of leading to deep unrest. The recent issue of the secret US cables by Wikileaks is a case in point where hostile remarks by some of the GCC officials regarding Iran created an embarrassing situation.ii GCC states, especially UAE with its significant Iranian community cannot afford to ignore this point. An attack or even crippling economic sanctions are likely to bring widespread unrest not only within the Iranian expatriate community residing in GCC states but also other Muslim immigrants there.
Why Iran and Israel are in Each Other’s Cross Hairs
The Holocaust which was conducted by the Nazis under Hitler was given as an excuse to establish the new state of Israel in the Muslim Arab land of Palestine. Ironically the Muslims, the Arabs or the Palestinians had no role to play in the Holocaust, yet they were the ones to pay the price for the sins of a racist, tyrannical regime by a consortium of Western European nations. This blatant travesty of justice is the principal reason behind the current animosity of the Muslim world against Israel irrespective of the racial or sectarian divide.
The beginning of the current toxic level of Iran – Israel hostility can be traced to the overthrow of the Shah’s rule in 1979. In fact during the over three decades of the iron-fisted rule of Reza Shah Pahlavi, Israel and USA were Iran’s strongest allies at the state level. However, even during that period, among the majority of the Iranian public who were conservative Shia Muslims, Israel was viewed with suspicion. The belief that while USA possessed the military brawn to intimidate the Muslim world, it was the Israeli brain that manipulates USA in committing aggression against them had made them wary of the Zionist State of Israel.
Under Ayatollah Khomeini after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, USA, rather than Israel was the declared enemy of Iran. This was expected as USA had not only established Reza Pahlavi to the Iranian throne through a CIA inspired coup in 1953, it had been his staunchest supporter and had tried its best to prevent his downfall. Iraq’s invasion of Iran in 1980 and suspected US involvement in this affair led to further deterioration in US-Iran relationship and since then the removal of Saddam Hussein had become one of Iran’s top foreign policy agenda. Although, during 1985-86 Iran received covert shipments of sophisticated arms from USA via Israel (the infamous Iran-Contra scandal) this did not help in improving bilateral relations between USA and Iran.iii During the 1990s, US – Iran and Iran – Israel relationship remained unfriendly rather than threatening.
With the beginning of the 21st century, the uneasy Iran – Israel relationship has taken a turn for the worst. Having diffused the Egyptian threat through an American sponsored Camp David Peace Accord in 1979, Israel perceived only two potential future threats from its immediate neighbourhood, namely Iraq and Iran. Among its regional adversaries, only these two nations were not under US influence and both had the human resources, expertise, and technological potential to challenge Israel militarily at some future date. The two, therefore, had to be neutralized. According to this theory, while Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was essentially a US decision, behind the scene Israeli exhortation had played an important role. The Iraqi invasion might have been disastrous for USA but from the Israeli viewpoint it did eliminate the potential Iraqi threat.
Saddam was the head of the Baath party and through his party and tribal connections reigned over Iraq and ruled it with an iron hand as a ruthless dictator. He happened to be a Sunni in a country where Shias are in a majority but his rule for all intent and purpose was secular rather than Islamic in nature. While the GCC states accepted Saddam as the head of Iraq, it had nothing to do with his sect but because through means fair or foul he exercised full control over his people until his ouster following the US invasion in 2003. This attitude is further confirmed by the Syrian example where Hafez Asad, also from the Baath party ruled over Syria and he was an Alawite (a mystical branch of Twelver Shia) in a country dominated by Sunnis. GCC states accepted him and never raised the sectarian issue, even supporting his son Bashar who succeeded him until the period when Bashar appears to have lost the confidence of his subjects. Iran on the other hand always portrayed Saddam’s rule as the rule of a Sunni minority over the Shia majority, exhorting the latter to overthrow him on sectarian basis.
The greatest beneficiary of the Iraqi invasion and subsequent removal of Saddam from power has been Iran. Many believe that Cheney was the mastermind behind the Iraqi invasion and he had little trouble in convincing the gullible President Bush (Jr) who was obsessed with extracting revenge from Saddam for his (Saddam’s) alleged failed attempt to assassinate the president’s father, Bush (Sr). Cheney’s motive was simple greed because the Iraqi invasion led to windfall profits to the corporate and businesses he headed or represented. It is also suspected that Israel might have initially been in favour of the invasion as it would cut down to size one of its potential enemies in the region but on further reflection realized that the removal of Saddam and replacing him with a Shia dominated government would result in major gains for Iran, which was a far greater threat to Israel than a secular Iraq under Saddam that had been heavily weakened due to international sanctions. Perhaps by the time Israel realized the folly of the Iraqi invasion it was too late as the American military juggernaut had been set in motion and could not be stopped.
