‘Victory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before.’ Liddelhart
Conflict in Afghanistan is now three decades old with short periods of relative calm and long periods of violent conflict among Afghans. The cast of external actors changed with changing times while Afghan players used external sources of patronage to secure, enhance and protect their own interests. Afghanistan as a relatively peaceful country ensured stability while efforts to radically change the state and society resulted in fragmentation of the state. The waves of instability generated from Afghanistan then had corrosive effects on many other nations.
Arrival of U.S. troops in the fall of 2001 to ouster the Taliban regime was the latest effort of radical change. The initial U.S. objective was very limited and framed by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Initial plan was simply to overthrow the Taliban regime and bring back the head of Osama bin Laden on a spike to satisfy a shocked and angry nation. The civilian and military leadership was not thinking about any long term commitment. At that time Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s motto was that ‘we don’t do nation building’. When the year 2001 ended, one initial major objective was achieved with less than 5’000 American boots on ground, total of 12 American soldiers killed and an investment of only few million dollars. The ‘mission creep’ started from trying to install a government with U.S. money and protected by American bayonets followed by an ambitious plan of rebuilding the whole country including the army, police, education, healthcare and garbage collection. There was little debate about the aims, the resources needed for such an enormous project as well as strategic patience for a long haul.
The prevailing thought process at Department of Defense was articulated by Donald Rumsfeld when he stated in September 2003, “If you wanted to go build a nation you’re doing what the Soviet’s did and kill 300,000 in a country and smother it and try to take it over and build it, that’s not what we’re about and I also do not believe that we are smart enough or wise enough to know precisely what template ought to be fashioned and flopped down on another group of people who have a different history, a different colored cultured, a different geographic and strategic circumstance.”1 This environment of ambiguity at the highest level coupled with absence of nuance and finesse resulted in almost exclusive reliance on the money factor which had a corrosive and corrupting influence on the whole strategy. The result was a free for all bonanza where Americans, Afghans and everybody’s cousin looted American tax payer money to their heart’s content.
A glance at the American investment so far and its returns can give an idea of what went wrong. For the year 2001-2002, combat operations cost was $20.8 billion. It started to escalate at a steady pace with $39.0 billion in 2007, $43.5 billion in 2008 and $59.5 billion in 2009. In 2010, with the surge of troops, the cost almost doubled to $104.9 billion and the projected cost for 2011 is 119.4 billion.2 There has been significant improvement in many sectors in Afghanistan with better education and health facilities and improvement of infrastructure of a war torn country. Peaceful areas of northern and western Afghanistan have not reached European standards but still they are far better than a decade ago if one looks at all parameters. However, the amount of money spent does not correspond to the results. Main reason is the fact that more than ninety percent of the cost is going towards troop maintenance and combat operations. Security and corruption eats a large percentage of reconstruction money. Total of $336 billion has been spent from the year 2001-2010 in Afghanistan with the end result that everyone now agrees that the country is less secure than it was in 2002. Winds of change are blowing in all directions and this means that all players have to reevaluate their role. Convergence of several factors is contributing towards this change.
‘We got ourselves into this mess – we did not calculate it right and exposed ourselves in all aspects. We weren’t even able to use our military forces appropriately. But now it’s time to get out … We’ve got to get out of this mess’. Mikhail Gorbachev, Politburo Session, 13 November, 1986.3
United States
‘We went there absolutely not knowing the psychology of the people, or the real situation in the country. And everything that we were and are doing in Afghanistan is inconsistent with the moral face of our country’. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Politburo Session, January 21, 1987.4
Arrival of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 was due to the tragic events of September 11. However, things have changed a lot in the last nine years and many voices in U.S. are asking for serious reevaluation of the whole project. The U.S. is the dominant player in Afghanistan although not in control of all the events. It announced an overly ambitious plan of overhauling a war torn country without taking into account the amount of money, blood and time that is needed for such projects. Secondly, by direct involvement in all affairs of the state of Afghanistan, the U.S. gets entangled in internal power struggles. Afghan players aligned with the U.S. are using American blood and treasure to serve their own interests. The domestic factors in the U.S. i.e. stagnant economy, high unemployment, midterm elections in November 2010 and preparation for 2012 presidential elections will determine what course Washington adopts in the case of Afghanistan. The most likely short term decision will be to give about twelve more months to see the results of current military operations. On the military side, the focus will be on thinning the senior and mid-level insurgent ranks by increased kinetic operations which will invariably result in escalation of manned and unmanned incursions in Pakistan’s FATA area (probably limited to a few miles inside the Pakistani territory). On the parallel track of negotiations, incentives will be increased to bring some Taliban as well as Hizb-e-Islami-Hikmatyar (HIH) inside the tent. In the meantime, various government agencies will be directed to prepare for alternatives such as re-deployment of forces, de facto division of Afghanistan or subcontracting the war to local and regional state and non-state players.
