The US Strategic Dialogue is taking place only because everyone and his uncle knows that the US interest in Pakistan is mainly because of their own major problems in Afghanistan. Pakistan is central to any solution in the long suffering country, the US recognises that that Pakistan’s stability and well being is vital for peace and prosperity in Afghanistan. Gen Petraeus’ predecessor, Stanley McChrystal, recognised that all ethnicities, particularly the Pashtuns, have traditionally sought a degree of independence from the central government. This alongwith other factors, causes major sections of the population to tolerate the insurgency and call for expelling foreigners.
As a predator society Afghanistan will take decades of peace to change their existing mindset. For centuries Afghans have used their geographical crossroads location to live off the traders who passed through their territory. Gen McChrystal said that, “Nonetheless, the Afghan people expect appropriate governance, the delivery of basic services, and the provision of justice. While Afghan is rooted in tribal structures and ethnic identities, Afghans do have a sense of national identity. The population can also be a source of strength and intelligence and provide resistance to the insurgency. Alternatively, they can often change sides and provide tacit or real support to the insurgents”, unquote. He goes on to talk about “the weakness of state institutions, malafide actions of power brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and coalition’s own errors. Afghans do not trust the govt or that they will provide their essential needs, such as security, justice, and basic services. This crisis of confidence, coupled with a distinct lack of economic and educational opportunity, has created fertile ground for the insurgency”, unquote.
On the other hand Talibaan weaknesses were counted as (1) the activity of criminal networks creating a pool of manpower, resources, and capabilities for insurgents contributes to a pervasive sense of insecurity among the people. A number of Afghan govt officials at all levels are reportedly complicit in these activities (2) Narcotics activity funding insurgent groups must be understood within the overall context of insurgent financing, substantial income coming from foreign donors as well as from other criminal activities within Afghanistan such as smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. Some insurgent groups “tax” the local population through check points and protection money (3) the insurgents are not invulnerable, they have exploitable shortcomings”, unquote. Petraeus believes like McChrystal did that, “having previously held power in Afghanistan and failed, popular enthusiasm for them appears limited as does their ability to spread viably beyond Pashtun areas. There is an opportunity to exploit the insurgent’s inability to mobilize public support” unquote.
The key geographical objectives of the major insurgent groups seem to be Kandahar City and Khowst Province. The (so-called) Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches for several years, there are indications that their influence over the city and neighboring districts is significant and growing. There are indications that the Haqqani Network (HQN) aims to eventually regain full control of its traditional base in Khowst, Paktia and Paktika, while Hizb-e-Islami Gulbaddin (HiG) maintains militant bases in Nangarhar, Nuristan and Kunar. All three insurgent groups require resources – mainly money and manpower. The QST derives funding from the narcotics trade and external donors. HQN draws resources principally from Pakistan, Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with Al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups. HiG seeks control of mineral wealth and smuggling routes in the east.
Corruption has grown around Karzai like a fungus, touching almost every ministry and office. Confirming this Kim Barker says, “this pervasive culture of graft is blamed for driving a wedge between Afghans and their government — even driving some toward the Taliban. For Afghans, corruption falls into three categories: (1) First is petty corruption by lower-level government employees who are looking out for their own survival (2) Next is large-scale corruption, which is committed by ministers and relatives of top Afghan officials involved in lucrative international contracts or the drug trade (3) Last is what Karzai described as Western-driven corruption, which begins with the foreign contractors who live conspicuously well in Kabul. They subcontract out work to local Afghans, who then make their own subcontracts with other Afghans. The end result is that the bulk of every aid dollar is wasted. But this, at least by Western standards, is technically legal — a seeming loophole that many Afghans find absurd, if not hypocritical and offensive”.
Afghanistan is dependant on Pakistan for nearly everything, either it comes from Pakistan or through Pakistan. While everyone blames Pakistan for “hosting” Taliban sanctuaries within the borders, they well know Pakistan has done all within its resources to curb this access but are mostly unable to stop the two-way traffic across the Durand Line. We have suffered grievously for it, and continue to do so in more ways than one.
What is most interesting is that Petraeus shares the view of his predecessor about regional actors other than Pakistan, “Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India. Iran plays an ambiguous role in Afghanistan, providing developmental assistance and political support to the govt. While Iran does not pose a short-term threat, it has the capability to threaten the mission in the future. Afghanistan’s northern neighbors have enduring interests in, and influence over, particular segments of Afghanistan. They pursue objectives that are not necessarily synonymous with the Coalition’s mission”, unquote.
Afghanistan happens to be a US core interest presently, and even if the US interests do not coincide with these of Afghanistan’s neighbours, Iran and Pakistan, the US has to come up with a viable exit strategy, and soon. While it may disagree with Pakistan on many issues, the US still finds it to be a pliable client State, therefore it is far more comfortable dealing with Pakistan. For our part, our core interest do coincide with the US on some issues, where they diverge the chasm is really deep. The US-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue is therefore meant to narrow the gaps between the core interests of the two countries and establish a working relationship that allows the US to exit Afghanistan without the withdrawal being labeled a failure.
Courtesy: The News