Immediately on the fall of Saddam, Iran started to use its Iraqi fellow sectarian surrogates (Muqtada al Sadr for example) to start a genocide against the Sunnis there in the name of revenge. This led to the Iraqi Sunnis seeking help from their Sunni counterparts in GCC states that resulted in the debilitating internecine Civil War on sectarian grounds. The Iraqi infighting that was engineered by Iran caught the occupying US and British forces unaware and by the time a modicum of peace was restored they were exhausted and had decided to pull out leaving the mess for the Iraqis to clear. The Shia government which eventually came into power felt itself beholden to the Iranian support making Iran the only beneficiary of the massacre of thousands of Iraqis of both sects.
For Iran, the Afghanistan and Iraq invasion by USA was a gift from the heavens. It watched with amazement as its enemy number one, the Great Satan first toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Iran’s enemy to the East and then removed Saddam Hussein from Iraq, Iran’s deadlier threat to the West; and Iran did not have to lift a finger militarily in the process.
Ironically, much to the chagrin of Israel, the fallout of the Iraqi invasion has strengthened Iran considerably. The overthrow of the minority Sunni regime of Saddam was not in the interest of the GCC States and it has brought the majority Shia element into power in post Saddam Iraq. In the context of the Shia-Sunni rift, the establishment of a Shia led government in Iraq has markedly reduced Iran’s sectarian isolation in the region, providing it with a buffer state between itself and its arch rival Saudi Arabia. It also gives it an ally who is likely to side with co-sectarian Iran rather than the Sunni Arabs in any Shia-Sunni based conflict.
For Israel this is an ominous development and it was only logical for them to initiate steps to cut down the Iranian influence and military reach. Since then, Israel’s policy seemingly has been to malign and isolate Iran internationally and after weakening it through economic and diplomatic suffocation, decimate it with the help of the US military might. Election of the hard-line President Ahmadinejad and his government’s rhetorical and jingoistic attitude has supported Israel greatly in its cause to portray Iran as a maverick and unstable nation that must be prevented at any cost from getting hold of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
The undisguised and blatant US/Israeli threat to the very survival of Iran as a nation state could have led to the latter’s flirtation with the nuclear technology in the hope that its possession could successfully deter an armed aggression by the overwhelmingly superior military might of its enemies. Since the start of the current century, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, all three non-nuclear states have been ravaged through armed aggression by US and NATO forces and non-nuclear Syria appears to be meeting a similar fate, while nuclear North Korea and Pakistan have so far been spared. This might have reinforced the Iranian belief that possession of nuclear weapons or at least convincing its enemies that it has the ability to develop one if pushed against the wall is their principal deterrence against a military invasion.
Iran’s attitude towards weapons of mass destruction has also been shaped by its horrendous experiences during the war with Iraq. During 1980s the Iranian military and civilians were subjected to repeated chemical attacks by Iraqi forces, which resulted in estimated 50000 casualties on the Iranian side. All this happened while the international community and the Islamic world either stood silent or encouraged the Iraqi regime in its pursuits.iv
Surprisingly after 1979 USA and/or Saudi Arabia have not mounted a bold and open-minded diplomatic maneuver to woo Iran in signing a non-aggression treaty or a peace and resource sharing accord with GCC (and perhaps Israel). USA has been instrumental in bringing about diplomatic breakthrough between Egypt – Jordan – PLO and Israel through a series of painstaking political, economic and diplomatic overtures. USA/Britain were also behind the political accords of 1971 (Iran – UAE) and 1975 (Iran – Iraq) when Iran was under the Imperial rule but no such initiative has been undertaken with Iran since it has come under the rule of the clergy.
However, after the Iranian Revolution, the policy of confrontation and jingoism has relegated diplomacy in the shadows. Iran, with its inflexible attitude and fundamentalist rhetoric is as much to blame for its diplomatic isolation as is USA or GCC, but the chances of a diplomatic solution between these countries are still possible and may eventually be the only way out of this stalemate. It may be a long and slow process but is still preferable to war or continued standoff.
How Does an Embargo against Iran Affect Pakistan and UAE Economically?