The outcome of the November 2010 midterm elections will have decisive impact on the outcome of Afghan strategy review scheduled for December 2010. If democrats lose a significant number of seats in midterm elections, then there will be more pressure on President Barack Obama from his own side to change the course in Afghanistan sooner rather than later. This will give the supporters of ‘Biden Option’ an opening to push for their plan. Vice President Joseph Biden and many on the left of the political spectrum favor marked reduction of military footprint in southern and eastern Afghanistan. This plan envisages concentrating U.S. intelligence, special operations and air assets (manned and unmanned) in Afghanistan to keep militants off balance.5 This option will invariably be coupled with arming local militias in Pushtun areas to take on insurgents and taking the war to the badlands of Pakistan’s tribal areas. Many argue that this will actually give Washington more room for maneuverability and it will not be completely beholden to both local Afghan as well regional players such as Pakistan. This plan will markedly reduce vulnerability of U.S. troops as well as the costs. However, it is just a detour and not a serious plan for the end state. This is essentially putting the conflict on a different trajectory by taking U.S. troops out of the gun sights and replacing them with locals.
At this stage, U.S. efforts are reminiscent of Soviet efforts of the past and it seems Washington is following the advice that Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Rhyzhov gave to the Politburo in January 1987 regarding Afghanistan. He said, ‘It would be better for us to give them weapons and ammunition. And let them fight on their own, if they want. And in parallel to actively lead the {process of} political reconciliation’.6 In 2009, limited efforts were started to recruit local tribesmen for protection of roads and public buildings in Afghanistan. This project was initiated in eighteen eastern, southern and western provinces.7 Currently, empowerment of local Afghan armed groups is on a small scale. Village Stability Program run by Special Forces is operating in some communities. If General David Petraeus gets his way (President Karzai is resisting this approach) then we will see expansion of this effort on a larger scale.8 The hope is that arming village communities to protect themselves while speeding up the training of Afghan forces will provide enough room for U.S. troops to pullback. This will meet at least the political requirement in Washington as it will be crucial for President Obama to actually manage a partial withdrawal (at least two combat brigades) before going in for his re-election campaign in 2012.
One key factor of extreme unpopularity of U.S. in the region and in the broader Muslim world is frequently overlooked by key decision makers as well as the otherwise very informative and in depth studies and analyses. An average American has no direct connection with these far off lands while those who travel to these areas are severely restricted in their interactions. As far as diplomats and spooks are concerned, they get some meaningful and useful information. However living in fortresses among a sea of extremely hostile populations and relying on their local contacts as well as ‘cocktail gossip’ has its own limitations. Local players have their own agenda and many a times they use American influence towards their own ends. Even U.S. allies in the Muslim world see Washington as part of the problem.
In the background of many genuine and perceived grievances among the general population as well as the ruling elite about U.S. policies towards their societies, it is naïve to expect that simply throwing some aid money will make the problem go away. Extreme negative opinion about U.S. hinders every aspect of U.S. policy. This anti-Americanism does not mean that the general population embraces extremism. In fact, majority abhor extremism among their midst but a good number see this menace as a direct result of the aggressive and militaristic U.S. posture and direct presence of foreign troops in Muslim lands.9
A strategic U.S. pull back is essential both to cool passions and anger in the Muslim world including Pakistan as well as putting the house in order back in U.S. This does not mean that U.S. will disengage from Afghanistan completely or quickly. The threat of extremism from the region is clear and present; however the approach needs to be changed. There was always a debate about whether the problem of extremism is military or law enforcement. After a decade of military approach, it is likely that those who advocate the law enforcement approach may get their voices heard in this ongoing debate. Military pullback will provide more room for diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation with countries crucial for tackling extremism.
‘Adjust your ends to your means.’ Liddelhart
Afghans
‘Americans have long known that Afghan commanders and regional leaders are incorrigibly fractious, unpredictable, uncompromising, and power obsessed’ – A Pakistani official to U.S. delegation, Islamabad, August 28, 2001.10
In all the discussions and studies about Afghanistan, one aspect that is missing is the Afghans. I have not seen any serious work that looks at what games Afghan power brokers are playing. Whenever Afghans are mentioned, they are seen as black and white. They are either vilified or eulogized depending on which side is describing Afghans. The narrative portrays an Afghan as insurgent or extremist busy killing and destroying or cooperating with the U.S. to try to put back the broken humpty dumpty of Afghanistan. The reality is much more complex where Afghan power brokers utilize their centuries old skills of using one party against the other to extract maximum benefits.11 The General population usually stays neutral in such circumstances while power brokers run their own shows. There are very few Afghan players who are thinking in modern nation state terms when talking about the future of Afghanistan. Each ethnic, regional, tribal and sectarian community is working to extract maximum benefits for its narrow support base.
In 2010, the situation is very much like late 1988 when the Soviet Union announced that it will be leaving Afghanistan. The ambitions of Afghan players need to be seen in the historical context. The speed with which Afghan power players make and then break any alliance is truly breathtaking and mind boggling for the outsider. This is the main skill used to survive in a tough neighborhood.
