Introduction
A few salient features of the treatise “ON WAR” by Von Clausewitz, one of the greatest philosophers of war, are being mentioned briefly in this article. It will be, mostly, con- fined to the nature of war, theory of war, strategy and combat as covered in the first volume of the book. Von Clausewitz has discussed each point very elaborately in this volume which consists of 340 pages. Endeavour has been made to define e the terminology used by the author. 7 The subject, obviously, is extremely dry and very vast in nature. A brief account of the great personality has been mentioned to ventilate that he was fully qualified for the work he has written for military leaders.
Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was born at Burg and was posted to the Prussian army as ensign in 1792 at the age of 12 years. He served in the Rhine campaign of 1793-1796, and in 1801 entered the Berlin Military Academy, then under the direction of the noted Col von Scharnhorst. In 1806 as an ADC of Prince Augustus of Prussia, in the Jena campaign he was wounded and taken prisoner. Later on military instructor to the then Crown Prince. For a short while he served in the Russian army and participated in Russian Campaign. In 1814, after holding many combat and staff appointments, he became the Chief of Staff in the Russio German Corps. He was present at the battles of Ligney and Wavre. In 1830, a year before his death, he became Director of Artillery (Maj Gen) and also Chief of Staff of Polish Army. He had taken part in five wars and 130 other campaigns. His writings are bound in 9 volumes but the most famous are the three volumes, “On War” published after his death. It will seem that throughout his military career he never held a command and probably, according to Fuller, was unsuited for such. He was essentially a student of war.
Aim
To highlight salient features of ON WAR for the study of those students of military history who are preparing for professional examination.
NATURE OF WAR
What is War?
War has been defined by von Clausewitz as a dual on an extensive scale. Let us take an example of two wrestlers. Each tries by physical force to compel the other to submit to his will. Each tries to throw his opponent and thus render him incapable of further resistance. War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel the opponents to submit to our will. This compulsory submission of enemy to our will is the ultimate object. In order to attain this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed and hence the disarmament becomes the immediate object. War does not consist of a single blow; it is a continuous process to achieve the object. The final object of war is to be decided by politicians. Thus, therefore, the political objective as real motive of war will be kept in view for deter- mining both the aims of military force as well as the amount of effort to be made. The general conducting the war to a successful end must know the state policy intimately. Finally, the destruction of enemy’s armed forces appears therefore as the superior means to which all others must give way. For example, all the European forces to submit to Germany’s will. The General planned the operations keeping in view this object. But soon after the fall of France Hitler miscalculated and changed the political object to defend the captured territories and so ops Sealion i.e. the invasion of England was cancelled, which was one of the greatest reasons of his defeat.
Branches of War
The art of war is nothing but the conduct of war. The conduct of war is therefore the formation and con- duct of fighting. From this arise the different activities that of fmn and conduct of single combat, and the combination of combats with one another keeping in view the ultimate object of war. The first is called Tactics and the second, Strategy. According to Clausewitz tactics is defined as the theory of use of military forces in combat and Strategy is the theory of the use of combat for the ultimate object of war. For example, the Allied Armies operating in AFRICA and later in ITALY kept the Axis forces engaged away from their homeland and struck the main offensive on the second front in Europe. The Russians were supplied with arms, ammunition and equipment for use against Germany. It was considered s wrong strategic move by Germany to attack Russia.
THEORY OF WAR
Theory of war may be defined as comprising a mass of speculation based upon the deductions from past wars and surmises for the future. From these deductions and surmises emerge certain broad principles (of Strategy and of Tactics). Clausewitz had discussed 46 different points to evolve the conception of war. He has discussed (in Book II of Vol I) wars of early days, tactics, reflections on military events, superiority of numbers, moral qualities, moral force, dangers, ends and means of strategy, review of battles, etc, etc. On the use of examples from history, Clausewitz is convinced that these furnish the best proof and should not be twisted. These apply with more force to the art of war than to any other. Firstly, examples can be used as explanations for ideas. Secondly, as an application of an idea. Thirdly, as historical fact, may be referred particularly in order to sup- port what one has advanced. Lastly, from details of historical events we may deduce some theory. It would be an immense service to teach the art of war by historical examples but it requires taking lot of pain and doing labour and the person who under- takes this job must first of all qualify himself by long experience of actual war. Such a task should be undertaken as for a long pious pilgrimage, giving all the time, sparing no sacrifice and according to the French Code, speaking all truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. In this connection, I draw your attention to the various books written by the opposing commanders of World War II. We find contradictions and discrepancies of major business of war in their books describing similar battles and campaigns. From such books, it is rather difficult to draw correct lessons.
STRATEGY
(a) General: has bee defined as the employment of battles to gain the object of war i.e. end of war. It must, therefore, give an aim to the whole military actions in accordance with the object of war, in other words, the plan of war. The act of marching in the combat generally called manoeuvring forms an integral part of a combat. But the marching outside the combat is nothing but the execution of a strategic measure. By the strategic plan is settled when, where, and with what forces a battle is to be delivered. The march outside of the combat is an instrument of strategy but not on the account exclusively a subject of strategy, for as the troops may be involved in a combat at any moment, therefore its execution starts also under tactical as well as strategic rule. If a column is well told to march on a particular side of a river of a hill feature, then that is a strategic measure for it contains the intention of fighting on that side in case a combat should be necessary during the march. It may sound strange that much more strength of will is required to make an important decision in strategy than in tactics. In tactics we are hurried on with the moment and circumstances suddenly compel us to make a decision and adopt a course of action. In strategy where all goes on at a slower rate, and we do not see things in strategy as we do in tactics with the living eye, the convictions produced as less powerful, the consequences is that most Generals when they should act remain stuck fast in bewildering doubts.