Pakistan
Pakistan’s energy crisis which had started to surface a decade ago has progressively gone worse especially in the last four years. Critical shortages of gas and POL products have led to a massive decrease in the production of electricity, widening the gap between supply and demand. It has resulted in massive load reduction leading to unprecedented load shedding making life miserable for the common people besides severely affecting industry and commerce.v
While the government of Pakistan’s efforts to overcome the energy crisis suffered from adhocism, shortsightedness and pure bad governance, when it did come up with viable long-term solutions, it ran into obstacles beyond its control. Two promising options Pakistan currently pursues are: one, building a gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and eventually to India to satisfy future energy needs, and the other to buy crude oil and other POL products on favourable terms from its next door neighbor Iran. USA has used its clout to scuttle the financing of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline project and is putting financial and diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to abandon it.vi
Similarly on the issue of increasing oil imports from Iran, Pakistan is being dissuaded by USA and some GCC members, under the pretext of US and EU imposed economic sanctions on Iran and less than cordial relationship of Iran and Saudi Arabia, a key member of GCC, with whom Pakistan has very close relationship. Pakistan, as a result, is being denied the option of buying POL products including gas from Iran on terms it can afford without being offered an alternate to offset the loss.
Pakistan’s major exports to Iran include rice and raw materials for textile and yarn industry while Iran exports limited petroleum products to Pakistan. Pakistan’s total annual oil import bill is now approximately 12 billion USD which can be substantially reduced if Iranian oil is imported. Out of this annual expense, Iran’s current share is a paltry 225 million USD.vii Recently Pakistan and Iran have tried to increase bilateral trade through currency swap and barter trade systems;viii however progress on these issues is painfully slow due to international pressures and mounting sets of sanctions against the latter. A peaceful and trade friendly Iran is in the economic and security interest of Pakistan as it can help Pakistan significantly in reducing its widening trade deficit.ix
United Arab Emirates
Iran is a major trading partner of UAE, and there is a significant Iranian community permanently residing in UAE, with major concentration being in Dubai. The recent US/EU sanctions have already started to affect legitimate Iranian businesses within UAE, as the banks and trading bodies are reluctant to do business with Iranian professionals, companies and financial institutions.x This is a major concern for UAE, which has an annual bilateral trade of more than 12 billion USD with Iran.xi Civil unrest and isolation amongst the UAE’s Iranian Diaspora is also likely to cause some amount of damage to UAE’s economy.
The trade between Iran and UAE still continues through informal and illicit means. But practically, the sanctions are hampering UAE’s legitimate economic trade and business activities with Iran. Some of the Emirate States, Dubai for instance, might find it harder to absorb the negative economic fallout of the Iranian sanctions as in the wake of the economic recession after 2007, Dubai among the Emirate states is in a far delicate economic situation than it was five years ago. Although the UAE Government has initiated measures to restore global investors’ confidence in its economy through active fiscal and monetary policies, at this juncture an extended round of sanctions – or worse – open hostility against Iran is going to further slow down its financial recovery.
Already, some countries such as Japan, South Korea and India have sought and secured exemptions from the US/EU sanctions due to their dependence on Iranian oil and the status they enjoy within the overall US security framework. UAE, with its political and security clout with USA and EU can also try to successfully negotiate some exemptions from the unilateral sanctions to safeguard its long-term economic interests.
Analysis
For as long as US/Israel – Iran standoff continues, Iran’s neighbours (Afghanistan, Pakistan and GCC States) will remain vulnerable to serious security threats. Pakistan’s strategic imperative to have a friendly neighbor in the West i.e. Iran, will have to surmount major obstacles from USA and Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s efforts to increase trade, especially with energy rich Iran is currently being suffocated by USA. The financial health of GCC (mainly UAE) meanwhile is being affected by the US sponsored Iranian economic sanctions while an attack on Iran will pose major challenges to their security.
Afghanistan is preparing for the ISAF withdrawal and bracing itself for the Taliban who almost certainly are going to escalate their offensive campaign against the Karzai regime in the post ISAF Afghanistan. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is being equipped and trained by the US forces with the help of “private contractors” to resist and defeat such an assault by the Taliban. Given the performance of ANA so far, their ability to prevent Taliban from annexing large portions of the country appears remote. This would mean that for the next few years, the struggle for supremacy between ANA and the Taliban would continue for a while wherein the Taliban would further expand their influence over major pockets of rural areas while the Government forces would remain in control of key population centers a la Babrak Karmal and Najeebullah, until the two were eventually overthrown.