A glimpse of these byzantine intrigues is provided by actions of Afghans in the last one year. When Afghan President Hamid Karzai got furious with Pakistan, he went to India to fulminate against Pakistan. When India tried to diversify its own Afghan portfolio and started high level contacts with Karzai’s rival Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai went to Islamabad to show his displeasure. When Washington demanded that Karzai clean his own stables and rampant corruption of his cronies, he retaliated by removing two key Afghan officials (Interior Minister Hanif Atmar and Chief of Afghan intelligence Amrullah Saleh) who were cooperating with the Americans in corruption investigations. When frustrated Washington snubbed Karzai by cancelling his U.S. visit, Karzai invited Washington’s nemesis Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Kabul.12 In the next move, President Hamid Karzai will try to bring in as many Pushtun groups as possible on his side for the next cycle of power struggle. Current negotiations with Taliban and HIH should be seen in this context. Two groups of Pushtuns, hardliner Taliban and Karzai’s local rivals in the southern part, especially Gul Agha Sherzoi will be the spoilers in this game. He will try first to negotiate a deal with insurgents independent of Pakistan. However, Pakistan will likely thwart these efforts and in the end, to achieve his goals, Karzai will have no choice but to get back on the Pakistan wagon or risk a direct conflict with Pakistan. In the inner battles, another wild card is Defence Minister Abdur Rahim Wardak. He is quietly strengthening his position in case replacement of Karzai becomes a serious consideration in Washington. His son Hamid Wardak, a Georgetown University graduate handles the business and public relations front, especially in Washington.13
Non-Pushtuns in general are in no mood for another round of Pushtun hegemony, no matter in what shape or form. Their hatred for the Taliban brand of hegemony is well ingrained now especially in the younger generation and they will fight to a bitter end to stop this outcome. Non-Pushtun leaders are already touring their respective areas warning their flocks about the looming danger as negotiations with the Taliban are getting under way. The political and military resistance will be localized with the real possibility of resurrection of old and emergence of new warlords in northern, central and western Afghanistan. They will drift back towards their former supporters including Iran, Russia, Central Asian Republics (CARs) and India. The only difference this time will be that if the U. S. decides on pulling back from eastern and southern Afghanistan, then it will be relying more on non-Pushtuns. If the next round of violence crosses a certain threshold then the first step will be the fracture of the fledgling Afghan army along ethnic lines. The northern, central and western Afghanistan may come under a loose alliance on the lines of old Northern Alliance. This will be the start of the road for another round of civil war or de facto partition of the country.
Opposition to Afghan government and U.S. troops is not monolithic and these players are also now positioning themselves for coming changes. Taliban is a generic term used for a number of groups operating in Afghanistan. Some Taliban fighting on the platform of removal of foreign forces also want to position themselves for the power struggle after U.S. pull back. This is the group most likely to participate in negotiations. Their aim will be to get some levers of state power to strengthen their ranks for the next round as well as preventing the take over of leadership by more extreme Taliban groups. However, they will also go with their own ‘surge’ to extract maximum in the negotiations. They will increase operations not only in the south but will try to engage international and Afghan troops in the east and start significant operations in northern Pushtun settlement pockets where coalition troops are thinly spread. Focus will be mainly on line of communications and bombings.
In 2008-09, small numbers of Taliban started to trickle back in northern Pushtun settlements and gradually increased control of local Pushtun communities.14 Taliban groups organizing and operating in Pushtun settlements in the north are coming in direct conflict with Hizb-e-Islami- Hikmatyar (HIH) group. The battle lines are already being drawn in the Pushtun settlement communities in the north. HIH has strong influence in these northern communities especially in Konduz. When the Taliban started to make inroads in these Pushtun communities, HIH was alarmed. NATO troops deployed in these areas were focused on reconstruction and were not in the fighting business. Arrival of U.S. troops gave HIH an opportunity to use U.S. firepower and purse to diminish Taliban influence. No one should be surprised if good actionable intelligence against Taliban in these areas start coming from HIH cadres. Afghan Taliban groups who genuinely believe in their own puritan version of governance based on the Sharia and those closely allied with foreign militants entrenched in Pakistan’s tribal areas will likely take extreme positions but will directly confront other power holders later in the game. Their best chance to expand their influence will be when the internal power struggle among other Afghan groups becomes violent with significant deterioration of overall security. The conflict between Afghanistan based Taliban and Pakistan-sponsored Taliban will also be later in the game when these groups are able to hold large swaths of territory and start to administer them openly.
Everyone is hailing the negotiations track and it is an important step, however it should be seen in the historical context of Afghanistan. There should be no illusion about the power games. In the previous civil war, deeply religious and conservative Afghan leaders were literally pushed inside the Kaba, the holiest place of Islam where they signed on the holy Quran and promised to work together and avoid violence. The moment they landed back in Afghanistan, they engaged in such a horrific cycle of violence that citizens of Kabul looked at the days of Soviet occupation with nostalgia. If anyone thinks that Afghans will adhere to any deal signed under the shadow of the Star Spangled Banner is either naïve or smoking the stuff that is now the major export of Afghanistan. Afghans will play by the rules of the Afghan game which will look more like Buzkushi rather than baseball. Unfortunately, the next act of this play will most likely be another cycle of violence and that also of local flavor (in the not too distant cycle of civil war, wholesale slaughter of opponents was the norm rather than exception). Afghans tend to blame outsiders for all their woes but ignore the fact that it was their own kin that decided to carry the rifles of strangers to kill their own countrymen rather than working for an inclusive political solution.
The best thing for the war ravaged proud people of Afghanistan will be some kind of power sharing arrangement among Afghan centers of power and ethnic communities so that ordinary citizen can rebuild his life. Current relatively balanced structure of government can be used as a platform on which an inclusive and participatory system based on tolerance and respect can be expanded. A reasonably stable and responsible government is functional enough to allow basic economic activity. Along with this, transition from U.S. troops to troops from neutral countries under a new UN mandate over twelve to twenty four months period should be the next step. UN troops then maintain security and provide training of Afghan forces with the hope that over next six to eight years, Afghan central government is able to provide minimum security to its citizens. Afghan project will need international support but it is better to spend on reconstruction rather than destruction. Violence will be there but if it is kept below a certain threshold then it will be a blessing for Afghans and their neighbors.
