In a tragic and ironical twist of events, it is now the turn of Pakistan to ask its supposed ally (ISAF and NATO) ‘Are you complicit or plain incompetent.’ The insane, almost barbaric attack on two Pakistani check posts by ISAF air power on 26 November 2011 martyred 24 brave soldiers of Pakistan and left scores injured. This single incident unless resolved to the satisfaction of Pakistan can finally sever the already tenuous relationship between USA and Pakistan.
The attack, according to reports available so far occurred around midnight and was carried out by ISAF helicopters that had been called to provide close air support to ISAF Afghan forces that were in a firefight with the Taliban close to the Durand line. The raid lasted for about two hours and as reported by ISPR, despite attempts by Pakistan to warn ISAF that they were engaging friendly Pakistani forces across the border, the mayhem continued. The posts had been established recently, were clearly demarcated without camouflage and the Pakistani flag was proudly and prominently displayed. It had been set up to prevent Taliban militants from coming across from Afghanistan into Pakistan for subversive activities and its precise location was provided to ISAF in a bid to prevent fratricide, which in military lexicon refers to casualties incurred due to friendly fire as opposed to enemy action. The fact that ostensibly Pakistan and ISAF are allies in their ongoing military campaign against the Taliban and that ISAF air activities just across the border were a routine affair, the check post was neither equipped nor prepared to face an aerial onslaught by its very ally. When the unexpected attack materialized, it had no defence and was promptly razed to the ground.
Was the attack a deliberate act or was it accidental that can be blamed on Clausewitz’s famous dictum, ‘fog of war’, is a question being hotly debated both in Pakistan and NATO Headquarters. NATO has since expressed its deep regrets for the tragic loss of lives and has ordered a full- fledged inquiry. A formal apology has been withheld and perhaps might become relevant according to them depending on the findings of the investigation. The initial statements of their spokespersons imply that the attack was not deliberate and was either accidental or because the gunship helicopters reacted to hostile fire coming from the direction of the check post.
Pakistani analysts have taken a more rigid stance. A majority of them have palpably ruled out any possibility of the attack being accidental or unintentional and are convinced that it was deliberate. This article will critically examine the hard and circumstantial evidence known to date, analyze all possible scenarios and deliberate upon their degree of probability.
Was it a Deliberate Act?
Was the attack on the Pakistani check posts a deliberate act and if so was it a strategic decision taken at the highest level (NATO Headquarters) or a tactical one by the troops engaged in combat on the fateful pre dawn raid on 26 November? The possibility of a strategic decision to bomb Pakistan Army’s border check post cannot be ruled out in totality but its probability has to be examined. A severance of US – Pakistan relationship on the Afghan situation is in the interest of neither party at this point in time. Despite the high degree of mistrust on both sides, conscious efforts toward bridge building and reduction of misunderstanding by the top military commanders of Pakistan and NATO is an ongoing process. Just a week ago, General Kayani was involved in a lengthy meeting with his counterpart to improve procedures to reduce the chances of such a disaster. What exactly would be the motive of ISAF to deliberately conduct such a brazen raid on its ally? True, ISAF suspects Pakistan Army is playing a double game and in their judgment continues to provide shelter and support to Afghan Taliban in their Tribal Belt. If the attack was meant to send a message to them to reverse their duplicitous policy, it has failed abysmally. To the contrary, this blatant act has put NATO and ISAF on the back foot and for the first time Pakistan’s anger, protest and actions have struck a sympathetic chord internationally. Even the staunch supporter of USA, Britain has publicly announced that Pakistan’s ire is justified. If indeed the decision to bomb the post was taken at the highest level it would indicate madness and senility on the part of the US decision makers. One can accuse the present US administration of imperial hubris but idiots, they are not. Perhaps if Dick Cheney and his cohorts were in power, such a charge would be more plausible. An unbiased analysis would suggest that such an act might fall in the realm of possibility but should be accorded a low probability.
The second aspect of the deliberate act is related to a conscious decision by the forces that were engaged in combat to knowingly attack and destroy the Pakistani check post. During the Vietnam War and the ongoing campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, cases of individual US soldiers committing heinous acts under severe psychological pressure are on record. The My Lai massacre is one such example. There are, however, no recorded incidents where combat pilots have gone on a murderous spree during combat since WW II. The chances of the gunship helicopter pilots deliberately targeting the check post might, therefore, be considered remote. But what about the Afghan forces that had called in the air support. The poison the Karzai’s government continues to spew against the Pakistan Army could very easily have led to a pathological hatred of the Armed Forces of Pakistan among the Afghan Army personnel. It is, therefore, not inconceivable that in the heat of the battle the local Afghan commander might have deliberately directed the close air support fire on the Pakistani check posts. The investigation authority should seriously examine this contingency.
Was it in Self Defence?
The latest explanation by ISAF on the disaster is that the helicopter gunships very likely fired back on the check post in self defence after being at the receiving end of hostile fire from that quarter. The facts on ground tend to belie this theory. 24 soldiers were martyred and scores were injured during the attack. If the check posts were in battle ready condition and were directing fire at the helicopter gunships, the high number of casualties could not have taken place. It appears that they were caught unaware. The investigation team must keep this aspect in consideration before forming any conclusions.
There could be another angle to the charges of unfriendly fire from the Pakistani side. It might be possible that some of the Taliban who were engaged with the Afghan forces had managed to slip across the border and were directing fire at the helicopters from somewhere in the vicinity of the check posts. This aspect should also be examined by the investigation team.
Was it Accidental?
Incidences of fratricide especially in close air support where the friendly and hostile forces are in close proximity are not uncommon even in modern warfare. Many of us might be of the view that the high tech environment in which NATO forces operate, such incidents cannot happen. While it is true that the advanced network centric warfare technique employed by NATO has reduced the chances of such mishaps but it has not been totally eliminated. In fact some of the cases on record were a result of the high tech environment. In 2007 in Afghanistan, the close support fighter, an F-15, was provided the target co-ordinates. In the transmission of the data, the pilot erroneously got one of the figures wrong and his relay of the incorrect reference was missed by the ground controller. The bomb landed 1000 metres off target killing three British soldiers. There are over a dozen recorded incidences during the current Afghan War where due to errors of commission and omissions ISAF air power had mistaken targeted their own troops. Could this factor be responsible for the disaster?
While not totally ruling out the possibility of accidental bombing, it should be remembered that in all such cases the site under attack is generally hit by stray bombs. Unless the target has been wrongly identified deliberately or otherwise, it does not come under sustained air assault. The check posts were under attack for about two hours, according to ISPR and the attack continued even after emergency distress calls were transmitted to the other side to cease the bombing. If this turns out to be true, the possibility of accidental bombing can be safely ruled out.
Conclusion
The incident of 26 November has the potential to derail the entire US – Pakistan relationship if mishandled by either or both parties. Apparently the US administration is taking steps to assuage the anger of the Pakistani public and the administration but the nature of the violation is so grave that more needs to be done by them to limit the damage. An investigation has been ordered by USA into the incident but its findings will only find acceptance in Pakistan if their representatives are involved in the process at the appropriate level. For the analysts and defence specialists of Pakistan they must ensure that their analysis is not affected by emotions – the tendency of playing to the gallery must be avoided and their analysis and recommendations should be based on cold facts devoid of sentiments. When the future of a nation is at stake, rationality rather than emotionalism must be the guiding principal for the course of action the country should adopt.