The foreseeable outcome for Pakistan and Afghanistan would be that even after the US and NATO withdrawal, conflict in the shape of a heightened state of civil war in Afghanistan with its resultant fallout on Pakistan would continue to destabilize the region stretching the economies and fragmenting the societies even further. In such an environment a major confrontation with Iran would only make things more difficult for the Afghan and Pakistani governments as both countries are in the immediate vicinity and have significant Shia populations of their own with close cultural, business and religious ties to Iran. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan would face major political and potential militant backlash in the aftermath of a war with Iran.
Iran has been under the clergy rule for over three decades and the initial euphoria and hope of good governance, better future and increased prosperity among the masses has diminished greatly. The clerical dispensation under the Ayatollah Khomeini’s dictum of Wilayat e Faqih where the interpretation in both religious and worldly matters of the chosen Ayatollah is to be considered sacrosanctxii has virtually stifled the freedom of the people in the manner they would like to live their lives. The overbearing attitude of the clerics is now being increasingly resented and challenged by an agitated and restless public that wants a change. Their dissent is being subdued by force reminiscent of the dark days of the Shah. The public disenchantment with the current system of governance continues to increase and is posing a real danger to the Iranian regime. Iran’s current ruling elite, the clergy, has raised the bogey of an imminent attack by the Great Satan (USA) in cahoots with Israel in an effort to ‘ignite a nationalist backlash that would help bolster their regime’.
Not satisfied with the playing of the US/Israel card, the Iranian clerics are also employing the sectarian threat from the predominantly Sunni Arab neighbours. The visit of the Iranian President Ahmadinejad to the disputed island of Abu Musa in the Gulf was an act of provocation. Iran is also using its influence to incite the Shia population in the GCC States to rebel against the rulers. Among the GCC countries, Bahrain is the only one where majority of the population is Shia while the ruling family is Sunni. Using the very successful Iraqi strategy, Iran fomented major uprising of the Shias in tiny Bahrain against the Amir; and Saudi Arabia had to send its forces to quell the rebellion. For the Iranian clergy, the Saudi actions were a propaganda bonanza where they proclaimed that the Sunni rulers of the GCC were guilty of Shia genocide in their respective nations and their eventual aim is the destruction of Shia Iran.
With hindsight it appears that in the beginning, GCC States did not fully comprehend the Iranian strategy against the Arabs. Their over-reaction to the Iranian provocations might have actually promoted the latter’s design. Now that a clearer insight into the Iranian provocative and mischievous plan has emerged, GCC States must come up with a modified game plan to thwart the Iranian ‘policy of intimidation.’ Iran’s “Policy of Intimidation” is used to unite its internal front and avoid internal disintegration of the theological regime. Policies used are: 1. Sunni threat to the existence of the Shia sector of Islam 2. Israel Zionist existence as a threat to the Shia state. 3. Nuclear technology development as the means to protect the Shia state of Iran from the surrounding threats.
In the current environment while an armed US-Israel combined military campaign cannot be ruled out, it is considered a low probability. However, Iran’s refusal to limit uranium enrichment programme exposes it to the possibility of a US/Israeli led military action. if Iran is perceived to be continuing its march towards nuclear weaponization and appears close to achieving the goal, the likelihood of an armed intervention increases significantly, which will have disastrous economic and security consequences for the neighbouring states, besides creating a major negative impact on global economy. It is in the world’s interest to dissuade US and Israel from contemplating a military assault on Iran, while trying to persuade the latter to convince the world body that its nuclear programme – as Iran continuously professes – has no weaponization component. Opening its fuel enrichment activities to full IAEA inspections is the way out for an end to the current impasse.
The economic repercussions of a military conflict in Persian Gulf will dwarf the “Oil Shock” the world experienced way back in 1974 due to the Arab oil embargo that more than quadrupled the oil prices and thoroughly shook the global economy. Economic sanctions can work up to a certain limit, but if it leads to strangulation of Iran’s economy, it may actually accelerate the nuclear weapons drive by Iran as an act of desperation.
Iran needs to tone down its rhetoric against USA and Israel, because it neither has the capability nor can it afford a military adventure without risking destruction by a massive US/Israel led military reprisal. Both Iran and Israel are being governed by ultra right-wing parties and presently both are engaged in a verbal exchange, which is primarily aimed at their own domestic populations (mainly right wing sections) to shore up respective vote banks. History is replete with incidences when such brinkmanship has led to catastrophic wars which neither side really wanted or wished for.