‘This is Afghanistan. We cannot get on here without practicing deceit’. Yakub Khan to Louis Cavagnari 1879.15
Pakistan
‘Pakistan is in a tight spot; If GOP pressure on the Taliban succeeds, critics say it proves the GOP has leverage; If GOP pressure fails, critics complain that Pakistan opted not to use its leverage’. A Pakistani official to U.S. delegation, Islamabad, August 28, 200116
Pakistan is the only country that has to benefit the most from a relatively peaceful and stable Afghanistan and also the country that will suffer the most from the next round of violence. Surely, the Pakistani military leadership is responsible for many acts of omission and commission as far Afghanistan is concerned and the Pakistani State and society is experiencing the horrific fallout from that policy. However, Pakistan is not responsible for everything. Every one has contributed its fair share to the mess in Afghanistan. Pakistani generals are also not naive and know the consequences of these dangerous games but are either unwilling or unable to change the course. Then Director General of Inter Services Intelligence (DGISI) Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmad told U.S. ambassador Wendy Chamberlain on September 23, 2001 that ‘we will not flinch from a military effort, but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men. It will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now’.17 That explosion is now proving to be a serious hazard to Pakistan’s health. Pakistan’s initial cooperation with the U.S. in Afghanistan in the aftermath of September 11 was in a totally changed strategic environment. For the first time, Pakistani military leadership really felt that if they did not cooperate with the U.S. the rug would be pulled so they wisely chose to get out of the gun sights of Washington. However, since that time period things have changed dramatically both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The instability of Afghanistan has rolled right across the Durand Line with horrific consequences for Pakistan.
Pakistan is now working on the post-U.S. scenario in Afghanistan. Fearful of losing everything in Afghanistan, Pakistan is desperately trying to collect its own Afghan horses for the race. In this effort, the gulf between Islamabad and Washington is widening at a rapid pace. In the background of long standing mutual suspicion and frustration, each party is blaming others for its own failures – Washington is blaming Pakistanis for not doing enough especially not draining the swamp in North Waziristan and Pakistan is blaming Washington for not paying any attention to Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan and making their job difficult by trying to shove U.S. personnel in Pakistan’s face and rapidly escalating drone strikes.
Lack of public support for any project of cooperation with U.S. means that Pakistani government and military has to tread the path very carefully. So far, the Pakistan army kept the balance by cooperating to the extent where one or two drone attacks every few weeks was considered manageable to keep the lid on public relations problem as well as ripples inside the military ranks. The friction worsened recently with the attack of NATO helicopters on a Pakistani post killing three soldiers and a rapid escalation of drone attacks. This was coupled with selective leaks from U.S. officials to the media about Pakistan’s naughtiness. In retaliation, Pakistan closed the border for NATO supply trucks. It was quite clear to even a casual observer that the supply route is an ace card in Pakistan army’s hand, however it was expected not be shown in the game. The fact that the military brass has actually used this card by closing the road shows extreme frustration and anger of the senior brass.
The U.S. military operating in Afghanistan is convinced that to achieve limited military objectives inside Afghanistan, they need to take into consideration Pakistan based militants. This means increased operations on Pakistani side of the border, angering Pakistanis and putting a severe strain on bilateral relations. U.S. intelligence community deeply worried about wide array of extremists from different countries entrenched in FATA dramatically escalated the ‘drone war’. The anger and frustration building in U.S. against Pakistan will play out in a year or two. Extreme negative opinion among general public and Congress will make continuation of military and economic aid very difficult for any administration. The third ongoing round of wide ranging dialogue between senior Pakistani and U.S. officials in Washington is not likely to be a pleasant one for either party. There are two schools of thought in the U.S. strategic community. One that considers Pakistan as part of the solution and the other considers Pakistan as part of the problem. If the latter group gets an upper hand in the next round of strategic shift, then Washington may decide to call the Pakistan army’s bluff and that is when things can get very ugly. In that case, Washington will slow down the money and equipment pipeline to tighten the screws on Pakistani generals. This will be paralleled with bypassing Pakistan government and opening a direct channel and serious discussions with groups inside Pakistan i.e. ethnic, tribal and sectarian.
On the Pakistani side, in the background of extremely negative public opinion about U.S. and rising anger over rapid escalation of drones attacks, it is very difficult for any government, as well as military leadership to be seen working openly with U.S. The Pakistan army is already deployed frontally in large swaths of the country and the military leadership is genuinely concerned about overstretch. The recent devastating floods and destruction of infrastructure makes logistical support of several divisions deployed in the periphery of the state a nightmarish task. Pakistani military brass is fearful that in such circumstances it is not wise to open a new front in North Waziristan. They want to do it on their own timeline but unfortunately Islamabad and Washington time zones are poles apart. The problem of Pakistan army is that if decides on the operation, its own people accuse it of acting for U.S. rather than in its own interests. If it does not act, then it faces the ire of Washington. They are trying to walk a fine line and in the process getting hammered by both sides.
