Army and Terrorism in Sindh

Independent Columnist Brig (Retd) RAJA KHURSHID AHMAD looks at the army's role in containing terrorism in SINDH

The Army employment and deployment in internal security (IS) role in aid of civil power is authorized in the constitution. And a full chapter is devoted to it in PAA. A well documented Pamphlet on IS Duties exists. In case of a serious law and order situation, of a local nature, the DC can make a direct request on the nearest Army commander for Army aid in IS role. In 1951 (Qadyani Movement), Martial law was imposed in Lahore. Mr Bhutto imposed a 'Funny Martial Law (ML), termed as 'M.L in aid of civil power' in three towns; the worst affected was Karachi. But in no case, Lahore 1951. Language Riots in Sind, Karachi in 1972 and 1997 etc. The ultimate objectives were achieved. No doubt Army, in each case restored law and order in shortest possible time. But failed to leave / achieve any lasting effect because:-

a. Short duration.
b. Limited role.

In 1977, military in aid of civil power, Karachi, Gen Arbab restored normality in law and order in a short time. But instead of kicking the police and civil administration to stand up and resume their normal responsibility as front line authority, he was side tracked to unwanted non-military duties to prove that the Army was panacea for all the ills of civil administration and society. For example:

a. Operation cleaning road and city.
b. Provision of drinking water by constructing private water tanks within houses. Thank God, response was luke warm and short lived, otherwise, water diseases would have sprouted in epidemic form.
c. Investigation and witch hunting, in the affairs of Defence Housing Society and KESC. No doubt each one of the measure was 'welfare' oriented. But within 3 months, lasting and complete results were not achievable.

Also local administration - top to bottom was not pleased with the Army role; they were inwardly against any Army operation except to stop killing, raids and law and order. No tears were shed on Army's withdrawal to barracks. Army earned a bad name inspite of all the good done by them. In case of a similar situation in future, already lurking terrorism in Karachi etc., Army must ask to get a clear-cut mandate and free hand to achieve the allotted mission; no more 'pangaas' within the time frame-work. Army must not be relegated to the level of Police/Rangers or be expected to work under the direction of local civil administration. In fact local DC and SP must work as advised and directed by the local military commander, who will be directly under the control of the highest working military commander in the area - Sindh province or Karachi/Hyderabad Divisions. I speak and recommend from personal experience; as Sector Commander Hyderabad Division (Distt Hyderabad, Thatta, Dadu, Sanghar, Mirpurkhas) in 'language riots and killings of 1972'.

a. DC and SP were to translate into practice, any measures recommended by local Army commander. They must not be allowed any feet shuffling/dragging and playing politics.
b. Police (and civil admin) must be compelled to do their normal duty under the umbrella of IS role of Army. Troops must not be used to assume police function. Troops must not be used for street lining of VIP or processions, when allowed. Avoid using military transport; ask DC to requisition civil transport. As the situation improves, VP. guards be provided by the police, as this is their normal routine duty.

Holding of public meetings, taking out of processions, imposition (and relaxation) of curfew, mounting of anti-dacoit and terrorist operation and all IS (Internal Security) role meetings and activities like removing of illegal construction or occupation of government land and property which requires Army, Civil Administration and Police coordination must be held at Army HQ and presided by the local Army commander. He should dictate and not take dictation while every cooperation, help, assistance and cordiality must be extended. The authority of Military Commander should not be diluted. City administration must know and accept that Army has been called in aid of civil power and will therefore remain in overall control of the situation; in particular law and order.