(b) Elements of Strategy, are firstly pertaining to moral qualities and efforts, secondly physical force, its org and capabilities, thirdly mathematical such as the angle of lines of operation. Fourthly, geographical terrain, landmarks, etc and lastly, statistics of all the means of supply.
‘Here it is relevant to mention that according to FM Wavel, ‘tactics’, the art of handling troops on the battle field is and always will be more difficult and more important part of the General’s task than Strategy, the art of bringing forces to the battle field in a favourable position. A homely analogy can be made from contract bridge. The calling is strategy, the play of the hand tactics.’
MORAL FORCES
(a) Mil Virtue of an Army is distinguished from mere bravery and still more enthusiasm for the business of war. Bravery is a natural gift in some men which may arise in a soldier as part of an Army from habit or custom. Enthusiasm for the profession gives greater fire to the mil virtue of an army. Espirit de Corps forms the bond of union within an army. Mil virtue is therefore, the quality of an army, being morally good and upright. The mil virt virtue of an army is therefore one of the most important moral powers in war. And where it is wanting, we see its place supplied with superiority of generalship or popular enthusiasm, or we find the results not commensurate with the effort made. We see the this great quality in Macedonians under Alexander, Roman Legions under Caesar, the Prussians under Frederick, the Greek and the French under Napoleon. It can be generated from two forces conjointly, the first is a succession of campaign and gig great victories, the other is an activity of an Army carried sometimes to the highest pitch. Mil virtue is for the parts what genius of Commander is for the whole. The General can guide the whole, not each separate part and where he cannot guide there mil virtue must be the leader.
(b) Boldness is derived from the weakness of others. It is a creative power. With an army belonging to a bold race in which the spirit of boldness has been nourished, very different things may be undertaken than with one in which this virtue is unknown. The spirit of boldness can exist in the army because it is in the people, or because it has been generated in a successful war conducted by able General. For example, Rommel defeated superior forces due to his boldness. This spirit of bold- ness was generated by him in his army. We find much more better examples in the Islamic history. On the other hand the Italians inspite of their superiority surrendered to inferior. forces’ boldly able General.
A Commander must have a spirit of adventure, touch of a gambler in him. As Napoleon said, “If the art of war consisted merely in not taking risks, glory would be at the mercy of very mediocre talent. A bold general may be lucky.
(c) Surprise is not only the means to attainment of numerical superiority but it is also regarded as a substantive principle on account of its moral effect. When it is successful in a high degree, con- fusion and broken courage in enemy ranks are the consequences. Secrecy and rapidity are the two factors which require great energy and a high sense of mil duty on the part of the Commander and the Army. In tactics the surprise is much more at home but more difficult in strategy. It therefore rarely happens that the state surprises another by war except the Japanese who attacked Pearl Harbour with- out warning. In the highest province of strategy there are many instances of surprise. The most brilliant marches were the crossing of the Alps by Napoleon and crossing of the Hindu Kush by the Army of Alexander the Great. A few examples where the element of surprise was successfully used in battle is as under:-
(1) Crossing of River Jhelum by Alexander at night.
(2) Crossing of the Rajputana desert by Mahmud Ghaznavi which surprised the Rajput princes in the battle of Somnath.
(3) In the battle of Yarmuk, Khalid bin Walid divided a part of his Army in 6 parts and made them appear after regular intervals which the enemy thought were the rein- forcements coming.
(4) The fast advance of the Muslim army for the battle of Nahavand.
(5) The surprise march of the Sultan Alap Arslan for the battle of Manzikert. (6) Movement of the bulk of the Turkish Army from the north to the south for the battle of Smyrna.
(7) Crossing of the Indus River by Muhammad Bin Qasim.
(8) The battle of Tenanburg.
(9) The smashing of the Maginot Line that was considered to be an impregnable defence system.
(10) The Japanese counter offensive in Burma.
(11) Concealing of the identity of 4 Corps by Gen Slim which surprised the Japanese when 17 DIV reached Meiktila.
There are many more examples in Military history when resounding successes were achieved by using the element of surprise.
COMBAT
Combat means fighting and in this the destruction or conquest of enemy is the object. The enemy here is the armed forces which stands opposed to us. It is tactical in nature. The loss in physical helo force is not the only loss which the two sides suffer in the course of combat. The normal forces are also shaken, broken and ruined. The loss of courage, confidence and cohesion also comes into consideration when deciding whether or not the fight be continued. Every combat is the bloody and destructive measure of strength, physical and moral. Whoever at the close possesses greater amount of both, is the conqueror. Destruction of the enemy’s military forces is in reality the object of all combats but other objects may be joined thereto, i.e. the capture of a place or holding of an object. We act differently if our object is merely to drive an enemy’s post out of its place from what we should if our object has to beat him completely. A combat is influenced by the following factors:
(a) Duration
(b) Decision
(c) Mutual understanding
The battles of YARMUK and Tennenberg are the two examples from the military history where enemy was completely routed in all respects.
As a result of the study of his work the following principles have been expounded:
(1) To reduce the weight of the enemy’s power into a few centers as possible.
(2) To act as swiftly as much as possible.
(3) To concentrate our forces as much as possible at the point where the decisive blows are to be struck.
(4) Surprise is the most powerful element of victory.
(5) The pursuit, means of gathering up the fruits of victory.
Conclusion
Very briefly, “WAR” as described by CLAUSEWITZ has been dis- cussed. According to him war is only a continuation of State policy by other means. There is no war with- out spilling blood. He wrote, “Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed.”
His penetrating analysis of the relationship of War and Policy has never been excelled and is more important today than when first expounded.â—†