Everyone acknowledges Pakistan’s genuine security interests in Afghanistan, however many including informed Pakistanis disagree with the approach taken by the Pakistani military. The Military as an institution follows the path directed by the higher brass but the officer corps is not monolithic. Some are of the view that domestic extremism has replaced India as the major threat while others still adhere to the India centric theme and see everything through the Indian prism. Some see the presence of ‘free lance militants’ as a serious threat to Pakistan especially in the context of horrific violence unleashed on Pakistani society. However, there are others who still think that some of these ‘loose canons’ can still be meaningfully employed especially to secure Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan obsessed with India is again repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan by taking sides in a civil war. In the process, it is earning the hostility of a number of Afghans and they will surely pay Pakistan in the same coin in due time. Many Afghans have sworn this time that if the neighbors don’t mend their ways, they will send the demons of chaos right back across the border (referring to Pakistan and Iran).18
It looks that Pakistan has doubled the wages on the Afghan gambling table. There is a general impression among army officers that U.S. has already lost Afghanistan and on its way out. They assume that Afghan groups sympathetic to Pakistan will prevail in the next round. While the first part may be true but the second part of this assumption is highly dubious. This is a very dangerous assumption and reminiscent of short sighted policy of 1989. Pakistan needs to take into consideration ground realities in Afghanistan. It may have some proxies but there are significant negative feelings about Pakistan among Afghans of all ethnicities. ABC/BBC poll done in 2009 gives some insight into these feelings. Only 1% of Afghans considered Pakistan very favorable while 65% ranked it very unfavorable. 86% Afghans were of the view that Pakistan was having negative influence on Afghanistan while only 5% considered positive influence of Pakistan.19 In addition, many other powerful regional and international players on Afghan scene will resist Pakistan’s efforts. Pakistani brass is again ignoring the basic fact of what others can do? In the aftermath of disastrous assault on Jalalabad in 1989, someone asked then Afghan President Najibullah about why Pakistan’s efforts failed? A smiling Najibullah replied, ‘they had a great plan but they forgot a small detail. They never thought about what we will do?’20 The stakes for Pakistan are much higher in 2011 compared to 1989.
Pakistan is insisting that only those ‘good Taliban’ escorted by ISI should be given a seat at the negotiating table. Islamabad is tightening the screws on those Taliban who are negotiating independently with Karzai. Washington and Kabul, suspicious of Islamabad are trying their best to make a deal with some insurgents independent of Pakistan while fully aware that Pakistan can hinder these efforts. As far as Pakistan is concerned, keeping channels open with all Afghan players is one thing but juggling with ‘grenades’ is a serious business. Pakistan has genuine expectation that Afghanistan should not be used against its interests, however the follies of the past clearly show that trying to install proxies to achieve this goal ended not only in dismal failure but has actually worsened Pakistan’s security situation. The best thing for Pakistan is to keep channels open with all Afghans encouraging them to work in a broad based government. If Afghans decide to go for another round of violence, Pakistan’s efforts should be focused on how to prevent this fire from crossing the Durand Line. Taking sides in favor of one party at the expense of the other will surely backfire with serious negative fallout for Pakistan’s security. Pakistan is suffering from the effects of it’s polices in the previous cycle of civil war in Afghanistan and if it repeats the same mistake, the consequences for Pakistani state and society will be horrific.
Many Pakistani officers now admit that use of non-state actors for national security policy was a disastrous decision. None other than former army chief General Pervez Musharraf recently stated that ‘we poisoned Pakistani civil society for 10 years when we fought the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s’.21 If Pakistan insists on direct meddling in Afghanistan’s affairs then it should also be ready for the inevitable fallout of such myopic policies. Last few years have shown extreme vulnerability of Pakistan on several fronts including unresolved serious economic and political issues, complete alienation of Balochistan, violence in FATA and terrorism in major urban cities. Very little effort and investment can literally unravel the state of Pakistan.
The national security decision makers of Pakistan should remember that their primary task is to secure Pakistan and provide security to Pakistanis. All resources should be geared towards peace and stability of Pakistan. The first step towards right direction is introspection and dispassionate analysis of policies adopted in the past as well rational analysis of potential benefits as well as consequences of current polices. In the absence of that there is serious risk that senior military leaders of Pakistan may put everything on the gambling table of Afghanistan, including the very survival of the state as well as its ‘crown jewels’. It is important that there is an informed debate in parliament as well in media about the country’s Afghan policy.
The most desirable outcome for Pakistan is a reasonably stable and functional government in neighboring Afghanistan no matter of what ideological or political inclination. Pakistan’s major threat is now internal and even if Afghanistan becomes Switzerland, it will not solve Pakistan’s problems. Pakistan should encourage all Afghan power brokers towards a negotiated settlement and in return expect a neutral even if not a friendly Afghanistan. Pakistani decision makers should try their best from getting sucked into the vacuum in the aftermath of foreign troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan is blessing for Pakistan and a cooperative and friendly relationship will help in security and economic sectors improving life of ordinary Pakistanis and Afghans.
‘Once the dust settles in Afghanistan, it is the Pakistanis who will live with the results, long after other coalition partners have returned home’. U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlain, November 30, 200122
Iran
‘Your rifle is not loaded, but that’s not what my heart tells me’. A Kurdish proverb
Iran’s strategic environment changed dramatically when two hostile governments at Iran’s borders, Afghanistan and Iraq were removed by U.S. military intervention in 2001 and 2003. One kind of threat was replaced by another as presence of U.S. troops in two countries bordering Iran in the background of poor relations between two countries gave many sleepless nights to Iranian leaders. In both cases, Tehran followed a policy where it worked with U.S. installed governments in Baghdad and Kabul and channeled financial support to its favorites and helped them to extract maximum concessions in internal struggles. At the same time, it provided enough money and weapons in a discrete enough way to make sure that there was enough heat on U.S. troops.