Revenue limits and administrative boundaries of a district may be adjusted for allotting law and order duties to local subordinate commander. For example, Jamshoro is part of Dadu District. But for IS role only, it was made part of Hyderabad District and the same Battalion Commander and DC/SP were made responsible for IS role both for Hyderabad and Jamshoro. The arrangement worked efficiently. A platoon was located within the Jamshoro University premises; more as a show of force for the students. The Vice Chancellor felt hurt; he took it as hostile interference in the affairs of the university. I along with DC went to his office and after explaining the purpose of stationing a token force within the university, I told him firmly 'Sir, I am withdrawing the platoon. But in case of any trouble by the students, you will be held responsible. No troops will come to your aid, unless a written requisition is made to me and the DC. 'He was all tamed. I assured him that troops will not be used in active role, unless the V.C. personally asked the Platoon Comd for help and also informed me. Later on, it transpired, that presence of the troops was conveyed wrongly to him as anti-trust move by the Provincial Government and to sort out his authority. I never met him again and no student trouble of any kind manifested in Jamshoro. I made it a routine drill for a Platoon mobile column to go into the interior urban area of each district, stop at every PS/Post en route and spend the wight in the open and outside a designated P.S. The police and revenue was informed of the route and itinerary of the mobile column so that public en route is informed accordingly. Dadu district interior, in particular Zullekhan PS, was considered to be sanctuary of dacoits, killers and bandit gangs. As army was not entrusted with the task of mounting anti-dacoit operation, no mobile column or even night camps was fired upon. Similarly, on every Sunday, I along with local Battalion Commander and SP, will move throughout the city, in any flag jeep with minimum escort. The police escort in one open transport were to lead. It was very reassuring to see the route street roads clean with no obstruction. The Army presence was welcome as we solely confined troops' deployment and employment for the purpose of maintaining law and order in IS role. Once, during a solo visit to Latifabad with one jeep escort, I found a street, all lined up of burning tyres across the road and about a dozen boys enjoying the fun. No sooner my jeep stopped, they all ran away into the adjoining houses and doors were shut. I went to the nearest house, knocked at the door and out came one male with a lady with folded hands. They beseeched that it was not their mischief (burning of tyres and blocking of roads). I ordered him to fetch a pale of water to throw it on the burning tyres. The message was soon conveyed and welcomed by a few more volunteers who started throwing water. I then asked them to remove the tyres from the road which they did without a murmur.

They were all 'six new Sindhis'. I told them to let it be known in entire Latifabad that if, hereafter, any burning of tyres causing any road block was done, the owner of the houses on either side of the road block, will be arrested and the entire street population will be collectively fined. I told them firmly, that it is parents, it is their moral duty to check and control their children from doing any such mischief or cause nuisance value.

All of them promised to abide by my advice. And throughout the troops stay for 3 months, very cordial relationships developed among new and old Sindhis and troops. We did no flag march in the area of Hyderabad and Latifabad. However, occasionally mobile patrolling, both by day and night was done. The troops' presence was welcomed and greeted. Language riots were both politically and administratively motivated and because of involvement of local and provincial administration, the political problem was converted into a law and order problem, styling it into an exaggerated form as mass killing both by old and new Sindhis.

Leaders on both sides were to be blamed for selfish vested political interest. The new Sindhis (now MQM) leadership never accepted their status as 'Guest' of the old Sindhis as 'Host'. You can't impose your language, your culture and your right over the real old Sindhi population - 'The host'. Perhaps, MQM should be grateful to old Sindhis, who welcomed and sheltered them by opening Khokrapar route to them. Because Frontier and Punjab had declined to accept any more refugees, other than coming from East Punjab. All lands, houses, factories and other wealth left behind by Hindu migrates was given to new Sindhis.

The role and employment of Army in anti-terrorist operation calls for different tactics and strategy. Army at the outset should make it clear to the civil administration, (federal and provincial level) that Army will undertake this duty as a military operation using Army tactics and use of all small weapons held by them, if necessary. Terrorists must not be shown any mercy as is normally extended in IS role.

Terrorists are no patriots. Collective responsibility for harbouring terrorists within a street and ward, must be fixed and shared. The informers must be protected and rewarded.

The area must be divided into blocks covered by roads/streets which should be blocked and cordoned by troops. The troops should leap frog over the roofs and into the houses. Where entry to a house occupied by a terrorist, is blocked, then entry be forced by combination use of Beehive charges for demolition of a wall/roof, smoke grenaded followed by tear gas grenades. Terrorist, who resist surrender should be 'shoot to kill'.

Sum UP

The role of Army in 'Aid of Civil Power' or as new developing in a sort of mini 'Martial Law in aid of Civil Power', both are provided constitutional protection. It is serious duty. The duty must be performed with utmost impartiality, dedication and all army officers must be firm and just.

They must show no leniency to dacoits, murderers and terrorists. Once an anti-terrorist operation is launched, it must be executed methodically and terrorists mopped up in easily defined and publicly announced phases so that those who want to surrender can do so with ease. Army must remain both accessible and kind to the lawful citizen. The wounded must be provided succour. The dead must be helped to bury no contempt or malice to those terrorists who fall wounded or dead. Those who surrender should be given due protection, as promised.

The authority of civil government - District administration and police and CAF, should be rehabilitated effectively. Let this be seen by the public; use of television and print media be made to give civil administration (DC, Police and CAF), a better and active coverage in dealing with all aspects of law and order.

Military courts need no advice except:-

It is better to err in acquitting an accused rather than to punish an innocent person/accused'.

Give a speedy and fair trial and a befitting punishment.