Within the Middle East, the degree to which the UAE can maintain a tight albeit delicate balance between its security and economic needs in the coming years will be determined by how well it responds to the changing dynamics in the Gulf and the wider South Asian region. The US-Iran confrontation, economic recession, home grown extremism and the continued violence in Afghanistan and Iraq are giving rise to new technological, social and geopolitical concerns in the GCC region, especially in the UAE with its multi ethnic society and trade oriented economy with global ties.
A diverse immigrant population due to globalization, coupled with the revolution in communications and transportation makes it easy for extremist elements to infiltrate hot spots and remain a viable threat in other parts of the world even when they are isolated within a limited geographic space themselves (example the proliferation of Taliban ideology from Afghanistan and Jihadi message from Chechnya and Somalia to farthest reaches of the Globe).
This phenomenon has put severe pressure on societies across the Middle East and South-South Western Asia, and the results are visible in the last few years. The increase in global communications through satellite channels, internet and social media has provided NGOs, religious groups and non-state actors of various hues and motives with an unprecedented flexibility to fund, plan, and organize operations across international borders. Media and internet provide them the tool to shape public opinion in the global comity of nations and are force multipliers that cannot be easily countered.
Globalization puts both positive and negative effects on socio-cultural and political dynamics of any region especially for prosperous and dynamic states like UAE, Singapore etc. As a logical outcome societies with complex socio-economic framework – such as UAE – are susceptible to growing influences of trans-national criminal gangs, extremist organizations, shadowy NGOs and other non-state actors. More than any other country, they need to keep pace with the globalization trends through a better understanding and acceptance of the impact of the information explosion through the use of internet and the social media (Facebook, Twitter, cellphone, texting etc) especially on the youth. Enlightening the masses through electronic and print media to inculcate moderation and an open-minded approach to socio-cultural diversity is extremely important if UAE has to remain in the lead as a dynamic, vibrant and economically stable country in the region.
Recommendations
The Social Media phenomenon has made information easily accessible globally and any attempts to unnecessarily curb it are counterproductive. For the younger generation the world over, the use of cell phones, texting, Facebook, You Tube, twitter, etc (that are part of the Social Media) has become a way of life. As the Middle Eastern population, especially in the GCC States consists of a very high percentage of young people (16 – 45 years bracket), who are educated and tech savvy, the impact and use of the social media and internet connectivity has mushroomed. Through intelligent use of the Social Media, the state should remain connected with its youth, giving them a sense of belonging with the state and its policies so that they are not alienated and become easy targets for recruitment by fanatical groups or ideologies.
After Saddam Hussein, GCC states have lost much of their political and economic clout with Iraq largely because of Iranian interference. Unless this anomaly is removed, successive Iraqi governments will remain heavily influenced by the fellow sectarian Iranian theocratic regime, to the detriment of its Arab neighbours. The present Maliki Government of Iraq is unacceptable to GCC States because it is strongly suspected of being a puppet of Iran. Even his election to the high office was manipulated by Iran, which is aiding him to hold on to power. This state of affairs is unacceptable for GCC States and especially USA, which still has much influence over the Iraqi administration. For the sake of Iraq and the region, the Iraqi public should be aided to elect a government that is not remotely controlled by Iran and which can independently secure Iraq’s national interests. For the GCC States, the sectarian orientation of Iraqi leaders would be immaterial as long as the policies they adopt are independent of the Iranian influence and are not directed against the neighbouring Arab States.
Historically, sanctions have not been helpful in resolving political or military disputes. This is also true in the case of the present heavy sanctions that USA and EU have imposed on Iran in a bid to dissuade it from further uranium enrichment. These sanctions are actually not affecting the ruling clique and they have used the sanction imposition to further whip up anti west sentiments among the masses thus diverting their attention from the failures of governance. By hurting people of Iran, the US and its allies are ensuring that the common population of Iran gravitates further towards its clergy.
To weaken the theological regime of Iran, the international community should abandon policies that mostly hurt the civil society of Iran and adopt policies that affect the regime. The regime in Iran survives in the environment of the International community’s economic sanctions, by the coronary artery supply from Syria and the Shia dominated government of Iraq. As a result to directly affect the regime in Iran, policies should be adopted against the Iraqi government and actions should be taken against Bashar Assad’s regime in Syria.