Iran is in a conundrum where it is fearful of re-emergence of extreme Sunni power base near its border in Afghanistan while at the same time uncomfortable with long term entrenchment of U.S. forces sitting on its borders. Tehran will be very happy with an Iraq like outcome where major U.S. forces depart leaving behind a government that is not hostile to Tehran. Tehran supports non-Pushtun allies in Afghanistan as well as its only Pushtun horse of dubious past, Gulbadin Hikmatyar. Hikmatyar spent several years in Tehran after Pakistan dumped him in favor of the Taliban. In addition, there have been allegations of supply of weapons by Tehran to groups fighting U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Ayatollahs are smart enough to keep their Afghan portfolio diversified.
Iran is the only country that is worried about the negotiations with Taliban. Tehran feels that increased power to Taliban means drastic reduction in influence of its own favorites, mainly non-Pushtun factions. Iranian and Indian interests converge in Afghanistan in this context. Iran has increased its cooperation with India in Afghanistan and both countries are working on joint projects in Afghanistan including development of Chahbahar port in Iran and construction of Zaranj-Dilaram road in Afghanistan and ambitious project of Chahbahar-Iranshahar-Zahedan railway on to Milak in Afghanistan. These efforts are geared towards developing alternative routes of doing business with Afghanistan and Central Asia and as an instrument of ‘soft power’ in Afghanistan.
Iranian leadership is pragmatic and despite serious disputes with U.S. and public hostile posture, they focus on securing their own interest. In 2001, Iranians cooperated with U.S. on the sidelines in removal of Taliban and installation of new government. Tehran may be again willing to work with Washington to secure its interests in Afghanistan replicating similar efforts in Iraq. In August 2010, German representative to Afghanistan Michael Steiner visited Tehran to prepare the ground for getting Iran on board.23 In October 2010, Iran participated in high level meetings in Rome with U.S., NATO, UN, European Union (EU) and Afghan officials. Tehran’s representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Mohammad Ali Qanezadeh led Iranian delegation in these talks.24
If Iran tries to repeat its mistakes of the past by using its Afghan proxies in Afghan civil war as well as Shia-Sunni rivalry then it will also suffer from the consequences. It will bring in Saudi Arabia as well as Pakistan on the opposite side. In addition, destabilized Afghanistan will be used by those hostile to Tehran to stir trouble. Alienation in Sistan-Baluchistan province of Iran can be used to create a bad headache for Tehran.
Working relations with all players despite differences may help in preventing more problems in Afghanistan. If both Tehran and Washington show restraint, cool down rhetoric and focus on common interest of stability of Afghanistan, it will pay dividend in the long run to both countries. Conciliatory tone in both countries on this issue and Washington’s move to separate talks with Tehran on Afghanistan from other explosive issues especially Iran’s nuclear program are a step in right direction. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan is in Tehran’s best interest and it has the potential of integrating Iran’s economy with Central Asia. This is a win-win game for all players. The best outcome will be where regional players including Iran compete in economic activity and reconstruction of the region rather than fighting proxy wars.
Saudi Arabia
‘A foolish man may be known by six things: Anger without cause, speech without profit, change without progress, inquiry without object, putting trust in a stranger, and mistaking foes for friends’. An Arab proverb.
In 1980s, Saudi Arabia provided money and arranged for some Arab foot soldiers for the Afghan war in cooperation with Pakistan. When U.S. disengaged from Afghanistan in 1990s, Saudi influence increased as they were writing the checks. Saudi Arabia got a rude awakening when the demons nurtured in Afghanistan came back home turning their guns on the royal family.
Now Saudi Arabia needs to keep an eye on the region and increase liaison with Pakistani intelligence to make sure that no demons sneak back into the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia hosted participants of Afghan negotiations and brought some Taliban to the table. However, they insist on one condition that Taliban cut ties with Al-Qaeda that just recently again announced its intention to strike at the royal family.
Saudi Arabia initially supported Afghans against Soviet occupation but later got entangled in Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan, in the context of old Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shia sectarian war in competition with Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia are equally guilty of engaging in a fratricidal war in Pakistan and Afghanistan. One hopes that both Riyadh and Tehran have learned their lessons after seeing the tragic consequences in their own lands where suicide bombers have targeted government officials and ordinary citizens. Tehran and Riyadh are poles apart on several issues but keeping channels open to avoid misunderstanding and working together on issues of mutual interests such as stability of Afghanistan and cooperation against extremist threat will benefit both countries. A constructive and positive contribution of Saudi Arabia towards negotiations in Afghanistan will benefit the kingdom in the long run.
