DEFENCE NOTES

 
For her nefarious designs on Pakistan, India had obtained complete backing of the Soviet Union, both, in terms of military supplies to augment its offensive strength quickly; and politically, to ensure that all Security Council efforts at cease-fire were nullified by Soviet vetoes. As is known to all, the Soviet Union obliged India most willingly, both, in terms of arms supplies and for the number of vetoes. What is not known to all is that a newly raised Indian Cavalry Regiment equipped with Russian T-80s/72s had waited impatiently to attack West Pakistan, only to mutiny when the cease -fire came through, for having been kept in the Rajasthan desert for months to no final purpose. The Pakistan Navy and the city of Karachi were not so lucky and both suffered because of surprise introduction of the Soviet supplied missile boats. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed in 1971 also prevented China from giving any direct military assistance to Pakistan when India finally attacked..

A further cursory military analysis of the three wars shows that in 1948/49 most units of Pakistan Army were abroad carrying out occupation duties for the World War II Allies and yet with the help of civilian armed forces we were able to defeat the attainment of India's objectives in Kashmir. The Air Force, too, was hardly in any shape at that time. Even so and despite Indian air superiority, which in terms of multiples must have been many times more than it is today, the Royal Pakistan Air Force (as PAF was called at that time) performed its missions most successfully in Kashmir. At sea, India was able to occupy the three Pakistani States of Junagadh, Mangrol and Munavader without any opposition, as the (Royal) Pakistan Navy was yet in a state of being organised and none of its ships coming from the Bombay dockyard was in fighting trim.

The sixties was the period of hey-day for the Army and the Air Force. Not only the two services had superior weapons and equipment than their adversary, but the Pakistan Defence Forces had had the additional benefit of world's best possible training, courtesy United States Military Aid Programme. Despite all these, plus other advantages, neither was the Armour able to make the expected break through into East Punjab nor the Air Force able to prevent the concentration of Indian Armour on Pakistan's borders and from creating the scene for the world's largest tank battle since WW II close to the city of Sialkot; nor prevent the daily Indian Air Force raids on Karachi or Sargodha. These were not failings, not by any means, but the outcome of realities of disparity in the size of forces of the two countries which, except for the Will of God, cannot be overcome in the foreseeable future either. No amount of limited sophistication in any single or multiple fields of defence can overcome this handicap. Even any limited sophistication under existing financial constraints; whether on land or at sea or in the air; is just unthinkable and therefore must remain a pious hope till better times. However, all this, should in no way detract us from extolling the heroic deeds performed during that war by individuals or units of the Army and the Air Force. Official recognition should also be given to the Pakistan Navy's, still un-rewarded, bombardment of Dwarka, by the surface fleet two hundred miles from Karachi.

What happened in 1971, was nothing more or better than aa bail mar'. On the 27th anniversary of the launching of military operation in Dhaka, which falls on 25 March,

It is still not clear what was the aim or purpose of the rulers of the country at that time, in unleashing events which ultimately led to the dismemberment of the country and brought nothing but humiliation to a brave force, though badly led, which in military operations had performed well beyond what it was called upon to do, by its masters in Rawalpindi.

On the other hand, the force in the West, which was to teach India a lesson, and by an offensive defend East Pakistan, just buckled under without even a fight.

After the Indian invasion in the Jessore Sector on 21 November, 1971 the Government first hesitated to act either at the UN or in the field in the West, causing the French equivalent of our Deputy DG ISI, and also a Desk Officer in the French Foreign Office, on whom the Ambassadors of Pakistan and India usually called for official purposes, to remark to me as the Army & Naval Attache in Paris, It seems Pakistan has something up its sleeve'. And then, according to Mr Roedad Khan quoting the then CGS in his book, when under public pressure the military strike was finally launched in the West on 3 December, 1971; neither the Air Force; for all its readiness, strength of its effort and pre-emptive nature of the strikes; was able to cause much dent to Indian capabilities; on land, sea or the air; for reasons beyond its control; nor was the Pakistan Strike Force able to debouche itself from Multan for reasons better not mentioned. The Navy, after suffering losses at sea from missile attacks, remained a force in being' in harbour. All this happened in the West when a good portion of the Indian military might was concentrated in the East and there was closest possible parity of forces amongst the adversaries in the Western sector.

The most important lesson which stands out of the above narration is, that the country came out the best when the people and the Army were allied in defending the country. That the nation fared well when the people supported the armed forces in the defence of the frontiers. That with the people and the defence forces at cross purposes, the outcome is not good for any of the three parties i.e., the people, the armed forces and the country. This is a lesson which, in the interest of all, should never be lost sight of in the future.

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