Blocking the coronary artery of Iran’s theological regime will urgently need a coronary double bypass to ensure the Iranian public does not get asphyxiated in the process. This can best be achieved by allowing Pakistan and UAE, Iran’s immediate Eastern and Southern neighbours, to resume full trade relations with Iran without the suffocating restrictions of the sanctions. Such a move would benefit the common citizens of the three nations creating a surfeit of goodwill among them. The positive public sentiments would then lead to the respective governments to adopt a more conciliatory approach towards one another. America and the West should realize that such an action should result in reducing Iran’s sense of isolation and persecution, making the current regime or its successor amenable to conflict resolution through peaceful dialogues rather than rhetoric, acts of subversion and threat of violence.
While GCC States and the world community must continue to condemn the atrocities and genocide being conducted by Iran against its own citizens and its aid to Syria to commit similar acts on the Syrian public, measures that hurt the common Iranians and Syrians far more than the regimes should be avoided.
For Pakistan and UAE, friendly relationship with Iran without jeopardizing their fraternal ties with Saudi Arabia is critical. A cessation of hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a very desirable outcome for both and would greatly benefit not only Pakistan and UAE but also other littoral Gulf States. Acquiring greater sectarian, economic and defence harmony between the Gulf and South-West Asian States including Afghanistan can be a strategic game changer and a harbinger of peace in the region.
End Notes
iMacdonald, Myra. (2012, Jan 11) Failing to learn: US resumes drone attacks in Pakistan retrieved from http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2012/01/11/failing-to-learn-us-resumes-drone-attacks-in-pakistan/
iiBlack, Ian and Tisdall, Simon (2010, Nov 28) Saudi Arabia urges US attack on Iran to stop nuclear programme retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/us-embassy-cables-saudis-iran
iiiForeign Affairs, 1985-1992 “Irangate”, retrieved from www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1889.html
ivRobinson, J. P. and Goldblat, Jozef. (1984, May) Chemical Warfare In The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988
SIPRI Fact Sheet, retrieved from http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/chemical_warfare_iran_iraq_war.php
vZaafir, M. S. (2012, Jun 17) S Korea offers Pakistan help to beat energy crisis, retrieved from http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-6-114918-S-Korea-offers-Pakistan-help-to-beat-energy-crisis; also see The Express Tribune (2012, Jun 15) Coal answer to energy crisis, say experts, retrieved from http://tribune.com.pk/story/393923/coal-answer-to-energy-crisis-say-experts/; also see The Dawn Business (2012, Apr 11) Pakistan’s energy crisis major hurdle in economic growth: ADB, retrieved from http://dawn.com/2012/04/11/pakistans-energy-crisis-major-hurdle-in-economic-growth-adb/
viReuters (2012, April 27) Pakistan seeks bids for Iran gas pipeline, despite US pressure, retrieved from http://tribune.com.pk/story/370890/pakistan-seeks-bids-for-iran-gas-pipeline-despite-us-pressure/; also see Pakistan Today (2012, Jun 07) Iran ready to finance gas pipeline in Pakistan, retrieved from http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/06/07/news/national/iran-ready-to-finance-gas-pipeline-in-pakistan/; also see The Dawn Archives (2012, Mar 21) Iran – Pakistan Gas Pipeline, retrieved from http://dawn.com/tag/iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline/
viiBhatti, Rizwan. (2012, May 27) 10-month oil import bill soars to $12.5 billion, retrieved from http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/1-front-top-news/59195-10-month-oil-import-bill-soars-to-125-billion-.html; also see Iqbal, Shahid. (2012, Mar 18) Trade with Iran hits rock bottom, retrieved from http://dawn.com/2012/03/18/trade-with-iran-hits-rock-bottom/
viiiHussain, Tom. (2012, Mar 12) Seeking new trade partners, Iran eyes Pakistan, retrieved from http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/03/12/141561/seeking-new-trade-partners-iran.html
ixPak Tribune (2012, Jun 19) Pakistan loses Iran’s mango market, retrieved from http://paktribune.com/business/news/Pakistan-loses-Irans-mango-market-9948.html
xReynold, James. (2012, Jan 23) Dubai’s Iranians worry about EU sanctions, retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16685330
Sadjadpour, Karim (2011, July) The Battle for Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the US – Iran Cold War, retrieved from http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/dubai_iran.pdf
xiGuziansky Yoel, “Made in Iran” The Iranian Involvement in Iraq, page 91
xiiKristof D. Nicholos, Not-so crazy in Tehran, Daily Times Pakistan, 25 June 2012, p A8.