India
‘The Indians think that we should not withdraw our troops completely, or in any case, to “move fast without rushing”.’ Mikhail Gorbachev in Politburo Session, January 21, 1987 25
India traditionally had good relations with Afghanistan. With the emergence of the Taliban, India lost everything in Afghanistan. It continued to support the Northern Alliance with the help of Iran and CARs but its impact was limited. Afghanistan became India’s national security problem in the context of relationship of militants operating in Indian controlled Kashmir with Afghan and Pakistani militants. In the aftermath of arrival of U.S. troops, India’s old Afghan friends in the Northern Alliance got important posts in government. Cooperation between newly reconstituted Afghan intelligence, National Security Directorate (NSD) and Indian intelligence (especially Research and Analysis Wing assigned with external intelligence task) improved over the years due to common threat perception from militants. India’s focus so far has been on ‘soft power’ mainly engaging in reconstructing projects and training of Afghans in India. Currently, there are about 4000 Indian workers in Afghanistan. After attacks on India workers, India sent a contingent of Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) to guard Indian workers and facilities in Afghanistan and current number of ITBP is about 500.26
Increased Indian activities in Afghanistan rattled Pakistanis and they complained that Indians were working with Baloch separatists to destabilize Balochistan province. India accused Pakistani intelligence of supporting and encouraging insurgents to attack Indian targets in Afghanistan. India publicly accused ISI of orchestrating the attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008 that killed Indian Defence Attaché Brigadier Ravi Dutt Mehta. Pakistani military conveyed its own misgivings repeatedly and forcefully to Washington and American policy makers now had to take into consideration Pakistan’s concerns. This was the main reason that Washington informed India to limit its engagement in Afghanistan to reconstruction projects. By 2009, this factor was important enough that U.S. commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal reported in his assessment that, ‘While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures in Afghanistan or India’.27 In view of decade’s old animosity between the two countries and shifting sands, there is a clear and present danger of escalation of proxy war between India and Pakistan on Afghan ground.28
There is a risk of serious miscalculation by both sides. If Pakistan encourages more violence against Indian interests in Afghanistan then it is very likely that hawks in Indian security establishment advocating a more aggressive posture may get an upper hand. This will result in increase in numbers of Indian paramilitary troops to guard Indian workers as well as intelligence assets. The argument for this policy will be that it is better to fight militancy in Afghanistan rather than on Indian soil as many militant organizations engaged in Kashmir against Indian forces have links with groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas as well as Afghanistan. On the other hand, if India takes some provocative actions regarding Balochistan, then a startled Pakistani military brass may target Indian interests in Afghanistan.
India’s main interest in Afghanistan is to make sure that the soil of Afghanistan is not used against its interests. The same is true in case of Pakistan. Understanding between India and Pakistan of not using Afghanistan against the other should be the first step towards right direction. Both countries have suffered from self inflicted wounds and every effort should be made by both sides to avoid a proxy war in Afghanistan. Engagement of diplomatic, military and intelligence communities of both countries and frank discussion about mutual fears and interests and an informed debate in their societies may have some restraining influence. It is an open secret that both countries are running robust intelligence gathering operations in Afghanistan however it is crucial for national security decision makers of both countries to show extreme restraint.
The most desirable outcome will be to bind economic interests of the two countries in projects involving CARs, Afghanistan, Iran, India and Pakistan. The hope will be that if both countries make more money by cooperation, they will be less inclined to pull the gun at the slightest provocation. For a change, may be the leaders of both countries can try competition in reconstruction rather than destruction in Afghanistan and involvement in economic and energy projects beneficial to the people of both India and Pakistan.
“The consequences of that vacuum where Pakistan stepped in and meddled were horrendous for India. It’s a lesson no one in India is in the mood to learn again.” Harsh Pant, professor of defense studies at King’s College London.29
Central Asian Republics (CARs)
‘Whatever you put in your pot comes to your spoon’.
A Turkmen proverb
Main fear of all CARS is extremism and violence coming to their lands from the Afghan gate. Three CARs; Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan share border with Afghanistan. CARS Afghan dilemma is complicated by conflicting pressures from Washington and Moscow, ethnic kin in Afghanistan and links of domestic violent opposition with militant groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Turkmenistan policy has been positive neutrality and working with any group that comes to power in Afghanistan. It has paid dividends and Turkmenistan has been able to avoid serious fallout. Main advantage of Turkmenistan is that its ethnic kin are very small in number in Afghanistan and country does not have a serious armed opposition that can use unstable Afghanistan as safe haven.
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are not as lucky as Turkmenistan. There is a significant Tajik presence in Afghanistan and a civil war in Tajikistan in early 1990s embroiled Afghan elements in it. Uzbekistan supported fellow Uzbeks in Afghanistan and Uzbek opposition most notably Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) used Afghan territory to fight government of Uzbekistan. In addition to these domestic and regional factors, CARs have to walk a fine line to avoid antagonizing powerful players especially U.S. and Russia. U.S. has been pushing CARs for more access for bases and transit facilities for its Afghan operation while Russia uses economic and diplomatic levers to prevent entrenchment of U.S. outposts in its backyard.
The most desirable outcome for CARs is a stable and peaceful Afghanistan that can act as a corridor for trade to outside world. This will benefit all regional economies and improve condition of local populations. A reasonable and stable Afghan government will likely not allow opposition groups from CARs to operate from its territory.
Conclusion
‘There is tiredness of Afghanistan everywhere – in Afghanistan itself, and in Pakistan, and in our country, and in the entire world’. Mikhail Gorbachev, January 21, 198730
Every country wants to secure its own narrow interests in Afghanistan and each country is hedging its bets as well as funding its Afghan proxies. In any national security decision making process, one cannot simply look at the credit side of the ledger and totally ignore the debit side. For every future gain there is also possibility of some serious fall out for national security. Continued presence of large number of American troops as well as large scale kinetic operations will continue to inflame passions not only in eastern and southern Afghanistan but also among Muslims worldwide.
This aspect is often neglected in discussion about the cost of war. Presence of U.S. troops in Iraq was like adding fuel to the fire of extremism in Muslim countries and departure of troops from that theatre has significantly reduced the anger. The Afghan theatre was not as violent in the early stages therefore its impact was not significant compared to Iraq. However, now with increasing violence and especially rapid escalation of extremism in neighboring Pakistan as well as threat of domestic violence from inflamed passions of American Muslims, should be a reason for strategic pull back. Then Secretary of State Collin Powell correctly diagnosed the problem a few years ago and said that ‘folks are tired of getting slapped around by the United States. They’ve stopped listening’.31
Frontal deployment of U.S. troops in Muslim countries is one of the major factors aggravating the situation. It was presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia long after the end of hostilities that was used as recruiting poster by militant groups all over the Muslim world. Attack on Iraq infuriated Muslims all over the world with devastating consequences for several countries. Now a responsible transition in Afghanistan and withdrawal of U.S. troops is the next logical step. Parallel to planning for an endgame in Afghanistan with gradual pull back of troops, focus on close cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies of regional countries will likely improve security than kinetic military operations.
Conflict does not follow a predetermined or desired pattern. It is a dynamic process that evolves with time and strategies to tackle it also evolve. Every action generates new ground realities. The most desired way forward is cooperation among all Afghan and regional countries to work together towards stability of Afghanistan. This should be coupled with a framework for withdrawal of American troops over twelve to twenty four months time period. A new U.N. mandate with troops from neutral countries can be used in the transition period where Afghan national army is strong enough to support a central government. Afghans can then decide among themselves whether to live together in peace, fight another round with each other or separate. Informed debate among populations of all involved countries demanding peace, stability and economic progress and encouraging people to people contact to understand each other better can be a much solid foundation for peace and progress. Public pressure from their own informed citizens can have some restraining effect on all governments. More transparency in higher decision making process and public debate regarding various options about ending the conflict can pay much rich dividends in the long run. Genuine efforts by all players and active engagement of civil societies for the better and peaceful future are an effort worth taking.
‘A real friend is one who takes the hand of his friend in times of distress and helplessness.’ An Afghan proverb
Acknowledgement
Author thanks many for their valuable input although conclusions as well as all errors and omissions are author’s sole responsibility. Special thanks to Saifullah Ahmadzai; an Afghanistan based independent analyst for his insightful information about regional players.
Notes
1. Donald Rumsfeld, September 08, 2003, (http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3144
2. Amy Belasco. Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations since 9/11. September 2, 2010. Congressional Research Service. (http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf
3. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%205%201986-11-13%20Politburo%20on%20Afghanistan.pdf
4. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%206%201987-01-21%20Politburo%20Session%20Afghan.pdf
5. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html and http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/world/14biden.html
6. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%206%201987-01-21%20Politburo%20Session%20Afghan.pdf
7. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124994313594220571.html
8. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070905599.html
9. This conclusion is based on author’s interviews with a number of Muslims from different backgrounds including Pakistan, Iran, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Turkey, Arabs and Kurds over the last few years.
10. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc03.pdf
11. For details of some of these intrigues see Mathieu Aikins. India in Afghanistan. The Caravan, October 2010 http://www.caravanmagazine.in/Story.aspx?Storyid=514&StoryStyle=FullStory
12. http://www.caravanmagazine.in/Story.aspx?Storyid=514&StoryStyle=FullStory
13. http://www.thenation.com/article/afghan-lobby-scam
14. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/08/28/74543/talibans-growth-in-afghanistans.html
15. Quoted in David Lyon. In Afghanistan (New York: Palgrave, 2009), p. 84
16. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc03.pdf0
17. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc08.pdf
18. Author’s interview with a source with in-depth knowledge about Afghan-Pakistan affairs.
19. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_02_09afghan_poll_2009.pdf
20. Author’s interview with a source present during that meeting.
21. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,721110-2,00.html
22. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc11.pdf
23. http://www.iran-daily.com/1389/5/21/MainPaper/3750/Page/3/Index.htm
24. http://www.google.com/hosted-news/ap/article/ALeqM5irILB7LXr1dIgm SwDkhF9slnwsoA?docld=60aed22440 644972b650bd59b5963970
25. http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NS AEBB/NSAEBB272/Doc%206°/0201987 0 1 21*/020Politburo°/020SessiOn°/020Afghan.pdf
26. “http://www.cfrorg/publication/17474/i ndiaafghanistan_relations.html
27. “http://media.washingtonpost.com/ w p srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Re dacted 092109.pdf
28. “Salfullah Ahmadzai. India and Pakistan: Proxy War in Afghanistan. http://www.caps.af/Doc/Microsoft°/020Wo 2 0 – 20June%20Indie/020and°/020Pakistan °/020proxy°/020war°/020in°/020Afghani.pdf
29. “http://www.time.com/time/world/arti cle/0,8599,1945666,00.html#ixzz12G2 Rlgtm
30. http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NS AEBB/NSAEBB272/Do0/0206°/0201987 0 1 21°/020Politbure/020Session°/020Afgha n.pdf
31. “Bob Woodward. The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008). p. 51
